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1Chapter 1
Introduction: digitalization of
economy and related issues
1.1 The era of digitalization
Year by year we are witnesses of fast transformation of our society, of our habits,
of our life thanks to new technologies and new ways of interaction. On one side
it is impossible not to state that a great benefit for us comes from this digital revo-
lution, on the other side new challenges come for us in terms of deregulation and
obsolescence of the current rules system. It is not always easy to face new situations
linked to innovation by using standard tools. Moreover the intangibility of these
new means and the widening of the range of their action contribute to blur national
borders and call for a new international law system.
We should consider in this context the interest for this phenomenon showed by sev-
eral governments and their demand for regulation addressed to international insti-
tutions, such as the European Commission (EC) or the OECD.
Before wrestling, however, with these issues and how they have been so far faced by
single governments and supranational organizations, we ought to outline the main
questions arisen by digitalization.
The connectivity between users and devices generates a huge data exchange. Gen-
eral and personal data is collected by businesses and governments and used to de-
velop and offer services in order to answer old and new needs. It is the good side
of the digital revolution, but other issues, less clear and not always positive, come
when innovation advances. Indeed, new technologies raise concerns linked to trans-
parency, control and security of personal information, and related legal jurisdiction.
The novelty and intangibility of this economy allow to create businesses not sub-
jected to any national laws. This aspect constitutes an additional benefit with respect
to traditional “brick and mortar” businesses, especially in terms of fiscal gains.
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1.1.1 Main features
Digital markets present several features. They have doubtlessly allowed businesses
to locate some stages of their production chain across different countries, exploiting
local advantages, economic and not. Furthermore, digital markets have made possi-
ble to address customers worldwide without actual physical presence, or as the EC
says without a “permanent establishment”.
Another key element consists of the growing use of IP assets, like software and al-
gorithms, as base for building platforms and websites. Their relative weight in the
chain value has been growing year by year.
In addition, digital enterprises are commonly characterized by data exploitation,
user participation, network effects and the provision of user-generated content. The
degree of active and passive user participation can be seen as a form of “free” work,
as stated by Colin and Collin (2013), when it contributes to create value for busi-
nesses.
These markets are characterized by direct and/or indirect network effects. Utility
from the consumption of a specific good or service can depend on the number of
other end-users consuming the same good or service, for instance trip or food re-
view sites, or from the interaction between two groups, such as the users and the
advertisers of a social network.
High fixed costs, associated for instance to an algorithm development, and very low
variable costs allow digital platforms to exploit economies of scale. This feature, in
combination with huge switching costs, due do lock-in effects, gives them a great
market power. In fact, the biggest actors of digital platforms operate in a monopoly,
or at least oligopoly, by offering a specific and distinct service to users. As a result,
digital markets are often not competitive, since single firms can influence market
prices, reducing the consumer surplus of their users.
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A representative example of this world can be a social platform supported by adver-
tising revenue. A social network is a multi-sided platform that collects users’ data
and provides advertising services. It offers specific services to users in exchange of
a payment of a fee, which in some cases can be also zero. Moreover, it collects users’
data, not only linked to platform usage, but also personal information about habits,
tastes, and so on. On the other side of the market, the platform enables firms to reach
a target audience though advertising, and sometimes to sell directly their products
in an effective and efficient manner. Revenue may come from one of the two sides
of the market, or from both. However, digital businesses exploit personal data for
users’ experience improvement with the aim of selling more and better targeted ad-
vertising space to third parties, which may in turn increase their sales.
To conclude, the specific business model presented here is only one of many possi-
bilities to make profits through digitalization. It allows us to focus mainly on two
problems: the privacy protection of users and the unfair tax advantage with respect
to traditional businesses.
1.1.2 The data protection issue
Digital giants have built up profitable empires by observing their consumers’ online
behaviour and collecting their data. The importance of “big data” in new forms of
business raises two separate issues. First of all, as highlighted in the French Report
by Colin and Collin (2013), data are a relevant input in the value chain for many dig-
ital platforms, and users voluntarily, but sometimes not consciously, upload them
without an exchange of money. The absence of any financial transaction, but a de
facto barter transaction between data and services, makes the fiscal authorities un-
able to properly tax the benefit coming from their own citizens, creating a distortion
and an unfair advantage with respect to other sectors and businesses.
Moreover, a second problem is linked to the “fairness” of the exchange between
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users and platforms, in particular whether the users receive a fair share of the sur-
plus. In fact, the data exploitation, while providing a valuable service to users by
improving platform’s experience and targeted ads, instead of advertising junk, also
involves a cost in terms of privacy loss. This last aspect is more relevant when plat-
forms engage unknown intermediaries in the resale of data through opaque arrange-
ments, which finally results in a loss of control on the dissemination of personal data
to third parties, as Facebook–Cambridge Analytica data scandal1 has shown, for in-
stance.
The privacy cost associated with the use of new technologies has been tackled mainly
by the European Commission, and it is still an object of concern. Indeed, the EU
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) is the most important change in data
privacy regulation done so far. The aim of the GDPR directive is to protect all EU
citizens from personal data breaches in today’s data-driven world.
Nevertheless, solving this problem will require additional efforts and it will not be
easy to separate the blurring edge between benefits and costs of personal data.
1.1.3 The fiscal issue
A different problem linked to digitalization is that the current international corpo-
rate tax rules are not appropriate for the realities of the modern global economy and
fail to capture those businesses that make profits from digital services in a country
without being physically present there. Current tax system, moreover, fails to recog-
nise how profits are created in the digital world, in particular the role that users play
in generating value for digital companies. As a result, there is a “mismatch” between
where value is created and where taxes are paid, when they are.
According to European Commission (2018), “in the digital economy, value is often
created from a combination of algorithms, user data, sales functions and knowledge.
1See for instance the article on The Economist (2018).
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For example, a user contributes to value creation by sharing his/her preferences (e.g.
liking a page) on a social media forum. This data will later be used and monetised
for targeted advertising. The profits are not necessarily taxed in the country of the
user (and viewer of the advert), but rather in the country where the advertising al-
gorithms has been developed, for example. This means that the user contribution to
the profits is not taken into account when the company is taxed.”
The point here is that digital companies benefit from the same advantages and in-
frastructure as traditional businesses, such as high speed internet, roads, a stable
legal system and others. The problem is that often, they do not contribute by paying
their fair share of taxes in the countries they do business in.
To answer this necessity, so far, unilateral actions have been undertaken by single
governments, ending up with complex and not so clear law systems, causing double
taxation problems. In order to overcome the fear of facing as many fiscal authorities
as the markets that digital businesses serve, and to avoid excessive tax compliance
burdens, which could be a stop for innovation, there is today the need for interna-
tional rules. Under this reading key, the European Commission and the OECD are
seeking to find a shared solution, capable to cover as many cases as possible.
1.1.4 The European Commission proposal
On 21 March 2018, the European Commission proposed new rules to ensure that
digital business activities in the EU are taxed in a fair and growth-friendly way.
The Commission has made two legislative proposals:
• The first initiative aims to reform corporate tax rules, so that profits are regis-
tered and taxed where businesses have significant interaction with users through
digital channels. It is the Commission’s preferred long-term solution.
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• The second proposal responds to calls from several Member States for an in-
terim tax which covers the main digital activities that currently escape taxation
altogether in the EU.
The first proposal would enable Member States to tax profits that are generated in
their territory, even if a company does not have a physical presence there. The new
rules would ensure that online businesses contribute to public finances at the same
level as traditional “brick-and-mortar” companies.
A digital platform will be deemed to have a taxable “digital presence” in a Member
State if it fulfils one of these three criteria: more than e7 million in annual revenues,
or more than 100.000 users, or over 3.000 business contracts for digital services in a
Member State in a taxable year.
Moreover, the new rules will also change the way profits are allocated to Member
States to secure a real link between where digital profits are made and where they
are taxed. The measure could eventually be integrated into the scope of the Com-
mon Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB).
The second proposal suggests an interim tax aimed at generating immediate rev-
enues for Member States from those activities which are currently not effectively
taxed. Moreover, it would avoid unilateral measures to tax digital activities in cer-
tain Member States which could lead to a patchwork of national responses that
would be damaging for the EU Single Market.
Until the comprehensive reform has been implemented, the tax would apply to rev-
enues created from activities where users play a major role in value creation and
which are the hardest to capture with current tax rules. Examples are sales of online
advertising space, financial transactions on a platform when this can facilitate the
exchange of goods and services between users, sales of data generated from user-
provided information.
According to the proposal, tax revenues would be collected by the Member States
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where the users are located, and will only apply to big companies with total an-
nual worldwide revenues of e750 million and EU revenues of e50 million, whereas
smaller start-ups and scale-up businesses will remain unburdened.
Though the legislative proposals have not been applied so far, the EU actively con-
tributes to the global discussions on digital taxation within the G20/OECD, and
pushes for ambitious international solutions.
1.1.5 The OECD proposal
Tax challenges of the digitalization of the economy have been identified as one of
the main focus of the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Action Plan by the Or-
ganization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), in particular the
impossibility to ring-fence the digital economy as observed by the 2015 BEPS Action
1 Report.
A whole and deep analysis of this phenomenon has been the object of an Interim
Report, delivered in March 2018 by the Task Force on the Digital Economy (TFDE),
entitled “Tax Challenges Arising from digitalization - Interim Report 2018”. It pro-
vides a study of value creation across new and changing business models in the
context of digitalization and it identifies three frequently observed characteristics:
scale without mass has a direct consequence on the country’s taxing right; a heavy
reliance on intangible assets exploits uncertainties and opportunities to relocate in-
come; data and user participation play a crucial role in the chain value, but not in
profit allocation rules.
A common conclusive agreement has not yet been reached, though all the members
agreed to continue working together to a final report in 2020. Nevertheless, in the
Policy Note “Addressing the Tax Challenges of the digitalization of the Economy,
approved on 23 January 2019, the Inclusive Framework proposed two pillars as the
basis for consensus:
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• Pillar One tackles the allocation of taxing rights between different jurisdictions;
• Pillar Two focuses on developing a rule to “tax back” when the fiscal subject
faces a too low level of effective taxation in the jurisdictions having their pri-
mary taxing rights;
According to the former, the Inclusive Framework is looking for changes to the per-
manent establishment rule, giving space to new concepts, such as “significant eco-
nomic presence” or “significant digital presence”.
With regard to the latter, the global anti-base erosion (GloBE) proposal would ad-
dress the risk of profit shifting and the risk of un-coordinated, unilateral action, in
absence of a multilateral agreement, which would finally harm all countries, large
and small, developed and developing. It would consist of two inter-related rules: an
income inclusion rule to allow taxation when the effective tax rate is below a mini-
mum rate (this seems very similar to the actual CFC rules); and a tax on base eroding
payments which would deny a deduction or impose a withholding tax unless these
payments are at or above a minimum rate.
Although the OECD is currently working on an international solution for digital
taxation, a number of countries have recently taken, or are going to take, unilateral
measures to implement a digital services tax. We are showing in the next paragraph
who they are and how they are facing the digitalization issues.
1.1.6 The unilateral national answers
With no consensus on taxation of the digital economy, some countries have resorted
to unilateral measures. Such measures are broadly of four kinds:
1. alternative applications of the permanent establishment threshold (such as
“significant presence” tests or “virtual” permanent establishments);
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2. withholding taxes (in particular for industries such as advertising, broader def-
initions of royalties);
3. “equalization” levies on internet advertising and digital services taxes;
4. specific regimes to deal with large MNEs such as the UK and Australian Di-
verted Profit Taxes and the recent US Base Erosion Anti-Abuse Tax.
France is the last country where a digital services tax (DST) has been introduced, de-
spite the objections made by the United States. Starting from January 2019, the DST
is imposed at a rate of 3% on the gross revenues derived from digital activities of
which French “users” are deemed to play a major role in value creation. The law af-
fects all digital business models which have registered during the previous calendar
year revenue above one of the following two thresholds: e750 million for taxable
digital services supplied worldwide; or e25 million for taxable digital services sup-
plied in France.
Also Hungary has previously implemented a type of digital services tax, albeit only
for advertising in Magyar language.
Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Italy, Poland, Slovenia, Spain, and the United
Kingdom have all either announced or published a proposal to introduce a DST2.
Furthermore, worthy of note is the India’s introduction of “significant economic
presence” jointly with an equalization levy.
Of broader impact has been the United Kingdom’s Diverted Profits Tax which aims
at tackle profits that have been artificially diverted from the UK. Albeit it is not ad-
dressed to digital taxation, in fact, it can indirectly hit digital businesses3.
Suchlike is the Australia’s Multinational Anti-Avoidance Law (MAAL) and Aus-
tralia’s Diverted Profit Tax (DPT). The former is an anti-abuse rule limited in scope
2For a comprehensive review of actual state of rules see KPMG (2020)
3As regard to this, interesting is a study made by Liberini et al. (2020) which highlights the change
in strategy by Facebook after the introduction of the UK’s tax.
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to non-resident enterprises belonging to large MNEs. Through penalty, akin to the
cancellation of the tax benefit for MNE, the measure is targeted at deterring certain
taxpayer behaviours, such as the use of trade structures involving remote sales of
digital products and services. The latter is essentially designed to work as a deter-
rent and improve compliance with corporate tax rules and tax authorities.
Therefore, an increasing number of countries has unilaterally implemented a vari-
ety of measures aimed at protecting and/or expanding the tax base in the country
where the customers or users are located.
On one side, all these initiatives are taken to increase the level of taxation of digi-
talized businesses, but on the other side they are likely to generate some economic
distortions, double taxation problems, increased uncertainty and complexity, and as-
sociated compliance costs for businesses operating cross-border and, in some cases,
they may potentially conflict with some existing bilateral tax treaties.
In conclusion, digitalization is a hot topic and it requires attention by different agents,
among which economists who can contribute to the actual debate and shed light
on pros and cons of different policies aimed to tackle digital challenges. In the
next paragraph, we will account for the actual economic debate and the literature
achievements reached so far.
1.2 Research area for economists
Digital economy constitutes a fruitful field for economists for several reasons.
First of all, defining a digital MNE as a company operates in multi-sided markets,
where one group, for instance the users, affects the outcome for another group, such
as the advertisers, across a platform through positive or negative externalities, it
opens at the young branch of literature about two-sided platforms.
Their intrinsic characteristics like market power, economy of scale and economy of
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scope, externalities, are all related to topics which are well-known to Industrial Or-
ganization.
Moreover, the role of users and their data have some implications on how to mea-
sure economic value and on privacy cost.
The importance of targeted ads as unique or main source of revenue for global big
players revives the debate between informative versus persuasive advertising. In
addition, personal data allow also an in-depth knowledge of final users, a better
personal marketing campaign that ends in the capability for the sellers to discrimi-
nate the price not only among users but also at different time.
Behavioural economics looks at investigating social networks and their impact on
different aspects of consumer’s life through experiments, whose goal is to show the
irrationality of choices and how these are leaded by emotions. The zero-price effect
plays a key role, moving the consumer from an interior to a corner solution.
Furthermore, the absence of a link with a specific jurisdiction requires attention by
international researchers. In particular, tax competition among jurisdictions, cross-
borders issues, direct versus indirect taxation are all fields for empirical researches
to analyse the efficacy of unilateral fiscal policies and their relative consequences on
other countries.
Last but not least, the wealth concentration in a few big companies calls for dis-
tributional concerns and inequality issues. How to weight users’ utility through a
well-being function and the optimal tax problem are totally new research areas to be
developed.
1.2.1 The current literature
The branch of industrial organization studying multi-sided markets is still young,
and only in the last years it has been applied to digital businesses. It starts with
the seminal contributions of Caillaud and Jullien (2003), Rochet and Tirole (2003 and
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2006), and Armstrong (2006). Other contributions come recently by Belleflamme
and Toulemonde (2009 and 2016), Belleflamme and Peiz (2010), Weyl (2010). All
these models tend to emphasize mainly three features: the capability of a platform to
provide distinct services to two sides of the market, charging different prices (multi-
product firm); the (partial or total) internalization of the externalities present in the
markets (both cross network effects and intra-group externalities); finally, the fact
that platforms act as price setters (like monopolistic or oligopolistic, according to
different markets and business models) on both sides of the market and typically
(but not always) set uniform prices.
As for advertising issues, the dichotomy between informative and persuasive dates
back to the last century. The economic analysis of advertising begins with Marshall
(1890,1919) and Chamberlin (1933). Actually three views have emerged, with each
view in turn being associated with distinct positive and normative application: ad-
vertising as informative, persuasive or complementary. We refer to Bagwell (2007)
for a summary of the whole literature about advertising.
Here we look at the relevant role played by ads in catching consumers’ attention
and as main source of revenue for many digital businesses. Indeed, a growing num-
ber of platforms allows users to enjoy free services exposing them to ads in many
ways and through several instruments, which in some cases blurs the edge between
commercial and personal data. The so called “zero price effect” has been studied by
Shampanier, Mazar and Ariely (2007), the importance of catching users’ attention by
Prat and Valletti (2019), the “privacy paradox” by Esayas (2018), according to which
consumers express concern about their privacy but, in reality, they do very little to
protect it and they are usually willing to disclose information in order to access to
better quality services.
This last topic is related not only to economy, but in particular to law and psychol-
ogy, therefore it requires a multidisciplinary approach.
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Then we have a few papers that consider taxation in two-sided markets in general,
and digital economy in particular, trying in this way to respond to the need of knowl-
edge and research in how to tackle it, expressed also by supranational institutions,
like the European Commission and the OECD. These works present different set-
tings and different focus, but in some aspects, they are related to the issues already
presented above.
Kind et al. (2010, 2009, 2008) are mainly concerned by comparing the impacts of
ad valorem and unit taxes on fiscal revenues and on welfare in two-sided mar-
kets, with a specific focus on advertising-financed media. Kotsogiannis and Serfes
(2010) adress the issue of taxation of two sided platforms in terms of tax competi-
tion between countries. Tremblay (2016) studies optimal taxation of a monopolist
two-sided platform with two tax instruments, one on content and one on platform
itself. Bloch and Demange (2017) focus on the effect of taxes on privacy protection,
while Bourreau et al. (2017) assess the likely impacts of a tax on data collection
and a tax on ads on the platform’s business strategy and on fiscal revenues. Finally,
Belleflamme and Toulemonde (2016) focus on the effects of taxation for competing
two-sided platforms and how they are passed on pricing decisions.
All these works are theoretical and move into a monopoly or oligopoly framework.
In fact, there are very few empirical papers due to the lack of available data and the
fog around pricing strategy implemented by the biggest digital players.
1.2.2 Further future developments
There remains a very large number of research areas to investigate for economists,
and not only, in the field of digitalization. There are many interesting elements that
have not been investigated yet.
One aspect consists in the likely impact of unilateral choice made by a government
on well-being in home and foreign country. It would constitute an additional chapter
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to the broad literature on tax competition between countries, summed up by Keen
and Konrad (2012).
The role played by data and the aftermaths on data mining on users constitute an-
other chapter that has had too few attention.
How to build a well-being function which takes care of privacy, how preferences dif-
fer between individuals and social ones, what the sphere of action of a benevolent
government is and how it can act, are all questions that need answers.
1.3 The present work
The present work constitutes a first attempt of understanding the digitalization of
economy for what concerns platforms, which exploit two sides of market to make
profits, by using targeted advertising built on personal “free” data.
In the following chapters we are going to show some different specifications to deal
with two kinds of problem.
In the next Chapter, we analyse the nature of targeted advertising. We focus on the
impact of ads on well-being of consumers. The possibility of having too much ad-
vertising calls for a government fiscal action that can be welfare-enhancing under
some circumstances. Moreover, in a context of open economy, the decisions made
by a government may spread their effects also abroad. We find out the condition
under which this may happen.
In Chapter 3, we study in depth how a two-sided platform works. We introduce a
new element to the previous chapter and to the related literature. Users care about
their privacy but they do not know the actual level of their data mining. We deal
with two issues: privacy protection and the need for government of raising fiscal
revenue. First, we show how a change in privacy-consciousness is sufficient to af-
fect platform’s optimal choices. Second, we focus on the effects consequent to the
introduction of some specific taxes.
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Finally, in the last Chapter, we enlarge our approach by asking why a government
should intervene by changing the market equilibrium. In an optimal taxation frame-
work, we draw a method to address persuasive advertising when “undesired” by
the government and show how it mixes with distributional concerns.
We are well-aware that our goal is ambitious and not easy to achieve, nevertheless
our aim is rather to explore the “grammar of arguments” and to give some possible
answers to the need of research into this area.
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Chapter 2
Targeted Advertising on the web:
too little or too much?
This paper addresses the question of the targeted web advertising and its impact on con-
sumers. By assuming the existence of a monopolistic digital platform that can link two sides
of the market, we find out the condition under which production choices are far from the
optimal ones. The possibility of having too much advertising calls for a government fiscal
action that can be welfare-enhancing under some circumstances. Moreover, in a context of
open economy the decisions made by a country could spread their effects also abroad.
JEL classification: D42, H22, M37.
Keywords: digital platform, turnover tax, unit taxes, targeted advertising, monopoly.
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2.1 Introduction
The digitalization has allowed to connect different sides of the market through the
development of new businesses.
Almost everywhere two-sided firms serve distinct customer groups that are con-
nected through interdependent demand. A classic example is a platform, whose
revenues accrue from advertising displayed on a web site and from access fee paid
by people to use services on that site, such as videos or streaming platforms, social
networks, etc.
These businesses are characterized by quantity spillovers as platforms maximise
profits by facilitating value-creating interactions between groups of agents.
Moreover, in the last years, the standard two-sided business model has implemented
a novelty regarding the role of data. In fact, most of the value created by a digital
platform comes from the data exploitation, though this input is provided by users
for free.
There exist several policy issues related to the taxation of firms operating within the
digital sector. It is possible to detect two opposing trends: one aims at maximizing
collections based on exponentially growing digital flows; the second one recognizes
instead that lowering taxation benefits consumers and businesses, and consequently,
economic growth. The two-sided or multi-sided nature of Internet platforms en-
gaged in digital advertising presents a greater number of taxation challenges since
the pricing model of digital advertisers involves at least three parties: the publisher,
the advertiser, and the user; each of which could be located in different jurisdictions
or countries. For this reason, an emerging view posits that online advertising should
be taxed in three jurisdictions.
The present analysis is in line with recent papers in Industrial Organization which
study two-sidedness (Anderson and Coate, 2005; and Rochet and Tirole, 2003, 2006)
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and how taxation may impact on markets (Kind et al., 2008, 2009, 2010). It also looks
at the data question investigated by Bourreau et al. (2016) and Bloch and Demange
(2016).
No one of these has attempted to abandon the concept of a closed economy to see
what might be the effects of taxes in a context with more countries.
For what we know there exist only two working papers, one by Cui and Hashimizade
(2019), which studies the likely outcome of a digital service tax with a theoretical
model, and another one by Liberini and al. (2020), which is the first attempt of mak-
ing an empirical analysis of Facebook ads’ prices.
Furthermore, also advertising literature plays a crucial role (Dixit and Norman, 1978;
Shaphiro, 1980). Here, we look at advertising as a tool for catching consumers’ at-
tention and as main source of revenue for many digital businesses (such as Google
or Facebook).
The present work mainly seeks to answer the following question: in a context where
a country needs to increase its fiscal revenue, how platform’s taxation may impact
the welfare for all involved agents, and whether there might be effects abroad.
By using a theoretical model, we keep in mind the following main features while
looking for an answer: a platform behaves like a monopolist, there exist difficulties
in imposing direct taxes on platform’s revenue, a crucial role is played by data ex-
ploitation in value chain, and users’ information is bought for free, so we can talk of
“free work".
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: in Section 2, we present the model; then,
in Section 3, we introduce the issues related to the taxation of digital economy; in
Section 4, we look at the aftermaths in a foreign country caused by some domes-
tic measures; and, finally, we conclude with some comments and possible future
insights.
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2.2 The model
Consider a digital platform placed abroad which allows a domestic firm to sell a
good x to a population of consumers in the same country. One can think of an e-
commerce shop as the retailer, but also traditional businesses buy ads’ space and
sell products online.
The role of the platform is not only that of linking the two sides of the market, it
also sells a targeted advertising service to the retailer. Hence, it builds a two-sided
market by exchanging on one side ads directly and on the other side the good x in-
directly.
The reason why we set the platform abroad will be clear later.
Here we are not considering how many users will be addressed by the platform and
why they choose to be online, so their mass is fixed and normalized to one.
The digital platform builds the advertising package as a combination of two factors:
ads “intensity", a, and quality, captured by a proxy, s, for the level of data exploita-
tion measured by the exchanged bits for instance. So, thereafter we use the term
“data exploitation" and “quality" with the same meaning. This package is sold to a
domestic firm at the price A through a system of auctions which allows the platform
to take the whole producer’s profit.
There exist lots of examples which endorse this scheme. For instance, let us think
about Amazon based in US that connects retailers in UK to customers in India. Or a
Google branch established in Ireland that makes profits all over Europe, and allows
retailers to buy ads’ spaces and “sponsoring" associated with research keys through
a complex system of auctions.
In our model, the domestic retailer sells good x at price p and can exploit its mo-
nopolistic power thanks to the auction since this allows it to be the only seller on
the market. Implicitly we are assuming that there is another potential entrant on the
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market but only one of them can produce and sell to consumers. However, the firm
cannot discriminate among customers due to arbitrage opportunities, i.e. the good
x can be resold between them. The demand for the product is D (p, a, s), and the
inverse demand is P (x, a, s). Costs of producing x units are c(x), and they are in-
creasing in the produced quantity at a non decreasing rate, that is cx > 0 and cxx ≥ 0,
where the subscript indicates the derivative. Hence, retailer’s profits are:
Πx = px− c(x)− A (2.1)
while the platform’s profits are:
Πp = A− k(a, s) (2.2)
where the function cost k(a, s) is non decreasing and convex in its arguments, that is
ka ≥ 0, kaa ≥ 0, ks ≥ 0, and kss ≥ 0.
The use of a unique price for the package of tailored ads allows the platform to
avoid the problem of double-marginalization and to appropriate the retailer’s profit
by imposing a “fee" equal to the vertical structure’s profit.:
A = Πx(pm, a, s)−Πx(p∗, 0, 0) (2.3)
where pm is the monopolistic price, and p∗ is the competitive price1. Here, we are
excluding any risk-aversion by the retailer or uncertainty about the final demand.
Therefore, the game structure is similar to Stackelberg’s one: the platform antici-
pates the firm’s action by choosing the level of ads a and data exploitation s that
maximises the retailer’s profit. Then, the firm sets the monopolistic price pm(a, s)
and pays the “fee" A, earning zero. Customers buy the good x according to the price
pm.
1Note that the profit Πx is without “fee”, and it corresponds to the maximum earnings for the
retailer given the level of a and s chosen by the platform. The profit without advertising is zero if the
retailer plays in a perfectly competitive market and the marginal cost is constant.
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Our goal is to understand the conditions under which the optimal choice of targeted
advertising made by the platform is not socially efficient.
The retailer has an incentive to raise the targeted advertising if this increases the
marginal willingness to pay of the marginal consumer, that is x∆p(x)/∆i > ∆k/∆i
with i = a, s. But this is not an accurate measure of the social benefits coming
from the rise since we have to consider not the marginal consumer but the average
marginal effect on the entire population. The targeted ads increase is desirable only
if the average benefit exceeds the average cost, i.e. if (1/x)
∫ x
0 ∆p(v)dv > ∆k/x. This
result is quite similar to that found by Spence (1975) about under/over-provision of
quality in monopoly.
The average benefit coincides with the increase in revenue for the retailer only when
the marginal consumer is representative of the entire population, that is to say when
(1/x)
∫ x
0 ∆p(v)dv = ∆p(x). In what follows, we are going to show when this equal-
ity does not hold.
First, let us focus on the Consumer surplus which can be expressed in two ways:
S =
∫ x
0
P(v, a, s)dv− xP(x, a, s) (2.4)
or, equivalently as:
S =
∫ ∞
p
D(v, a, s)dv (2.5)
Profits for the retailer are always equal to zero, whereas profits for the platform can
be re-expressed by using (2.1) and (2.2) as:
Πp = p(x, a, s)x− c(x)− k(a, s) (2.6)
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whose first order conditions (FOCs) are:
p− cx = −xpx (2.7)
xpa − ka = 0 (2.8)
xps − ks = 0 (2.9)
The reader should notice that the condition (2.7) is set only after the optimal choice
of a and s, and it is not chosen by the platform jointly with the others. Due to this
reason, the equilibrium of a fully integrated platform might differ.
Looking carefully at conditions (2.8) and (2.9), it is quite evident that the ratio be-
tween level of ads and data exploitation is always efficiently set by the digital plat-
form whatever the provided quantity x, that is:
pa
ps
=
ka
ks
(2.10)
The platform chooses directly two of four variables: quantity of ads and data ex-
ploitation; the price is chosen by the maximizing retailer, whereas the fourth, the
quantity of good x is determined by the demand function.
Making a comparison between consumer surplus and profit, it is apparent that these
two may differ. For a given quantity, x, a social planner who wants to maximize the
consumer surplus with respect to ads, a, and data, s, has to satisfy these two condi-
tions:
∂S
∂a
=
∫ x
0
padv− ka = 0 (2.11)
∂S
∂s
=
∫ x
0
psdv− ks = 0 (2.12)
Hence the level of ads and data differs from the socially efficient ones for the con-
sumers each time that the integrals are not equal to the marginal valuation of tar-
geted advertising. In other words, by comparing expressions (2.11) and (2.12) with
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(2.8) and (2.9), an increase in consumer surplus depends on the relative magnitudes
of
∫ x
0 padv to xpa and of
∫ x
0 psdv to xps. By dividing both terms by x, we obtain the
average valuation respectively of ads and data at the margin over the whole popula-
tion in the market. So, when the increase in this last exceeds the marginal valuation,
the level of ads and data is too low compared to the optimum, otherwise it is set too
high.
Proposition 1 For given x, the platform oversupplies advertising relative to the optimum
when 1x
∫ x
0 padv < pa and conversely. A sufficient condition for over-provision is that the
marginal value of ads increases as absolute willingness to pay falls, that is pxa > 0, and
conversely for under-provision.
A caveat of the proposition above is that it tells us which way the platform biases its
choice of ads only if the output is the same both for the monopolist and for the social
planner.
Proposition 2 For given x, the platform overexploits data relative to the optimum level
when 1x
∫ x
0 psdv < ps and conversely. A sufficient condition for over-exploitation is that the
marginal value of data increases as absolute willingness to pay falls, that is pxs > 0, and
conversely for under-exploitation.
The caveat is always the same. When ads quantity and quality are complementary,
that means that the marginal value of data increases in ads, i.e. pas > 0, for a given
x, the platform ends up oversupplying targeted advertising. An increase in one
variable strengthens the effect of the other at the margin.
In other words, the term pxa means that the effect of an increase in ads is greater
at the margin when the willingness to pay declines, while pxs stands for a greater
effect of an increase in data exploitation at the margin when the willingness to pay
declines. Therefore, since the platform, being a monopoly, cares only about what
happens at the margin, for a little shift of monopoly’s quantity with respect to social
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optimum, it will produce too much targeted advertising.
Then, one should notice that the condition (2.10) is quite different from the social
optimum ratio expressed as follows:∫ x
0 padv∫ x
0 psdv
=
ka
ks
(2.13)
Since x∗ > xM at the two solutions, nothing guarantees that the left sides of (2.10)
and (2.13) coincide. Though efficient, platform’s choices about how much to invest
on ads or data will end by not being the social preferable ones.
Thus, the digital firm with market power deviates in three aspects. First, it sets a
markup above the marginal cost, selling too little quantity of good x. Second, the
amount of ads may be too high or too low according to the relative valuations of ads
of the marginal and average consumer. Third, the level of data exploitation may not
be optimal depending on the relative valuations of “privacy" of the marginal and
average customer.
Another interesting circumstance to investigate is when the retailer is committed to
set the price at the competitive level, that is p(x, a, s) = cx.
Under this circumstance, a distortion would still happen. Indeed, the social planner
aims at maximizing the area between the demand curve and the marginal cost of
providing the quantity, whereas the digital platform focuses on maximizing the area
between the final price and the marginal cost. When this latter area grows faster
than the former one as targeted advertising goes up, then the monopolist oversup-
plies ads.
On the contrary, when the marginal cost increases slowly, in a way that is quasi-
horizontal, it is possible that the consumers’ surplus grows faster than the platform’s
profit. In this case, the firm undersupplies targeted ads2. The present result is quite
2To see it, let us assume that cx = 0, such as the cost is constant. It is quite simple to show that when
the maximum willingness to pay does not change, that is the intercept on the vertical axis is fixed while
the slope of the demand changes in relation to a and s, consumers’ surplus increases with them. So any
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similar to that one obtained by Kind et al. (2008).
Coming back to monopoly case, generally the relationship between optimal and
profit maximising targeted advertising is determined by (i) the interaction of the
average marginal effect and (ii) the extent to which the monopolist restricts output.
This second factor can be caught also by the shape of the demand curve, or roughly
by the elasticity of demand.
Intuitively, one should investigate how the fraction of total potential surplus catch-
able by the firm varies with targeted ads. It depends on any demand function
D(p, a, s), except when the elasticity is independent of price.
Proposition 3 If the price elasticity is not a function of the price and if the elasticity in-
creases with targeted advertising, then ads are oversupplied and conversely. If the elasticity
does not vary with targeted advertising, then ads level and data exploitation are set at the
optimal level by the monopolist.
To prove it3, let us suppose that the demand function is a CES type, for any given
level of targeted advertising, so that P(x, a, s) = g(a, s)x−n(a,s), where g(a, s) is a
generic function and n(a, s) is the inverse of the price elasticity of demand.
Moreover, consider the marginal cost of producing an additional unit constant and
independent of the level of a and s. Define, in addition, the term β as the ratio of
maximized profits to maximized surplus, that is:
β(a, s) =
pi(a, s)
W(a, s)
contraction in a and s, by decreasing the elasticity of demand, shrinks the area of consumers’ surplus
triangle.
3The demonstration is similar to that one used by Spence (1975).
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It is possible to show4 that:
β(a, s) = [1− n(a, s)] 1n(a,s) (2.14)
and, as consequence, if price elasticity increases with targeted advertising, that is
with a and s, then n′(a, s) < 0 and dβ/dn < 05. Since in the optimum for the
monopolist, we have pi′ = 0, then W ′ < 0, which means that targeted ads are too
many from a social planner prospective.
Hence, the above mentioned failures of market open to government’s intervention
in order to correct them. In next paragraph, we show how some kinds of taxes may
impact the equilibrium.
2.3 Taxation
In this section, we want to show how different implemented fiscal instruments might
generate divergent effects.
We suppose to use four kinds of taxes: a tax on turnover, labelled as tr, an ad val-
orem tax, τ, a specific tax on ads or on data6, ta and ts respectively.
4Starting from the profit function for the monopolist: pi = P(x, a, s)x − c(a, s)x; the quantity cho-
sen is equal to xm =
[
c
g(1−n)
]− 1n . By substituting it into the monopolist’s profit function, we get:
pi = g
1
n c− 1−nn (1− n) 1n [(1− n)−1 − 1].
Doing the same for the social planner function, that is: W =
∫ x
0 P(v, a, s)− c(a, s)x, we find the opti-
mum quantity x∗ =
(
c
g
)− 1n . So, the welfare function becomes: W = g 1n c− 1−nn [(1− n)−1 − 1].
As a consequence, it follows that the ratio pi/W is equal to: β = (1− n) 1n .
5Taking the derivative of β with respect to n, after some calculations, we get:
dβ
dn
=
[
− 1
(1− n)n −
ln(1− n)
n2
]
(1− n) 1n
which is negative as long as n < 1.
6In a French study on the taxation of the digital economy by Colin and Collin (2013), the authors talk
about implementing a tax based on the effectively free use of personal data provided by internet users
which businesses use as means of creating value, in addition to three proposed new taxes, including
a tax on on-line advertising, a tax on e-commerce services and the extension of the current tax on the
sale of rental of videos and films including video on demand to foreign internet players.
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Looking at the profit for the platform, the introduction of a tax changes the expres-
sion (2.2) and the relative first order conditions. When we use a tax on revenue, we
get:
Πpr = (1− tr)A− k(a, s) (2.15)
where the subscript indicates the fiscal instruments. It is possible to show that the
efficiency ratio does not change neither under a tax on revenue nor with a VAT.
Instead, using a specific tax either on ads or on data, the condition (2.10) becomes:
pa
ps
=
ka + ta
ks + ts
(2.16)
Using comparative statics, under whatever taxation, the amount of ads and data de-
creases jointly7.
Using a utilitarian welfare function, when the platform is located abroad, the gov-
ernment takes into account only the fiscal effects on consumers’ surplus and on
firm’s profits, which are zero under our specifications:
W = S +Πx + T =
∫ x
0
p(v, a, s)dv− p(x, a, s)x + T (2.17)
where the term T indicates the fiscal revenues accruing from taxation.
Now, according to a general instrument t, the welfare variations result as:
dW
dt
= −x dp
dt
+
da
dt
∫ x
0
padv +
ds
dt
∫ x
0
psdv +
dT
dt
(2.18)
Being the fiscal revenue effect always positive when evaluated in t = 0, the above
condition calls undoubtedly for an increase in welfare when the price decreases
and this reduction times the number of unit consumed is greater than the loss for
marginal consumers due to the reduction in targeted advertising. Looking at the
effect of taxes on ads and data exploitation, we know that they are negative from
7The whole derivation is shown in the Appendix.
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comparative statics.
Graphically, Figure 2.1 shows well why the difference in size of the two areas deter-
mines if the tax is welfare enhancing or not. Indeed, when the area in blue is smaller
than the area in purple, then the welfare increases for sure.
p
0 x
pm
xm
pm
′
xm
′
p(x, a′, s′) p(x, a, s)
A
B
FIGURE 2.1: Welfare’s comparison
The essential assumption is that the strength of the effect of targeted advertising is
decreasing in consumers’ marginal willingness to pay. It corresponds to assume that
marginal willingness to pay rises with targeted ads, i.e. pxa > 0 and pxs > 0. As a
consequence, after the introduction of taxes the platform reduces both ads and data
exploitation from a and s to a′ and s′ respectively, and the demand curve shrinks
inward. The equilibrium shifts from point A to B, where both price and quantity are
lower. Implicitly, we are assuming that the platform overproduced targeted adver-
tising, and despite the distortion induced by the monopolist’s power of the retailer
continues to hold, this distortion reduces when advertising falls.
Next step consists of studying which of the previous kinds of taxes may be more
efficient. After having implemented a tax, a government causes a distortion to the
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equilibrium in exchange of a positive fiscal gain.
Any indirect tax generates some distortion, but there are some whose effect is greater
in terms of distortion or lower in terms of fiscal revenue. We seek to identify in this
way the tax that generates the highest fiscal gain, with the same distortion.
In order to do it, we start by comparing the first order conditions in presence of
taxes8. When these conditions are identical under two different taxes, then the quan-
tity choices are the same and so it is the distortion. By comparing the fiscal revenue
it is hence possible to find the best fiscal instrument.
Let us begin by comparing two specific taxes on advertising and data and a tax on
revenues:
(1− tr)xpa = xpa − ta → ta = trxpa (2.19)
(1− tr)xps = xps − ts → ts = trxps (2.20)
Using the above expressions, let us define tax revenue under respectively turnover
and unit taxation as:
Rrev = tr A = tr[px− c(x)] (2.21)
Runit = taa + tss = trx(pa + ps) (2.22)
Taking the difference between expressions (2.21) and (2.22), we obtain:
Rrev − Runit = tr[px− c(x)− (pa + ps)x] (2.23)
whose sign depends on the strength of marginal effect of a and s onto price p.
Proposition 4 A turnover tax generates more fiscal revenues compared to specific taxes
when the price minus the joint marginal effect of targeted advertising of a and s on p is
greater than the average cost, that is (p− pa − ps) > c(x)x , and conversely.
8The reader can find easily the first order conditions for each kind of taxes in the appendices.
34 Chapter 2. Targeted Advertising on the web: too little or too much?
Making the same exercise by comparing a VAT and two specific taxes, we obtain:
Rvat =
τ
1+ τ
A =
τ
1+ τ
[px− c(x)] (2.24)
Runit = taa + tss =
τ
1+ τ
x(pa + ps) (2.25)
Taking again the difference between expressions (2.24) and (2.25), we obtain:
Rvat − Runit = τ
1+ τ
[px− c(x)− (pa + ps)x] (2.26)
whose sign always depends on the strength of marginal effect of a and s onto price p.
When the square bracket is negative, then there exists a pair of specific taxes which
revenue-dominates an ad valorem tax.
Proposition 5 An ad valorem tax generates more revenue than specific taxes when the per-
unit advertising expenditure is greater than the sum of marginal effects of targeted advertis-
ing, that is Ax = p− c(x)x > pa + ps, and conversely.
The interpretation of this result tells us that if we start from an equilibrium with
a positive tax, for instance τ > 0, and the marginal effects of pa and ps are very
high, then we can do better by substituting the VAT with two specific taxes. In
fact, by substituting the ad valorem tax with two specific taxes, the government
has to impose a higher unit tax rate to keep output unchanged or otherwise it may
reduce the fiscal burden and consequently the tax distortion by levying the same tax
revenue.
2.4 The model for an open economy
Now, we will seek to point out the feasible indirect consequences that a unilateral
action played by a domestic government may have on a foreign country’s economy.
We want to figure out how the effects of taxes could be spread from the home coun-
try to the foreign one.
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We consider here the existence of two countries, a domestic one labelled by h and
a foreign one, labelled by f . The platform is located out of these two countries so
it cannot be affected by standard corporate tax rate, but only through indirect tax-
ation. The retailer is placed in home country h, but it is able to sell goods at home
and abroad through the digital platform without having a physical presence in the
foreign market. It is what happens actually where we think about digital services
for instance.
The platform sets a distinct fee according to the destination market:
Πp = Ah + A f − k(a, s) (2.27)
where total costs depend on total ads “intensity" and “quality", that is a = ah + a f
and s = sh + s f .
Consequently the retailer’s profits function changes as follows:
Πx = ph(xh, ah, sh)xh + p f (x f , a f , s f )x f − c(x)− Ah − A f (2.28)
where prices can be different between the two markets, and consumers cannot resell
goods abroad, so we are assuming that there is no cross-border trade.
Looking at the first order conditions for the retailer, we get:
ph − cx ∂x
∂xh
= −xh phx (2.29)
p f − cx ∂x
∂x f
= −x f p fx (2.30)
which is the standard distortion in a monopoly market, similar to that found in the
closed economy.
Given the retailer’s chosen prices, using expression (2.27), the platform maximises
its profit function by choosing a and s for both markets:
Πp = ph(xh, ah, sh)xh + p f (x f , a f , s f )x f − c(x)− k(a, s) (2.31)
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whose Focs are, taking into account that ∂a/∂ai = ∂s/∂si = 1 with i = h, f :
xh pha − ka = 0 (2.32)
xh phs − ks = 0 (2.33)
xh p fa − ka = 0 (2.34)
xh p fs − ks = 0 (2.35)
And, by combining these expressions, it is possible to show that in the optimum the
following condition must hold: (
pa
ps
)h
=
(
pa
ps
) f
(2.36)
It tells us that the ratio between “intensity" and “quality" has to be the same at home
and abroad. After the unilateral choice of the domestic government about setting an
indirect tax, this ratio however may change and, consequently, effects may arise not
only in the home country, but also in the foreign one.
2.4.1 Effects of home taxes
First, we look at a tax on turnover. Platform’s profit function changes as follows:
Πpr = (1− tr)Ah + A f − k(a, s)
which can be rewritten as:
Πpr = (1− tr)
[
phxh − c(x) x
h
x
]
+ p f x f − c(x) x
f
x
− k(a, s) (2.37)
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whose Focs are:
(1− tr)xh pha − ka = 0
(1− tr)xh phs − ks = 0
x f p fa − ka = 0
x f p fs − ks = 0
What happens is strictly clear. The level of a and s decreases in home country but
through the cost function this effect is spread also abroad.
To derive a not ambiguous sign due to the complexity of using a matrix 4× 4, let us
assume thereafter that the marginal cost of ads “intensity" is constant and normal-
ized to zero, i.e. ka = 0.
Under this assumption and using comparative statics9, one can show that:
da f
dtr
< 0
ds f
dtr
< 0
The same happens also when we use a specific tax on ads, ta, or on data, ts. Plat-
form’s profit function changes as follows:
Πpr = phxh + p f x f − c(x)− k(a, s)− taah − tssh (2.38)
whose comparative static analysis gives the following results:
da f
dta
< 0 and
ds f
dta
< 0
da f
dts
< 0 and
ds f
dts
< 0
9See the Appendix A.5 for the whole derivation.
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So the effect is always a contraction on the provision of ads and on data exploita-
tion10.
Therefore, the home negative effect of taxes on the two variables chosen by the plat-
form can be mitigated and spread through the costs’ channel also abroad. The reader
should also notice that what we said before about the welfare-enhancing power of
taxes still holds both at home and abroad. Though, in a foreign country, the final
effect might be lower due to the lack of fiscal revenue effect which instead is present
in the domestic country.
In fact, looking at the foreign well-being, we have:
dW f
dti
= −x f dp
f
dti
+
da f
dti
∫ x f
0
p fa dv +
ds f
dti
∫ x f
0
p fs dv (2.39)
where the subscript i = r, a, s indicates the kind of implemented tax.
The final result depends on the change of price for final users, when they pay more,
the sign is unambiguous and the foreign welfare decreases, otherwise when it is neg-
ative, then the sign of final effect abroad depends on the strength of the “price effect"
with respect to the targeted “advertising effect".
Hence this constitutes the only circumstance under which it is possible an improve-
ment in the foreign well-being. However this gain is more difficult to be achieved
with respect to the domestic improvement.
2.5 Summary and concluding remarks
The digitalization of the economy represents a big challenge for many actors in tra-
ditional and new markets, and also for fiscal authorities. The role of government
has been studied looking at traditional forms of taxation and the feasible effects
onto final consumers. One omitted aspect in the literature consists of the possibility
that unilateral choice of a government might affect welfare besides home borders
10The whole derivation is shown in Appendix A.6.
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through international links built by a digital platform.
The present study seeks to show how this situation can verify and to forecast likely
effects resulting after the introduction of some kinds of taxes.
Through the common cost structure a two-sided platform is able to shift a slice of its
fiscal burden not only onto the other side of the market, as shown in literature, but
also on markets abroad, in a context of more countries.
Another aspect that we have learnt is that each fiscal action needs to evaluate first
the impact of targeted advertising on final consumers’ well being and then whether
ads and data are under/over provided with respect to social optimum levels.
A fiscal action implemented by a country may generate a welfare improvement,
when the platform is located abroad and the attention is focused only on domes-
tic consumers. Nevertheless, the final effects overcome home borders and might
impact also foreign consumers’ well-being. A gain in welfare is not obvious and
needs specific conditions.
For this reason, the choice of European Commission and OECD to follow a common
path to face the problem, avoiding to let each state to act alone, seems to be the best
way. Though it is not enough.
We showed also that the means chosen to rise fiscal revenues are relevant as well,
and there are some of them that can be more effective reducing distortions.
This said, we know very well the drawbacks and the limits of our work, but at the
same time, it can be considered a good starting point with lots of hints to examine in
depth the issues and challenges that digitalization has opened.
As argued by Fuest (2018), looking at the whole picture, there are two additional
issues to consider talking about taxing digital economy and shifting from origin to
destination principle. Firstly, lower tax burden for digital businesses derives par-
tially from tax credit for R&D activities. All relative benefits would be harmed by
any taxes: “removing the preferential treatment that arises through tax subsidies for
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research would be economically damaging as a result". The second point to stress
concerns the proposal to allocate more taxation rights to those countries in which
products are sold. As regard to, there is little empiric evidence to suggest that Eu-
rope would benefit from such a reform, in fact it is a net exporter.
Therefore, forthcoming papers will focus on other theoretical aspects neglected so
far to embody the dynamism of investment in R&D for instance or different market
competition structure for domestic retailers. However, empirical evaluations of uni-
lateral tax reforms already set by single countries would help more to understand
what happens behind the fog of multinational digital companies.
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Chapter 3
How privacy disclosure and
specific taxes affect a two-sided
platform
This paper considers a model where a two-sided digital platform sells services to users and
provides targeted ads to a unique retailer to address customers. In the analysis we show
how government may use taxes to deal with two kinds of issues: citizens’ privacy and fiscal
fairness. We use the context of monopoly to exploit the market power of digital platform and
an auction to eliminate the problem of double marginalization. Under the assumption that
consumers are affected by targeted advertising in their willingness to pay and that they care
about their privacy, we show the effects that may arise after taxation or by a change in users’
expectation about data mining.
JEL classification: D62, H22, L12, M37.
Keywords: two-sided markets, digital platform, monopoly, taxation, privacy.
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3.1 Introduction
Digitalization is undoubtedly the greatest revolution of current century. It has been
and continues to be a source of technical and organizational change and one of the
main engines of growth, at the point of talking about “digital economy". Multina-
tional tech enterprises are at the top between public companies by market capital-
ization (PWC, 2019). And prospectives about future growth are high. These big
companies are usually multi-products firms, characterized by cross network effects
and bilateral market power, as highlighted by Weyl (2010).
Most of them use advertising as one of the revenue sources, but for some of them,
ads selling constitutes the only one. In all statistics, internet advertising expenditure
has considerably increased in the last decade and nowadays it overcomes all other
media. The market presents few ad-selling companies that account for about 75% of
the total revenues generated in the advertising market (IAB 2018).
These companies have a considerable market power and in this aspect they resem-
ble monopolies. In fact, they may constitute, if not the only one, at least a preferable
channel to address specific bunches of final customers for many retailers. A digital
multinational, MNE, usually operates through an interface as a link between two
sides of the market. These platforms however usually fail to totally internalize net-
work effects and, as a consequence, they generate distortions (Chiaromonte, 2020).
Policies directed to alleviate these drawbacks therefore must take account of how
actions addressed on one side of the market might affect welfare and platform’s be-
haviour on the other side.
There are further concerns calling for international interventions and homogeneous
rules. As highlighted by the European Commission, there exists a discrepancy in
fiscal treatment between digital platforms and traditional businesses. Today’s in-
ternational corporate tax rules do not fit business models that can make profit from
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digital services in a country without being physically present there. It is not a new
phenomenon the fact that digital companies pay much less tax than traditional busi-
nesses, even when they make the same profit. This “unfairness" is partially justified
by specific aid rules to sustain innovation and R&D, for instance there exist particu-
lar laws for start-ups, but, in other cases, it is totally unjustified.
Big digital MNEs benefit from the same advantages and infrastructure as traditional
businesses, high speed internet, road, a stable legal system just to name a few, but
often they do not contribute at all by paying their “fair" share of taxes in the coun-
tries they do business in.
To find a balance between these needs, one that supports innovation, but also to
make sure that all companies, digital and traditional, big or small, contribute to so-
ciety, and operate on the same playing field, is not an easy task. Though it has to
be the goal of a new international tax legislation. In doing it, one cannot ignore the
consequences on economic players that a change of this dimension would generate.
The present paper tries to show some of these aspects, though it focuses on a spe-
cific business model, as a simplification of a real one. Firstly, it recognizes the role of
data in the value chain. Secondly, it shows some consequences arising from indirect
taxes. And last but not least, we pay attention on users’ behaviour and their con-
cerns about personal information disclosure.
In the digital economy, value is indeed created, with different weights, from a com-
bination of algorithms, user data, sales functions and know-how. For example, a
user can contribute to value creation by sharing his/her preferences (e.g. liking a
page, or giving a feedback) on a social platform. This data will later be used and
monetised for targeted advertising. The profits however are often taxed where the
advertising algorithm has been developed, that it is usually a low tax country. This
means on one side that the user contribution to the profits is not considered where
the company is taxed, and on the other side that the company can gain an “unfair"
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fiscal advantage compared to traditional businesses by locating its activities in a low
tax countries and acting remotely. Understanding how algorithms work is the key
and it is positive that the EU Commission is carrying out an in-depth analysis into
algorithmic transparency and other issues through a group of experts (European
Commission, 2018).
In Industrial Organization, multi-sided markets have been studied by Anderson
and Coate (2015), by Rochet and Tirole (2003, 2006), and Armstrong (2006). Re-
cently, Belleflamme and Toulemonde (2009, 2016) and Belleflamme and Peitz (2019)
instead have add intra-group externalities to models with inter-group externalities,
and have analysed competition issues, but only marginally fiscal effects. The way
taxation impacts on these businesses, focusing specifically on media industry, has
been studied by Kind et al. (2008, 2009, 2010). They show how taxation may help to
correct some inefficiencies and that the welfare dominance of ad valorem taxes on
specific ones does not hold in these markets.
The other aspect related to our paper is users’ information. Data are considered in
every sector as the “new oil”, most of the value created in digital industry come from
data, and this oil is essentially free for the platform, since it is provided by users who
do not know very well what they are giving away. The true cost, although very con-
sistent in some cases, for the platform is only that of developing and improving the
algorithm to read these data. Due to the relevance of data in the chain value and also
to tackle privacy issues, some scholars have proposed to levy a tax on persona data
(Collin and Colin, 2013). Data taxation has been also investigated by Bourreau et al.
(2017) and by Bloch and Demange (2017), to our knowledge.
Our paper studies the impact and the effects of taxing a two-sided monopolistic
platform offering personalized services to users and targeted advertising to sellers,
based on the collection of users’ data. Our goal is to show how consequences may
be different according to the taxes used. In particular, we find that the strength of
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data externalities determines both the adopted specific business model and how the
platform reply to a tax introduction.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model, all the agents in-
volved and how the platform makes its optimal choices; next Section treats what
happens following a change in users’ expectation about their data exploitation; Sec-
tion 4 shows the effects of unit taxes on platform’s choices; the last Section concludes
with some comments and gives some research lines for the future.
3.2 The model
We have a platform which chooses the level of data exploitation s, the amount of ads
a to produce and the fee Z which users have to pay to join the platform’s services.
The retailer produces a good x, sold to customers on the platform at price p, and
participates to an auction paying an amount A equivalent to its profits. Hence, at
last the digital platform is able to catch all producer’s surplus.
Customers first decide whether to join or not the platform. Joining it, they enjoy a
basic service which is a function of the level of their data exploitation. Moreover,
they can be addressed through targeted ads by the retailer and as a consequence,
they can buy good x. So, they also benefit from the consumption of good x. Finally,
they care for their privacy, they know they are giving away their information, but
they do not know the actual level of data exploitation.
The game proceeds as follows: at first stage people decide to enter or not the plat-
form, according to the fee Z and on their common expectation about the level of data
exploitation se, but without the possibility to verify it.
The utility from joining the platform is given by:
U = u(s)− ψ(se)− Z (3.1)
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where u(s) is drawn from a uniform distribution on (0, v) with a mass of v(s) of
potential users. A user enters the platform if u(s) ≥ ψ(se) + Z. Therefore, denoting
by n the number of participants, we have from expression (3.1) that:
n = v(s)− ψ(se)− Z (3.2)
where the utility function v(s) is increasing and concave, vs > 0 and vss < 0, whose
subscripts state for the derivative, whereas the disutility function ψ(se) is increasing
and convex, that is ψse > 0 and ψsese > 0.
Retailer’s profits are defined as:
Πx = [p(x, a, s)x− c(x)] θ(n)− A (3.3)
where θ(n) indicates the probability per active seller that the users will buy the good
x. It is an increasing function in its argument, at no increasing rate, that is θn > 0
and θnn ≤ 0. Its first order condition is:
p + xpx = cx (3.4)
Platform’s profit function is defined by the following expression:
Πp = n ∗ Z + A− k(a, s) (3.5)
which can be rewritten as:
Πp = [v(s)− ψ(se)] Z− Z2 + [p(x, a, s)x− c(x)] θ(n)− k(a, s) (3.6)
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and whose first order conditions are:
Z : v(s)− ψ(se)− 2Z− [px− c(x)] θn = 0 (3.7)
a : xpaθ(n) = ka (3.8)
s : vsZ + [v(s)− ψ(se)− 2Z] ∂Z
∂s
+ xpsn + [px− c(x)] θn
(
vs − ∂Z
∂s
)
= ks
(3.9)
From condition (3.7), one can obtain the equilibrium access fee for users as:
Z∗ =
v(s)− ψ(se)− [px− c(x)] θn
2
(3.10)
and from (3.10), one can derive ∂Z∂s =
vs−xpsθn
2 .
Looking at condition (3.10), when the disutility ψ(se) of the expected data exploita-
tion is very high or the earnings on the retailer’s side are very large, then the access
fee Z could be negative. In this case we assume a corner solution, with Z = 0.
Combining the condition (3.10) with (3.2), one can find the number of users joining
the platform:
n∗ =
v(s)− ψ(se) + [px− c(x)] θn
2
(3.11)
One can find the relation existing between the advertising and the level of data ex-
ploitation substituting (3.10) and (3.11), respectively, in (3.8) and in (3.9):
xpa [v(s)− ψ(se) + (px− c(x)) θn] = 2ka
vs [v(s)− ψ(se) + (px− c(x)) θn] + 2xpsθ(n) = 2ks
Or by exploiting condition (3.11), as:
xpan = ka (3.12)
vsn + xpsθ(n) = ks (3.13)
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By combining the two conditions above, (3.12) and (3.13), we get the efficient ratio
between a∗ and s∗:
xpa
vs
=
ka
ks − xpsθ(n) (3.14)
For interpretation purposes, consider hereafter θ(n) = λn with λ = 1. Hence, ex-
pression (3.14) becomes:
xpa
vs + xps
=
ka
ks
(3.15)
In setting this efficient ratio, the platform aims at balancing the marginal effect on
price linked to an increase in the number of ads, pa, and the double effect of an
increase in data exploitation on users’ evaluation of the service, vs and on final price
for good x, ps.
Furthermore, using the simplification about θ(n), we can rewrite the optimal access
fee and derive the number of users as follows:
Z∗ =
v(s)− ψ(se)− px + c(x)
2
(3.16)
n∗ =
v(s)− ψ(se) + px− c(x)
2
(3.17)
So, more profits the platform gains from retailer’s side, more likely it will set an
access fee equal to zero, greater is the incentive to have more users joining the plat-
form. The reader should remind that the fee A for advertising is exactly equal to the
profit made by the retailer.
As a consequence, any action changing this equilibrium would spread its effect on
both sides of markets.
In the next section, we will begin by analysing one of these possibilities.
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3.3 The effect of a change in users’ expectation about their
privacy
Firstly, it is interesting to understand what happens to platform’s choices in front
of a change in privacy-consciousness by users. For instance, an increase in se may
happen as a consequence to some scandals, such as a disclosure of sensitive infor-
mation1, or a more coercive rule about privacy like the introduction of the GDPR2 in
Europe for instance.
What we expect is a twofold effect, both on users’ side and on retailer’s one. Us-
ing comparative statics3, it is possible to show that both the level of ads a and the
level of data exploitation s fall, while, in principle, the access fee Z may either rise
or decrease:
dZ
dse
=
(+/−)
Ω
≷ 0
da
dse
=
(+)
Ω
< 0
ds
dse
=
(+)
Ω
< 0
where Ω < 0 since it is the determinant of the negative semidefinite Hessian matrix
3× 3 of first order conditions associated to equations (3.7-3.9).
The sign of access fee Z depends strictly on the specific business we are going to
analyse and on the relative strengths of externalities. In fact, going through the
complex derivation of comparative statics, one can state that higher is the retailer’s
marginal willingness to pay for targeted advertising, that is pa and ps, the more likely
Z increases. The platform indeed tries in this way to partially shift the negative effect
1An example has been the Cambridge Analytical scandal. See The Economist (2018).
2The General Data Protection Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (GDPR) is a regulation in EU law on data
protection and privacy in the European Union (EU) and the European Economic Area (EEA). The
GDPR aims primarily to give control to individuals over their personal data and to simplify the regu-
latory environment for international business by unifying the regulation within the EU.
3See the Appendix for the whole derivation
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of users’ expectation by increasing the fee they are going to pay and reducing their
participation since the retailer’s side is now less profitable. So, also when the access
fee is set to zero, consequently to a change in users’ expectation it is possible that the
platform finds convenient to turn it in a positive value.
On the contrary, when the profitability of retailer’s side is not enough to partially
compensate for the reduction in targeted advertising, the optimal response is to set
a lower access fee to increase the number of users joining the platform.
Hence, to sum up, the final effect can be a partial shift of profits from one side of
the market to the other one, to compensate in part the losses, or, on the contrary, a
change in expectation may end up by reducing profits twice4, on both sides of the
market.
Proposition 6 When the externalities of data on users’ evaluation of services are low, while
their marginal willingness to pay derived from data exploitation is very high, it exists the
possibility that the optimal strategy for the platform consists of setting a higher access fee for
users and reducing both the number of ads and the level of data exploitation.
Looking at the consequences on the number of users joining the platform indeed,
from totally differentiating n(s, se, Z), we get:
dn
dse
= vs
ds
dse−
− ψse − dZdse
+/−
(3.18)
The condition (3.18) tells us that when the platform finds convenient to increase the
access fee, less users will join the platform. Otherwise, when the platform reduces its
access fee, it tries to partially compensate the reduction in participants to its service
in order to reduce the losses made on the other side of the market. This happens
each time the retailer’s side is more profitable than users’ one.
One can see it better by taking the total differentiation of gross retailer’s profit, with
4It is similar to what found by Belleflamme and Toulemonde (2016), when they talk about “double
jeopardy”.
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A = 0:
dΠx
dse
= x
[
∂p
∂a
da
dse
+
∂p
∂s
ds
dse
]
n + [px− c(x)] dn
dse
(3.19)
The result depends on the sign of the derivative of n with respect to se. The retailer
side is less profitable, since the first square bracket sign is negative, but the losses
may be partially compensated, at least in principle, by an increase in users’ partici-
pation, i.e. when dndse > 0. The more likely a business depends on data mining, the
more likely the platform will avoid a shrinking in users’ number.
3.4 The effects of unit taxes on platform’s choices
In line with the current debate about the need to find a way to build a fairer playing
field for all businesses without exceptions, single governments are implementing
unilateral actions to deal with digital platforms. Their aim is twofold: on one hand,
they want to rise fiscal earnings without increasing the fiscal burden on domestic
players, on the other hand, they want to fight harmful tax planning made by multi-
national enterprises, and particularly, by digital businesses, which allows them to
avoid any direct form of taxation and to take advantage compared to standard busi-
nesses. In order to deal with these two issues, the European Commission is studying
some proposals to guarantee a fair level of competition between companies within
its borders, but so far no real actions have been implemented due to the lack of a
common agreement and the fear of international repercussions. Nevertheless, some
countries have adopted unilateral specific fiscal regimes to tax digital companies.
The next discussion aims at highlighting the likely consequences following a unilat-
eral decision made by a single government about adopting specific taxes.
3.4.1 A specif tax tZ on the access fee
Let us focus on the effects of specific taxation on platform’s choices. We use three
unit taxes in line with what has already been implemented in some countries and
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proposed by Colin and Collin (2013): a specific tax on the access fee, tZ, one on ad-
vertising, ta, which is measurable in the number of ads displayed online and a spe-
cific tax on data exploitation, ts, measured using data exchange throughout servers
as a proxy.
Thus, platform’s profit function becomes:
Πp = n ∗ Z + A− k(a, s)− tZZ− taa− tss (3.20)
and the optimal access fee changes as follows:
Z∗∗ =
v(s)− ψ(se)− px + c(x)− tZ
2
(3.21)
Looking only at the effects of a tax tZ, its impact is clearly negative, as confirmed by
comparative statics5:
dZ
dtZ
=
(+)
Ω
< 0
da
dtZ
=
(−)
Ω
> 0
ds
dtZ
=
(−)
Ω
> 0
where Ω < 0, and it is the determinant of the negative semi-definite Hessian matrix
3× 3 derived from first order conditions.
As evident the effect of a tax on users’ fee is to reduce the profitability for the plat-
form on that side of the market. As a consequence, the monopolist chooses to shift
partially the source of its profits from users’ to retailer’s side, by exploiting more the
targeted advertising effect.
Proposition 7 A specific tax on users’ fee changes the profitability of users’ side of the
market. The platform is induced to partially move the source of its revenues from that side to
the retailer’s one by reducing the fee and increasing the investment in targeted advertising.
5For the full derivations, see the appendix B.2
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At last, the platform sets a lower access fee for users, but it displays more ads and exploits
more users’ data.
The consequences on the number of users joining the platform are positive. In fact,
provided that there is no change in privacy’s consciousness, we get:
dn
dtZ
= vs
ds
dtZ
− dZ
dtZ
> 0
So, the platform finds convenient to exploit the other side of the market by provid-
ing better services and reducing taxable profits. As an extreme consequence, the
monopolist could set no access fee, Z = 0, paying no taxes and making all profits
from the retailer’s side.
This result is in line with what expected. More interesting is instead looking at two
other fiscal instruments and their consequences.
3.4.2 A specific tax on advertising, ta, or on data, ts
The effect of a tax on access fee indirectly affects also the optimal ratio in (3.15), since
the number of ads a and data s changes, but the optimal rule, which guarantees the
efficient provision, still holds.
A unit tax on ads or on data instead distort the optimal ratio:
xpa
vs + xps
=
ka + ta
ks + ts
(3.22)
Only when the increase in numerator and denominator is equally proportional,
which is different from saying that ta = ts, then the ratio does not change, though
the quantity of a and s are different compared to the case without taxes.
Moreover, their final effect on the variables chosen by the platform is similar. Both
of them may cause either a rise or a decrease in the access fee for users, depending
on the strengths of externalities on price of good x, but both a tax on ads, and a tax
on data, will likely end by reducing the number of ads displayed and the level of
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data exploitation.
Studying the effect of a tax on advertising, from comparative statics we get:
dZ
dta
=
(vs − xps)(2nxpas − kas) + xpa [2n(vss + xpss) + vs(vs + xps)− kss]
Ω
≷ 0
da
dta
=
−2 [2n(vss + xpss) + vs(vs + xps)− kss] + v2s − x2 p2s
Ω
< 0
ds
dta
=
xpa(vs + xps) + 2(2nxpas − kas)
Ω
< 0
where Ω < 0, and it is the determinant of the negative semi-definite Hessian matrix
3× 3 derived from FOCs.
The numerators of the second and third expression are both positive, so the sign is
well-defined, and, as a consequence, the final effect on a and s is negative. The first
numerator is in fact the principal minor of a matrix 2× 2, which is positive when the
second order conditions hold. The second one is positive due to the initial assump-
tion of the model about the externalities of a and s on users’ utility and willingness
to pay.
The sign of the numerator in the first expression is ambiguous. The square bracket
is negative and so it pushes for an increase in the access fee Z, whereas the second
round bracket is positive, but the first one may be either positive or negative. When
it is negative, that means that the externality of s on price weighted by the amount of
good x sold is higher than the externality on users’ utility, then the access fee rises.
Otherwise, when the business is not data-driven, that means that data are more use-
ful for users’ services than for creating value for the retailer, then the sign is not
well-defined.
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For a tax on data, ts, using comparative statics, we obtain:
dZ
dts
=
−xpa(2nxpas + xpavs − kas)− (vs − xps)(2nxpaa − kaa)
Ω
≷ 0
da
dts
=
−xpa(vs − xps) + 2(2nxpas + xpavs − kas)
Ω
≶ 0
ds
dts
=
−2(2nxpaa − kaa)− x2 p2a
Ω
< 0
In this case, only the sign of the effect on data is well-defined and negative, since
the numerator is a principal minor of a matrix 2× 2. Whereas for the first two ex-
pressions, the sign depends strongly on the round bracket (vs − xps). When it is
negative, the sign is positive for the access fee and negative for the advertising, oth-
erwise it remains ambiguous. Hence, the result is the same as the previous case only
for the impact on data exploitation.
The effect is also partially similar in sign to that found for a change in users’ eval-
uation. Further considerations can be made when the data externality is higher for
retailer’s revenue than for users’ benefits, i.e. xps > vs.
Proposition 8 When the externality of data on users’ evaluation of services is weaker than
the increase of their marginal willingness to pay derived from data exploitation, that is vs <
xps, then the optimal strategy of platform is well defined. The platform would set a higher
access fee for users and would reduce both the number of ads and the level of data exploitation,
independently of the implemented unit tax.
This strategy is justified indeed by the opportunity for the platform partially change
the source of its revenue on the other side of the market. In this way, it is able to
reduce the fiscal burden on the most profitable side of the market.
Finally, looking at the consequence on the number of users joining the platform,
from totally differentiating n(s, se, Z), provided that there is no change in privacy’s
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consciousness, we get:
dn
dt
= vs
ds
dti−
− dZ
dti
+/−
(3.23)
where ti with i = a, s indicates the implemented specific tax. The condition (3.23)
tells us what happens to users’ participation.
Proposition 9 When the externality of data on users’ evaluation of services is weaker than
the increase of their marginal willingness to pay derived from data exploitation, that is vs <
xps, then the number of users joining the platform will decrease. The platform would prefer
less users’ participation to partially compensate the reduction in services’ quality and in
order to not reduce too much the level of data exploitation.
So, when the platform finds convenient to increase the access fee, then less users
will join the platform. Otherwise, when it reduces its access fee, it tries to partially
compensate the reduction in participants caused by poorer services’ quality in order
to reduce the losses made on the other side of the market due to lower data exploita-
tion. This happens each time the retailer’s side is more profitable than users’ one. In
simple terms, in data driven businesses, profits come from the ability to extract value
from personal info. Conversely, in mass driven businesses, profits come mainly from
the number of customers and the analysis of their preferences is not so relevant. The
strength of data externality determines the adopted specific business model. The
more retailer’s sales depend on data, the more likely the monopoly would charge a
higher access fee. The less the business is data driven, the more likely the monopoly
would try to subsidise users’ participation.
3.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we deal with a two-sided monopolist platform which makes profit
both from selling personal services to users and selling targeted advertising to re-
tailers. We show how this business model tries to balance the profitability of the two
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sides of the market by choosing an efficient level of data exploitation and setting a
non-negative access fee. When the profitability of ads’ sales is very high, there exists
the convenience for the platform of offering services freely in order to push up users’
participation.
We introduce here an element of novelty regarding users’ expectation about their
privacy. Though it might seem a strong simplification, this aspect allows to show
how a change in the attention to personal privacy may have direct effects on plat-
form’s choices.
In line with the current debate about the harmful tax planning of digital platform
and the need to rise fiscal revenue by the government, the analysis goes on by show-
ing the effects of introducing specific taxes on sources of income for the platform.
According to the specific business model adopted by the platform, a data driven
business or a mass driven one, the results are opposite. In the former, the monopo-
list would try to subsidise users’ participation by lowering the access fee, conversely
in the latter the monopolist would partially shift the source of its income from the
retailer to users by charging a higher access fee as best reply.
These results suggest that a policy maker cannot ignore the business model adopted
by a digital platform before choosing the best reply to this phenomenon. An em-
pirical enquire is needed to take the best choice and to understand the mechanism
behind these companies. In this line, the attention of the EU Commission to study
how algorithms work through a group of experts is very positive. Given that most
of the business models involved in the digital economy rely on advertising based on
data exploitation, we have to draw some actions to balance the needs for personal
privacy and to raise fiscal revenue assuring an equal playing field for all businesses,
traditional and digital. Single and uncoordinated responses seem to be a poor way
for governments to capture a bigger share of the digital value creation, and they may
finish by exacerbating distortions, by stifling innovation and by creating a puzzle of
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fiscal rules. For a global problem, the best solution in our opinion is an international
agreement, though it will not be easy to build a common ground among many dif-
ferent countries. Otherwise, the final scenario will be a fragmented landscape, with
problems of double taxation and international disputes.
There are several paths to extend the present analysis. One is to investigate how
these results change in presence of some form of competition between platforms.
Another one consists of studying the effect of data exploitation on investment deci-
sions, how these are made and whether some kind of taxes would finish by stifling
innovation or exacerbating the efforts to create value from personal data. Other
studies can be performed through experiments to analyse users’ perception of their
privacy and if and how their privacy-consciousness changes after specific events.
However, the greatest effort has to be concentrated into empirical research. In fact,
national and supranational institutions may help to force digital companies to dis-
close their data to scholars and be more transparent in front of citizens.
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Chapter 4
Optimal taxation with persuasive
advertising
This paper studies the optimal structure of taxation in a model where persuasive advertising
is treated as undesired by the government, which, as consequence, aims at maximising a
“laundered" version of consumers’ utility. We tackle also distributional concerns, allowing
for two types of agents, high-skilled and low-skilled. We find that in some cases a positive
tax rate on commodities or on ads can help to pursue redistributive goals. In addition, under
some conditions, combining commodity taxation with a positive advertising tax rate can be
welfare-enhancing.
JEL classification: H21, D60, M37.
Keywords: Nonlinear income taxation; commodity taxation; redistribution; advertis-
ing.
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4.1 Introduction
Economists have long recognized that advertising has two main functions: to inform
and to persuade.
A third, but less exploited function is associated with the concept of complementar-
ity. Becker and Murphy (1993) was the first to introduce and interpret advertising as
a complement of the advertised good.
In the digital age, the information function seems to have been overcome, because
consumers can get all the product informations they want from a quick search on
web. That makes virtually all advertising today purely persuasive. This is even more
true since it seems difficult to compare the whole amount of information available
online. As consequence, every day new web-sites are born to help people making
right choices. Information function seems to belong to these web-sites than adver-
tising itself.
Persuasive advertising has been considered anti-competitive, because it induces peo-
ple to buy products that they do not really prefer, harming consumers and placing
sellers of consumers’ preferred products at a competitive disadvantage.
The idea that some individuals do not know what is best for them is not new in eco-
nomics and other social sciences. Mistakes in individuals’ behaviour is in fact the
object of behavioural public economics (Kanbur et al., 2006). Indeed the key feature
of behavioural optimal taxation models has been to highlight how standard optimal
tax formulas should be amended by the presence of terms reflecting the failure of
consumers to act in accordance with their real well-being.
A first attempt at building a link between the empirical literature on the determi-
nants of subjective well-being and the theory has been made by Gerritsen (2016).
While the most recent and complete contribution about optimal taxation with be-
havioural agents belongs to Farhi and Gabaix (2020). They provide a general model
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of behavioural biases, which allows on one side to show how the forces arising in
isolation interact, and on the other side it adds new insights on some of the corner-
stone results of optimal taxation theory.
Although the growing attention in literature to correct “wrong" behaviour by indi-
viduals, as highlighted by Thaler and Sunstein (2008), at the best of our knowledge,
no one has paid proper attention to distortions in choices induced by advertising.
In the era of digitalization, people are bombed continuously by ads from everywhere
at every time, directly or in an inaudible way. This is enough to justify in principle
government’s actions to limit and to regulate digital advertising. Furthermore, con-
cerns about privacy and data exploitation in order to create fitter targeted ads might
be considered an additional reason to ask authority’s intervention.
The paper conceptually closest to our is Blomquist and Micheletto (2006), which
deals with the concepts of paternalism and merit goods, showing the consequences
for the structure of direct and indirect taxation of a divergence between the individ-
uals’ and the policy maker’s utility functions.
The way we choose to treat persuasive advertising, such as a demerit good, is also
similar to how Veblen effects are treated in Micheletto (2011), who highlights that
“laundering" the individuals’ preferences adds a new term in the optimal formulas,
which consists of an incentive to under/over-provide the good, according to govern-
ment’s preferences. Related to these two studies, recently, Aronsson and Johansson-
Sterman (2018) have made a comparison among paternalism and Veblen effects. Al-
though the tax motives differ between paternalist and welfarist governments, they
find that the policy rules for optimal income taxation may be remarkably similar.
Using a similar approach, here we provide a characterization of an optimal tax sys-
tem when a government aims at “laundering" consumers’ utility from the effect of
persuasive advertising.
In our analysis we also tackle distributional concerns, finding that in some cases a
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positive tax rate on commodities or, alternatively, on ads can help to pursue redis-
tributive goals. In addition, we also show that combining commodity taxation with a
positive advertising tax rate might be welfare enhancing, under some circumstances.
These results are achieved under the condition of quasi-linear preferences, which is
an assumption that is often made for simplifying purposes in the optimal tax lit-
erature. Nevertheless, a more general, though cumbersome, result can be derived
without relying on the assumption of quasi-linearity.
Therefore, the contribution of the present work is threefold. It helps to shed light
on the age-old link between direct and indirect taxation, studied by Atkinson and
Stiglitz (1976). Moreover, it faces an issue not yet discussed in the literature of op-
timal taxation about the restraint of targeted advertising, when this last could lead
to unaware damage for individuals. According to this interpretation, persuasive ad-
vertising might be considered undesired as well as demerit goods, such as cigarettes
or alcohol and addressed into similar ways1. And finally, it introduces the idea that
persuasiveness might affect distinct groups of customers differently. Some empirical
studies are required to validate this hypothesis.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model and
characterizes the behaviour of agents and firms. In Section 3 we present the gov-
ernment’s maximization problem and characterize the properties of an optimal tax
system in presence of traditional persuasive advertising. In Section 4 we present a
more elaborate model where we also introduce the possibility to use a tax on adver-
tising as an additional policy tool for the government to deal with targeted persua-
sive advertising. Finally, Section 5 provides concluding remarks and a discussion of
possible future extensions of our analysis.
1For having an example of how merit goods has been treated into literature, see Racionero (2000,
2001).
4.2. The model 71
4.2 The model
There are two groups of agents, low-skilled and high-skilled. Variables pertaining
to low-skilled are denoted by `; variables pertaining to high-skilled are denoted by
h. Low-skilled agents are paid a wage rate w` and high-skilled agents are paid a
wage rate wh, with wh > w`. The size of total population is normalized to unity
and the proportion of low-skilled is denoted by pi. Agents can buy two goods: good
x1 is internally produced by perfectly competitive firms and its production price
is normalized to one; good x2 is imported from abroad and is sold by a foreign
monopolistic firm. There is no limitation on imports and no duties are charged. This
firm can use persuasive advertising, denoted by a, to boost its revenue by increasing
the amount that consumers are willing to spend on good x2. Only the consumption
choices of low-skilled agents are affected by persuasive advertising2, a.
For high-skilled agents preferences are given by
Uh = u (x1) + φ (x2)− v (L) (4.1)
whereas for low-skilled they are given by
U` = u (x1) + φ (x2) + ψ (x2, a)− v (L) (4.2)
The functions u (·), φ (·) are increasing and concave and the function v (·) is increas-
ing and convex. The function ψ (x2, a) captures the persuasive effect of advertising,
which increases the marginal willingness to pay of low-skilled agents for good x2,
and it is assumed to be characterized by the following properties:
∂ψ (x2, a)
∂x2
> 0;
∂ψ (x2, a)
∂a
> 0;
∂2ψ (x2, a)
∂x2∂a
> 0;
∂2ψ (x2, a)
∂x2∂x2
< 0;
∂2ψ (x2, a)
∂a∂a
< 0.
2This assumption will be released in the next sections after having introduced targeted advertising.
The idea is that without data, high-skill people are able to protect themselves from persuasive ads at
no cost, whereas the advertiser cannot discriminate efficiently among customers.
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Notice in particular that the marginal effect on utility of good x2 is increasing in ads
a.
Labor income is denoted by I j, for j = `, h, with I j = wjLj. The government uses a
nonlinear income tax T (I) and a linear commodity tax t on good x2 to pursue redis-
tributive goals. Moreover, tax policy is also used by the government to correct for
the fact that low-skilled agents make suboptimal consumption choices due to the ef-
fect of persuasive advertising. The monopolistic foreign firm charges a unitary price
p for good x2; denoting by q the consumer price of this good, we have that q = p+ t.
The game proceeds as follows: the government chooses the fiscal instruments, after
that the foreign firm set its price p, then consumers make their consumption and
labour choices. Thus, we solve the problem by backward induction in the next para-
graph.
4.2.1 Consumers’ behavior
Consider first the behavior of high-skilled agents. Defining disposable (i.e. after-tax)
income by B ≡ I − T (I) and denoting by Vh (q, B, I) the conditional indirect utility
obtained by a high-skilled agent for given values of q, B and I, we have:
Vh (q, B, I) = max
xh1 ,x
h
2
{
u
(
xh1
)
+ φ
(
xh2
)
− v
(
I
wh
)
| xh1 + qxh2 = B
}
The first order condition φ′
(
xh2
)
= qu′
(
xh1
)
, together with the budget constraint
xh1 + qx
h
2 = B define the conditional demand functions
xhi = x
h
i (q, B) for i = 1, 2 (4.3)
High-skilled agents choose labor supply maximizing Vh (q, B, I) subject to the link
between pre-tax income and after-tax income implied by the income tax schedule
T (I) = I − B. This allows to implicitly define the marginal income tax rate faced by
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a high-skilled agent as
T′ (I) = 1+
∂Vh/∂I
∂Vh/∂B
= 1−MRShIB
where MRShIB denotes the marginal rate of substitution between I and B for an agent
of type h.
Similarly, denoting by V` (q, B, I; a) the conditional indirect utility obtained by a low-
skilled agent for given values of q, B, I and a, we have:
V` (q, B, I; a) = max
x`1,x
`
2
{
u
(
x`1
)
+ φ
(
x`2
)
+ ψ
(
x`2, a
)
− v
(
I
w`
)
| x`1 + qx`2 = B
}
The first order condition φ′
(
x`2
)
+
∂ψ(x`2,a)
∂x`2
= qu′
(
x`1
)
, together with the budget con-
straint x`1 + qx
`
2 = B define the conditional demand functions
x`i = x
`
i (q, B; a) for i = 1, 2. (4.4)
Low-skilled agents choose labor supply maximizing V` (q, B, I) subject to the link
between pre-tax income and after-tax income implied by the income tax schedule
T (I).
This allows to implicitly define the marginal income tax rate faced by a low-skilled
agent as
T′ (I) = 1+
∂V`/∂I
∂V`/∂B
= 1−MRS`IB
where MRS`IB denotes the marginal rate of substitution between I and B for an agent
of type `. Notice that, given the separability structure that characterizes the indi-
viduals’ preferences, it follows that consumption choices (4.3)-(4.4) do not directly
depend on labor supply I/w.
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4.2.2 Foreign firm maximization problem
Denoting by θ (a) the increasing and convex function describing the cost incurred
for advertising purposes and assuming that good x2 can be produced at a constant
marginal cost c, the foreign firm solves the following maximization problem:
max
p,a
[
pix`2
(
B`, a, p + t
)
+ (1− pi) xh2
(
Bh, p + t
)]
(p− c)− θ (a)
The first order conditions are:
pix`2 + (1− pi) xh2 +
[
pi
∂x`2
∂q
+ (1− pi) ∂x
h
2
∂q
]
(p− c) = 0 (4.5)
(p− c)pi∂x
`
2
∂a
− θ′ (a) = 0 (4.6)
Totally differentiating the set of first order conditions above, and assuming that the
second order conditions for a maximum are satisfied, i.e. that the Hessian matrix is
negative semi-definite so that its determinant Ω is positive,3 we get the following
comparative statics results4:
Ω
dp
dt
= pi2 (p− c) ∂
2x`2
∂q∂a
[
∂x`2
∂a
+ (p− c) ∂
2x`2
∂q∂a
]
−
[
pi
∂2x`2
∂a∂a
(p− c)− θ′′ (a)
] [
pi
∂x`2
∂q
+ (1− pi) ∂x
h
2
∂q
]
−
[
pi
∂2x`2
∂a∂a
(p− c)− θ′′ (a)
] [
pi
∂2x`2
∂q∂q
+ (1− pi) ∂
2xh2
∂q∂q
]
(p− c) (4.7)
3The determinant Ω is given by:
Ω =
{[
pi
∂2x`2
∂q∂q
+ (1− pi) ∂
2xh2
∂q∂q
]
(p− c) +
(
pi
∂x`2
∂q
+ (1− pi) ∂x
h
2
∂q
)
2
}[
pi
∂2x`2
∂a∂a
(p− c)− θ′′ (a)
]
−pi2
[
∂x`2
∂a
+ (p− c) ∂
2x`2
∂q∂a
]2
4See Appendix C.1 for the whole derivation.
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Ω
da
dt
=
[
pi
∂x`2
∂q
+ (1− pi) ∂x
h
2
∂q
] [
∂x`2
∂a
− (p− c) ∂
2x`2
∂q∂a
]
pi
+ (p− c) ∂x
`
2
∂a
[
pi
∂2x`2
∂q∂q
+ (1− pi) ∂
2xh2
∂q∂q
]
pi < 0 (4.8)
Ω
dp
dBh
= − (1− pi)
[
∂xh2
∂Bh
+ (p− c) ∂
2xh2
∂Bh∂q
] [
pi
∂2x`2
∂a∂a
(p− c)− θ′′ (a)
]
≥ 0 (4.9)
Ω
da
dBh
= pi (1− pi)
[
∂xh2
∂Bh
+ (p− c) ∂
2xh2
∂Bh∂q
] [
∂x`2
∂a
+ (p− c) ∂
2x`2
∂q∂a
]
≥ 0 (4.10)
Ω
dp
dB`
= pi2 (p− c) ∂
2x`2
∂B`∂a
[
∂x`2
∂a
+ (p− c) ∂
2x`2
∂q∂a
]
−pi
[
∂x`2
∂B`
+ (p− c) ∂
2x`2
∂B`∂q
] [
pi
∂2x`2
∂a∂a
(p− c)− θ′′ (a)
]
≥ 0 (4.11)
Ω
da
dB`
= pi2
[
∂x`2
∂a
+ (p− c) ∂
2x`2
∂q∂a
] [
∂x`2
∂B`
+ (p− c) ∂
2x`2
∂B`∂q
]
−2pi (p− c) ∂
2x`2
∂B`∂a
[
pi
∂x`2
∂q
+ (1− pi) ∂x
h
2
∂q
]
−pi (p− c)2 ∂
2x`2
∂B`∂a
[
pi
∂2x`2
∂q∂q
+ (1− pi) ∂
2xh2
∂q∂q
]
≥ 0 (4.12)
The only expression whose sign is not well-defined is the one capturing the impact
of commodity tax t on price p, since on the right hand side of (4.7) the first row is
positive, whereas the last two lines are negative. As expected the impact of the tax
on ads is negative since advertising is complement to consumption of the advertised
good. An increase in either B` or Bh rises both the price p and the amount of ads.
76 Chapter 4. Optimal taxation with persuasive advertising
4.3 The government’s problem
From the government’s perspective the effect of advertising is harmful since it dis-
torts the behaviour of low-skilled agents who are induced to act as consumers in a
way that is not consistent with the maximization of their true well-being. Therefore,
the government’s optimal tax problem can be formally described as follows:
max
I`,B`,Ih,Bh,t
V`
(
p + t, B`, I`; a
)
− ψ
(
x`2, a
)
subject to:
Vh
(
p + t, Bh, Ih
)
≥ V,
Vh
(
p + t, Bh, Ih
)
≥ Vh
(
p + t, B`, I`
)
,(
I` − B` + tx`2
)
pi +
(
Ih − Bh + txh2
)
(1− pi) ≥ R.
In the problem above the first constraint prescribes a minimum utility that should
be granted to high-skilled agents; the second constraint is a self-selection constraint
requiring high-skilled agents not to mimic low-skilled agents; the final constraint
represents the government’s budget constraint, where R represents an exogenous
revenue requirement.
We implicitly assume that the government aims at redistributing towards low-skilled
agents so that we do not need to worry about the possibility that low-skilled agents
may be tempted to mimic high-skilled agents.
Notice that, rather than aiming at maximizing the utility function of low-skilled
agents (subject to the relevant constraints), the government’s goal is to maximize
a “laundered" version of the utility of low-skilled. In particular, and in accordance
with the interpretation of advertising as persuasive rather than informative, the ef-
fect of ads is neglected in the “laundered" version of the low-skilled utility.
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4.3.1 Optimal commodity taxation
Denote the Lagrange multipliers associated to the three constraints above by, respec-
tively, δ, λ and µ. Denote by a “hat" a variable pertaining to a high-skilled behaving
as a mimicker. Denote Hicksian (compensated) demands by a “tilde" symbol. Using
first order conditions, after some calculations, it is possible to obtain a complex ex-
pression for optimal commodity tax rate5.
To simplify the interpretation of the optimality condition, assume that the agents’
utility function is quasi-linear6 in x1 so that ∂x
j
2/∂q = ∂x˜
j
2/∂q for j = `, h, da/dB
` =
da/dBh = dp/dB` = dp/dBh = 0, and ∂V`/∂B` = ∂Vh/∂Bh = ∂V̂/∂B` = 1. Then,
the following Proposition 10 characterizes the optimal commodity tax rate.
Proposition 10 Under the assumption of quasi-linear utility function in x1, the expression
for optimal commodity tax rate provided by a monopoly becomes:
t =
λ
µΥ
(
x`2 − x̂2
)(
1+
dp
dt
)
+
1
µΥ
[
∂x`2
∂a
da
dt
+
∂x`2
∂q
(
1+
dp
dt
)]
∂ψ
∂x`2
− p− c
Υ
[
pi
∂x`2
∂q
+ (1− pi) ∂x
h
2
∂q
]
dp
dt
(4.13)
where
1+
dp
dt
=
(
pi
∂x`2
∂q + (1− pi) ∂x
h
2
∂q
) [
pi
∂2x`2
∂a∂a (p− c)− θ′′ (a)
]
− pi2
[
∂x`2
∂a +
∂2x`2
∂q∂a (p− c)
]
∂x`2
∂a
Ω
.
5See the Appendix C.2 for the whole derivation.
6It worth to be noted that this assumption is not without consequences. Doing it, we rule out any
income effect from the analysis. There exist two different ways of thinking about preferences to be
quasi-linear. It is usually assumed that if consumer has to make choices among large variety of goods,
then his preferences are quasi-linear at least in one of them. And it constitutes a first meaning of good
x1. Otherwise, quasi-linearity in money is usually assumed, since money is a natural numeraire in
which one can express the value of every good. According to this last interpretation, x1, can be reread
as money instead of a good produced in a perfectly competitive market.
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and Υ has been defined as
Υ ≡
[
pi
∂x˜`2
∂q
+ (1− pi) ∂x˜
h
2
∂q
](
1+
dp
dt
)
+ pi
∂x`2
∂a
da
dt
Proof. See Appendix C.2.
Noticing that 1+ dp/dt = dq/dt, i.e. it represents the net variation in the consumer
price for good x2 when t is marginally increased. We will hereafter base our discus-
sion of (4.13) on the assumption that 1+ dp/dt > 0.
The first term on the right hand side of (4.13) tells us how self-selection consider-
ations affect the choice of the optimal value for t. We know that x`2 − x̂2 > 0 as
persuasive advertising makes low-skilled agents spend more income on good x2
than a high-skilled mimicker; therefore, since dq/dt > 0 =⇒ Υ < 0, self-selection
considerations call for subsidizing the consumption of good x2. The second term on
the right hand side of (4.13) is instead a corrective term that descends from the fact
that the government launders the preferences of low-skilled agents in the objective
function that it maximizes. Given that da/dt < 0 (see (4.8)), this term would favour
selecting a positive tax rate on the consumption of good x2. Finally, the last term on
the right hand side of (4.13) is a corrective term that has opposite sign to dp/dt. If, as
one were to expect, dp/dt < 0, the last term on the right hand side of (4.13) would
call for setting t > 0. This would induce the foreign monopolist to set its price closer
to the marginal cost c, therefore reducing the deadweight loss descending from the
fact that, exploiting its market power, the monopolist charges a price which is higher
than the marginal cost.
To provide a better intuition for this corrective term appearing in (4.13), consider
for illustrative purposes the hypothetical case when advertising is not a choice vari-
able for the foreign monopolist, but is instead exogenously given. Then (4.13) would
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reduce to:
t =
λ
(
x`2 − x̂2
)
+
∂x`2
∂q
∂ψ
∂x`2
µ
[
pi
∂x`2
∂q + (1− pi) ∂x
h
2
∂q
] − (p− c) dpdt
1+ dpdt
Hence, if advertising were treated instead as exogenously given, we would have
dp
dt
= −
pi
∂x`2
∂q + (1− pi) ∂x
h
2
∂q + (p− c)pi ∂
2x`2
∂q∂q + (p− c) (1− pi) ∂
2xh2
∂q∂q{[
pi
∂x`2
∂q + (1− pi) ∂x
h
2
∂q
]
2+ (p− c)pi ∂2x`2∂q∂q + (p− c) (1− pi) ∂
2xh2
∂q∂q
} < 0
so that
1+
dp
dt
=
pi
∂x`2
∂q + (1− pi) ∂x
h
2
∂q{[
pi
∂x`2
∂q + (1− pi) ∂x
h
2
∂q
]
2+ (p− c)pi ∂2x`2∂q∂q + (p− c) (1− pi) ∂
2xh2
∂q∂q
} > 0
and therefore:
dp
dt
1+ dpdt
=
dp/dt
dq/dt
= −
pi
∂x`2
∂q + (1− pi) ∂x
h
2
∂q + (p− c)pi ∂
2x`2
∂q∂q + (p− c) (1− pi) ∂
2xh2
∂q∂q
pi
∂x`2
∂q + (1− pi) ∂x
h
2
∂q
= −
1+ pi ∂2x`2∂q∂q + (1− pi) ∂2xh2∂q∂q
pi
∂x`2
∂q + (1− pi) ∂x
h
2
∂q
(p− c)
 < 0
Thus, when advertising is not a choice variable for the foreign monopolist, the cor-
rective terms for “laundering" and “distortion" call undoubtedly for a positive tax
rate.
4.3.2 Optimal marginal income tax rates and marginal effective tax rates
Here we show firstly how to derive the optimal marginal income tax rates for both
agents and then their marginal effective tax rates.
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For the high skilled we have:
T′
(
Ih
)
= 1−MRShIB = 1+
∂Vh
∂Ih
∂Vh
∂Bh
The first order condition with respect to Ih is:
(δ+ λ)
∂Vh
∂Ih
= −µ (1− pi)
Whereas, the first order condition with respect to Bh is:
(δ+ λ)
∂Vh
∂Bh
= −µ
[
t
∂xh2
∂Bh
− 1
]
(1− pi)−
[
µtpi − ∂ψ
∂x`2
]
∂x`2
∂a
da
dBh
− ∆ dp
dBh
where ∆ accounts for the partial effect of a change in p on the government maxi-
mization problem7.
Combining the two first order conditions above gives:
∂Vh
∂Ih
∂Vh
∂Bh
{
−µ
[
t
∂xh2
∂Bh
− 1
]
(1− pi)−
[
µtpi − ∂ψ
∂x`2
]
∂x`2
∂a
da
dBh
− ∆ dp
dBh
}
= −µ (1− pi)
and rearranging:
1+
∂Vh
∂Ih
∂Vh
∂Bh
= T′
(
Ih
)
=
∂Vh
∂Ih
∂Vh
∂Bh
t ∂x
h
2
∂Bh
+
[
µtpi − ∂ψ
∂x`2
]
∂x`2
∂a
da
dBh + ∆
dp
dBh
µ (1− pi)

Assuming that utility is linear in x1 implies that the expression above simplifies to:
T′
(
Ih
)
= 0
Therefore, defining the marginal effective tax rate faced by high-skilled agents as
METRh ≡ T′
(
Ih
)
+ t
[
∂xh2
∂Ih
+ MRShIB
∂xh2
∂Bh
]
7See equation (C.1) in the Appendix.
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we also have that METRh = 0 since ∂x
h
2
∂Ih =
∂xh2
∂Bh = 0
8.
For the low-skilled, instead, we have:
T′
(
I`
)
= 1−MRS`IB = 1+
∂V`
∂I`
∂V`
∂B`
The first order condition with respect to I` is:
∂V`
∂I`
= λ
∂V̂
∂I`
− µpi
The first order condition with respect to B` is:
∂V`
∂B`
=
∂ψ
∂x`2
∂x`2
∂B`
+ λ
∂V̂
∂B`
− µ
[
t
∂x`2
∂B`
− 1
]
pi −
[
µtpi − ∂ψ
∂x`2
]
∂x`2
∂a
da
dB`
− ∆ dp
dB`
Combining the two first order conditions above gives:
∂V`
∂I`
∂V`
∂B`
{
∂ψ
∂x`2
∂x`2
∂B`
+ λ
∂V̂
∂B`
− µ
[
t
∂x`2
∂B`
− 1
]
pi −
[
µtpi − ∂ψ
∂x`2
]
∂x`2
∂a
da
dB`
− ∆ dp
dB`
}
= λ
∂V̂
∂I`
−µpi
and rearranging:
µpi
[
1+
∂V`
∂I`
∂V`
∂B`
]
= λ
∂V̂
∂I`
−
∂V`
∂I`
∂V`
∂B`
{
∂ψ
∂x`2
∂x`2
∂B`
+ λ
∂V̂
∂B`
− µt ∂x
`
2
∂B`
pi −
[
µtpi − ∂ψ
∂x`2
]
∂x`2
∂a
da
dB`
− ∆ dp
dB`
}
Hence, we get the marginal income tax for low-skilled agents as:
T′
(
I`
)
=
λ
µpi
∂V̂
∂B`
(
∂V̂
∂I`
∂V̂
∂B`
−
∂V`
∂I`
∂V`
∂B`
)
+ t
∂x`2
∂B`
∂V`
∂I`
∂V`
∂B`
− 1
µpi
∂V`
∂I`
∂V`
∂B`
{
∂ψ
∂x`2
∂x`2
∂B`
−
[
µtpi − ∂ψ
∂x`2
]
∂x`2
∂a
da
dB`
− ∆ dp
dB`
}
8Therefore the “no distortion at the top" result is not violated, but it strongly depends on the quasi-
linearity assumption for preferences.
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Assuming that utility is linear in x1 implies that the expression above simplifies to9:
T′
(
I`
)
=
λ
µpi
(
∂V̂
∂I`
− ∂V
`
∂I`
)
> 0
Furthermore, defining the marginal effective tax rate faced by low-skilled agents as
METR` ≡ T′
(
I`
)
+ t
[
∂x`2
∂I`
+ MRS`IB
∂x`2
∂B`
]
we have that METR` ≡ T′ (I`) since ∂x`2
∂I` =
∂x`2
∂B` = 0.
Notice that the impact on METRi of commodity taxation is different from zero when
the quasi-linearity assumption is released.
4.4 A model with data and advertising
In this section we try to sophisticate the previous model and to adapt it to digi-
tal economy, specifically to targeted advertising industry, like social platforms for
instance. By doing it, we consider the use of data as a tool to address customers
through targeted ads.
First of all, we need to adapt our previous model to standard digital businesses. As-
sume that the monopolist selling good x2 is now a domestic firm and assume that its
profits are fully taxed away by the government. Assume also that this monopolistic
firm buys advertising from a platform which is located in a foreign country10. More-
over, differently from the previous model, the platform is able to recognize both
agents and discriminate among them by using targeted ads through personal data
exploitation.
9The marginal tax rate for low-skilled can be written also as: T′
(
I`
)
= λµpi
∂V̂
∂B`
(
MRS`IB
)
− M̂RSIB;
which is necessarily positive when utility is linear in x1. The standard single-crossing condition. which
guarantees that the expression in round bracket is positive, is no longer necessarily satisfied if prefer-
ences are not linear into x1.
10In this way, the real profits arising from advertising cannot be addressed by a standard corporate
income tax.
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Hence, a new element, data s, enters as a proxy for privacy. Implicitly, we are as-
suming that individuals are not able to evaluate privacy protection issues, unlike
government does11.
Our goal here it is not to make a comparison between the previous model and a new
one, but it consists of adapting that one to deal with digital targeted advertising.
Therefore, assume high- and low-skilled preferences are represented respectively by
the quasi-linear functions:
Uh = x1 + φ (x2) + ρhψ (x2, a, s)− v (L)
U` = x1 + φ (x2) + ρ`ψ (x2, a, s)− v (L)
where s represents data collected by the platform which gives access to the users at
no charge, and ρ` and ρh are two positive constants capturing the extent to which
advertising distorts the behavior of, respectively, low- and high-skilled agents12.
The sequence of game does not change. The government chooses the taxation, after
the platform sets the price for ads and sells them to the domestic firm. Then the firm
decides the price for commodity x2 and finally people choose how much to work
and how to allocate their earnings. So we can solve it by backward induction.
11Though it seems a strong assumption, the concerns about the use of personal information are
on the basis of current General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 2016/679 in the European Union.
These concerns also justify in some way our presumption about the greater attention by countries’
authorities rather than a single person.
12It seems unrealistic to assume that high-skilled agents are immune (as done before) from ads when
these are well-targeted.
84 Chapter 4. Optimal taxation with persuasive advertising
The maximization problem solved by the monopolist selling good x2 is the follow-
ing13:
max
p,ah,a`
(1− τ)
{[
pix`2
(
p + t, a`, s
)
+ (1− pi) xh2
(
p + t, ah, s
)]
(p− c)−
(
ah + a`
)
pa
}
whose first order conditions are:
pix`2 + (1− pi) xh2 +
[
pi
∂x`2
∂q
+ (1− pi) ∂x
h
2
∂q
]
(p− c) = 0
(p− c) (1− pi) ∂x
h
2
∂ah
− pa = 0
(p− c)pi∂x
`
2
∂a`
− pa = 0
Totally differentiating the three first order conditions above allows deriving expres-
sions for:
dp
dt
=
dp
dt
| ds=0
dpa=0
+
dp
dpa
dpa
dt
+
dp
ds
ds
dt
dah
dt
=
dah
dt
| ds=0
dpa=0
+
dah
dpa
dpa
dt
+
dah
ds
ds
dt
da`
dt
=
da`
dt
| ds=0
dpa=0
+
da`
dpa
dpa
dt
+
da`
ds
ds
dt
Assuming that the advertising is produced by the platform at a cost given by the
increasing and convex function g
(
ah + a`, s
)
, the maximization problem solved by
the platform is given by:
max
pa,s
(
ah + a`
)
pa − g
(
ah + a`, s
)
13It should be noted that the prices are linear though the possibility of discrimination among indi-
viduals happens in reality. We are aware that it constitutes a limitation of the current approach, but it
could be justified in this specific framework. Indeed, having an homogeneous good, it is possible to
have some arbitrage between buyers of different skills if we allow for distinct prices without avoiding
people to exchange goods.
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Here, we implicitly assume that the platform does not discriminate between the
charged price for targeted advertising addressed to high- and low-skilled customers14.
The first order conditions are:
ah + a` +
(
∂ah
∂pa
+
∂a`
∂pa
) (
pa − g′1
)
= 0(
∂ah
∂s
+
∂a`
∂s
) (
pa − g′1
)− g′2 = 0
where g′1 and g
′
2 are respectively the first derivative of function g(·) with respect to
the first and the second argument.
Totally differentiating the two first order conditions above one gets expression for
dpa/dt and ds/dt, whose sign is not well-defined15.
The government’s problem is
max
I`,B`,Ih,Bh,t
V`
(
p + t, B`, I`; a, s
)
− ρ`ψ
(
x`2, a, s
)
subject to:
Vh
(
p + t, Bh, Ih; a, s
)
− ρhψ
(
xh2 , a, s
)
≥ V,
Vh
(
p + t, Bh, Ih; a, s
)
≥ Vh
(
p + t, B`, I`; a, s
)
,(
I` − B` + tx`2
)
pi +
(
Ih − Bh + txh2
)
(1− pi) +
+τ
{[
pix`2
(
p + t, a`, s
)
+ (1− pi) xh2
(
p + t, ah, s
)]
(p− c)−
(
ah + a`
)
pa
}
≥ R.
Once again, the first constraint prescribes a minimum utility that should be granted
to high-skilled agents; the second constraint is a self-selection constraint requiring
high-skilled agents not to mimic low-skilled agents; the final constraint represents
14We are aware of this strong assumption, and that it is not completely true. In fact, it happens in
practice to pay for the targeted audience. A firm does it through a complex system of auctions (i.e., a
first-price sealed-bid auction for instance). We are going to face this issue in a next paper.
15See Appendix C.3 for the relative comparative statics.
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the government’s budget constraint, where R represents an exogenous revenue re-
quirement.
Notice that the second line of the government’s budget constraint represents the rev-
enue collected through the tax, levied at rate τ, on the profits of the domestic firm
selling good x2. Since we assume that these profits can be fully taxed by the govern-
ment16, in our calculations below we will implicitly assume that τ = 100%.
The first order conditions of the government’s problem with respect to Bh and B` are,
respectively (remember that we have assumed that utility is quasi-linear in good x1):
(δ+ λ)− µ (1− pi) = 0 (4.14)
1− λ− µpi = 0 (4.15)
Assume that the nonlinear income tax is optimally chosen so that (4.14)-(4.15) are
satisfied. Then consider a tax reform that marginally increases t while at the same
time adjusts B` and Bh by, respectively, dB` = x`2dt and dB
h = xh2dt. By considering
the effects on the Lagrangian of the government’s problem, we can use a perturba-
tion method to derive an expression characterizing the optimal commodity tax rate.
As shown in the Appendix, this is given by the Proposition 11:
16Without this assumption, we should discuss how to share firm’s ownership between high- and
low-skilled agents.
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Proposition 11 When t is optimally chosen, the optimal tax rate on commodity provided
by a monopolist will be:
t =
λ
µΞ
(
x`2 − x̂2
)(
1+
dp
dt
)
+
ρ`
µΞ
∂ψ
(
x`2, a
`, s
)
∂x`2
[
∂x`2
∂q
(
1+
dp
dt
)
+
∂x`2
∂a`
da`
dt
+
∂x`2
∂s
ds
dt
]
+
δρh
µΞ
∂ψ
(
xh2 , a
h, s
)
∂xh2
[
∂xh2
∂q
(
1+
dp
dt
)
+
∂xh2
∂ah
dah
dt
+
∂xh2
∂s
ds
dt
]
− p− c
Ξ
{[
pi
∂x`2
∂q
+ (1− pi) ∂x
h
2
∂q
](
1+
dp
dt
)
+
[
pi
∂x`2
∂s
+ (1− pi) ∂x
h
2
∂s
]
ds
dt
}
− pa − g
′
1
Ξ
(
∂ah
∂pa
+
∂a`
∂pa
)
dpa
dt
where we have defined Ξ as
Ξ ≡
[
pi
∂x`2
∂q
+ (1− pi) ∂x
h
2
∂q
]
dq
dt
+
[
pi
∂x`2
∂s
+ (1− pi) ∂x
h
2
∂s
]
ds
dt
+pi
∂x`2
∂a`
da`
dt
+(1− pi) ∂x
h
2
∂ah
dah
dt
Proof. See Appendix C.4.
Once again, we get an expression for the optimal t which depends on three types
of considerations. On the right hand side of the expression above, the terms ap-
pearing on the first line capture how self-selection considerations affect the optimal
value for t. They depend both on the difference in consumption of good x2 by a
low-skilled and by a high-skilled mimicker, and on how a variation in t is going to
affect, through the induced variations in ah and s, the incentives for a high-skilled
to behave as a mimicker. The terms contained in the second and third line capture
the non-welfaristic motives affecting the optimal choice for t; these terms are due to
the fact that the government launders the individual preferences when evaluating
their utility. Finally, the terms contained in the last two lines capture the effect of a
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variation in t on the revenue obtained by the government through the tax levied on
the profits of the monopolist selling the good x2.
Understanding the sign of the expressions above is not simple. In fact, several terms
are not well defined in sign.
Assuming that the net variation in the consumer price for good x2 is positive, that
is 1 + dp/dt > 0, is not sufficient to state something else about the optimal tax rate
formula.
The problem is twofold: we cannot define apriori the sign of term Ξ, and the net
effect of t on the final consumed quantities x2 for both agents, i.e. dxi2/dt. Hereafter
we will discuss how to interpret the optimal formula when the platform answers
by reducing data exploitation, ds/dt < 0, and by increasing price, dpa/dt > 0, or
by decreasing it, dpa/dt < 0, but it is not enough to compensate the reduction in
demand for ads, that is dai/dt < 0.
Therefore, the first line assumes a negative expression, if the low-skilled one con-
sumes more than high-skilled mimicker. In the previous section, this circumstance
was obvious since persuasive advertising affected only low-skilled agents. Now, it
is possible also the opposite case and self-selection considerations might end to call
for a positive tax rate.
Furthermore, the second and third lines would favourite selecting a positive tax rate
on the consumption of good x2, because of “laundering" preferences by the govern-
ment.
Lastly, the effect on fiscal revenue would be negative due to the hypothesis that the
profits of the domestic firm selling good x2 are fully taxed. This negative impact
could be partially compensated (or enhanced) when the platform decreases (or in-
creases) the price for ads.
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4.4.1 Optimal advertising taxation with data exploitation
Suppose now that the government chooses to tax directly the ads that the monopolist
buys instead of taxing the consumption of good x2. Denote by ta the specific tax on
ads. The government’s problem changes as follows:
max
I`,B`,Ih,Bh,ta
V`
(
p, B`, I`; a, s
)
− ρ`ψ
(
x`2, a, s
)
subject to:
Vh
(
p, Bh, Ih; a, s
)
− ρhψ
(
xh2 , a, s
)
≥ V,
Vh
(
p, Bh, Ih; a, s
)
≥ Vh
(
p, B`, I`; a, s
)
,(
I` − B`
)
pi +
(
Ih − Bh
)
(1− pi) +
(
ah + a`
)
ta +
+τ
{[
pix`2
(
p, a`, s
)
+ (1− pi) xh2
(
p, ah, s
)]
(p− c)−
(
ah + a`
)
(pa + ta)
}
≥ R.
Apart from the fact that the indirect utilities V j (for j = `, h) no longer depend on t
(since t is now by assumption equal to zero), the differences with the case considered
in the previous subsection only pertain to the government’s budget constraint. Here
we have a specific tax ta on ads bought by monopolist. The rate at which the tax is
levied is assumed to be independent on whether the advertising is targeted towards
high- or low-skilled agents.
While the maximization problem solved by the platform is still the one that we have
considered in the previous subsection, the maximization problem solved by the mo-
nopolist selling good x2 becomes the following:
max
p,ah,a`
(1− τ)
{[
pix`2
(
p, a`, s
)
+ (1− pi) xh2
(
p, ah, s
)]
(p− c)−
(
ah + a`
)
(pa + ta)
}
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The first order conditions are:
pix`2 + (1− pi) xh2 +
[
pi
∂x`2
∂q
+ (1− pi) ∂x
h
2
∂q
]
(p− c) = 0 (4.16)
(p− c) (1− pi) ∂x
h
2
∂ah
− (pa + ta) = 0 (4.17)
(p− c)pi∂x
`
2
∂a`
− (pa + ta) = 0 (4.18)
Totally differentiating the three first order conditions above allows deriving expres-
sions for
dp
dta
=
dp
dta
| ds=0
dpa=0
+
dp
dpa
dpa
dta
+
dp
ds
ds
dta
dah
dta
=
dah
dta
| ds=0
dpa=0
+
dah
dpa
dpa
dta
+
dah
ds
ds
dta
da`
dta
=
da`
dta
| ds=0
dpa=0
+
da`
dpa
dpa
dta
+
da`
ds
ds
dta
Notice that the first order conditions of the government’s problem with respect to Bh
and B` are still given by (4.14)-(4.15).
Proposition 12 Given our assumption that utility is quasi-linear in x1, at an optimum ta
will be set according to the following rule:
ta =
λ
µ
(
x`2 − x̂2
) dp
dta
da`
dta +
dah
dta
+
ρ`
∂ψ(x`2,a`,s)
∂x`2
[
∂x`2
∂p
dp
dta +
∂x`2
∂a`
da`
dta +
∂x`2
∂s
ds
dta
]
+ δρh
∂ψ(xh2 ,ah,s)
∂xh2
[
∂xh2
∂p
dp
dta +
∂xh2
∂ah
dah
dta +
∂xh2
∂s
ds
dta
]
µ
[
da`
dta +
dah
dta
]
−
(p− c)
{
pi
[
∂x`2
∂p
dp
dta +
∂x`2
∂s
ds
dta
]
+ (1− pi)
[
∂xh2
∂p
dp
dta +
∂xh2
∂s
ds
dta
]}
da`
dta +
dah
dta
− (pa − g′1)
(
∂ah
∂pa +
∂a`
∂pa
)
(
dah
dta +
da`
dta
) dpa
dta
4.4. A model with data and advertising 91
Proof. See Appendix C.5.
Hence, we get an expression for the optimal ta which depends on three types of con-
siderations. On the right hand side of the expression above, the terms appearing
on the first line capture how self-selection considerations affect the optimal value
for ta. They depend both on the difference in consumption of good x2 by a low-
skilled and by a high-skilled mimicker, and on how a variation in ta is going to
affect, through the induced variations in ah and s, the incentives for a high-skilled
to behave as a mimicker. The terms contained in the second and third line capture
the non-welfaristic motives affecting the optimal choice for ta; these terms are due to
the fact that the government launders the individual preferences when evaluating
their utility. Finally, the terms contained in the last two lines capture the effect of a
variation in ta on the revenue obtained by the government through the tax levied on
the profits of the monopolist selling the good x2.
Leaving unchanged and adequately adapting the hypotheses made in the previous
case, we discuss hereafter the above formula when dp/dta > 0, dai/dta < 0, and
dxi/dta < 0.
Thus, the first line assumes a negative expression, if the low-skilled ones consume
more than high-skilled mimickers. On the contrary, when mimickers consume more,
self-selection considerations might end to call for a positive tax rate.
Furthermore, the second and third lines would favourite selecting a positive tax rate
on the consumption of good x2, because of “laundering" preferences by the govern-
ment.
Lastly, the effect on fiscal revenue would be negative due to the hypothesis that the
profits of the domestic firm selling good x2 are fully taxed. This negative impact
could be partially compensated (or enhanced) when the platform decreases (or in-
creases) the price for ads.
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4.4.2 Introducing ta when t is optimally chosen
In this last paragraph, we deal with the issue of introducing a tax on data when com-
modity taxation has been already optimally chosen. Thus, we are at an equilibrium
where t and T (I) are optimally levied, but ta = 0.
Suppose to have solved the government’s problem:
max
I`,B`,Ih,Bh,t
V`
(
q, B`, I`; a`, s
)
− ρ`ψ
(
x`2, a
`, s
)
subject to:
Vh
(
q, Bh, Ih; ah, s
)
− ρhψ
(
xh2 , a
h, s
)
≥ V,
Vh
(
q, Bh, Ih; ah, s
)
≥ Vh
(
q, B`, I`; ah, s
)
,
(
I` − B` + tx`2
)
pi +
(
Ih − Bh + txh2
)
(1− pi) + ta
(
ah + a`
)
+τ
{[
pix`2
(
q, a`, s
)
+ (1− pi) xh2
(
q, ah, s
)]
(p− c)−
(
ah + a`
)
(pa + ta)
}
≥ R.
Being at an initial equilibrium which is given by the solution to the above optimiza-
tion problem, consider a tax reform that marginally raises ta, starting from a value
which is by assumption equal to zero, while at the same time varying t according to:
dt = −
dp
dta
1+ dpdt
dta
where
dp
dta
≡ dp
dta
| ds=0
dpa=0
+
dp
dpa
dpa
dta
+
dp
ds
ds
dta
dp
dt
≡ dp
dt
| ds=0
dpa=0
+
dp
dpa
dpa
dt
+
dp
ds
ds
dt
4.4. A model with data and advertising 93
Notice that, by construction, the tax reform leaves unchanged the equilibrium value
for q = t + p (t, ta; pa, s). Also, the reform does not exert any effect on the self-
selection constraint.
Proposition 13 Defining dx
j
2
dta as
dxj2
dta ≡
∂xj2
∂aj
daj
dta +
∂xj2
∂s
ds
dta +
∂xj2
∂q
dp
dta and the elasticity eaj,pa as
eaj,pa ≡ da
j
dpa
pa
aj , we get the following expression, whose sign tells us whether introducing a
small tax on advertising is welfare-enhancing or not:(
q− c− ρ
`
µpi
∂ψ
(
x`2, a
`, s
)
∂x`2
)
pi
dx`2
dta
+
(
q− c− δρ
h
µ (1− pi)
∂ψ
(
xh2 , a
h, s
)
∂xh2
)
(1− pi) dx
h
2
dta
− ∑
j=`,h
(
1+ eaj,pa
)
aj dpadta +
λ
µ
(
x̂2 − x`2
) dp
dta (4.19)
Proof. See Appendix C.7.
The sign of the expression (4.19) tells us whether, starting from an initial optimum
where τ = 1 and both t and T (I) are optimally chosen, an introduction of a small tax
on advertising is welfare-enhancing or not. In particular, a small tax on advertising
will be welfare-enhancing if the sign of the above expression is positive; otherwise,
it will be a small subsidy on advertising that will prove to be welfare-enhancing.
On the first line, the term q − c − ρ`µpi
∂ψ(x`2,a`,s)
∂x`2
can be interpreted as the difference
between the consumer price for good 2 paid by low-skilled consumers and its “effec-
tive” marginal cost, which also includes the negative impact of a marginal increase
in the consumption of good 2 when individual utilities are evaluated according to
the laundered utility function used by the government. A similar interpretation ap-
plies for the term q − c − δρh
(1−pi)µ
∂ψ(xh2 ,ah,s)
∂xh2
, relative to high-skilled consumers. The
first term in the second line of the expression above captures instead the effect of the
proposed tax reform on the revenue collected by the government through the taxa-
tion of the profits of the domestic firm selling the good x2. Assuming that the tax ta is
partly shifted onto the platform, so that dpa/dta < 0, the sign of this budget effect is
positive (resp.: negative) if the elasticities eaj,pa (for j = h, `) are smaller (resp.: larger)
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than one in absolute value. The last term is a self-selection term that depends on the
difference between the amount of good x2 demanded by a true low-skilled and by a
high-skilled mimicker. Assuming that ρ` > ρh, i.e. that the behavior of low-skilled is
more easily affected by persuasive advertising, and noticing that from the first order
conditions (4.17)-(4.18) of the firm selling good x2 we have that
∂xh2
∂ah =
∂x`2
∂a` pi/ (1− pi).
One can conclude that, as long as the proportion of high-skilled agents is not too
large (i.e. pi/ (1− pi) is not too small), ah will be set at a value that is smaller than a`,
and therefore x̂2 − x`2 < 0. Then, we will have that the sign of the self-selection term
will be positive when dp/dta < 0.
4.5 Summary and concluding remarks
For what we know, the present work is the first attempt at formalizing, under the
optimal taxation framework, the idea that persuasive advertising may distort indi-
viduals’ utility in a way which is not reflected by government’s preferences. We have
tried to catch two aspects through an optimal taxation formula: the role of targeted
advertising in changing the perception of utility derived by the consumption of the
advertised good; and the distortion coming from monopoly.
By doing this, we have found that a positive commodity taxation may be justified,
although our results hold under strict assumptions on preferences. The formulae
that we have derived seek to correct three distortions: self-selection issues, persua-
sive advertising and market power.
In addition, we have considered the role of data in targeted advertising, evaluating
how the non-welfarist terms can justify a positive tax on commodity or directly on
ads.
Although it has not been possible to find a clear answer to the privacy issue since
the effect of taxes on data exploitation is not well-defined, it seems plausible that it
would decrease together with ads.
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Lastly, we have shown how the implementation of a tax on advertising jointly with
an optimal commodity tax might be welfare-enhancing, especially when mimicker
is more sensitive to ads compared to low-skilled agents. It is an interesting and fas-
cinating result if we think of targeting as a way to address customer better and in
a more efficient way. Traditional ads may be more effective to low-skilled, whereas
data exploitation may reverse the relative sensitivity of agents. Precisely why this
hypothesis deserves empirical tests.
We are aware of the embedded limitations of the present analysis, but at the same
time it can make governments reflect on opportunity to use fiscal tools to correct
eventually undesired effects related to digital advertising and data exploitation, par-
ticularly when they care more than individuals about privacy protection for instance.
Besides taxation, other instruments can be designed to address these issues, like new
laws to limit data mining or the use of nudges, but it is out of the scope of present
paper. We reserve to characterize jointly these aspects and optimal taxes in future
works, as well as the capacity for firms to discriminate prices.
Said that, we hope that our exposition will serve to shed a new light on how to deal
with the phenomenon of digitalization, and to widen its current research areas.
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Appendix A
Main derivations for Chapter 2
A.1 Derivation of comparative statics for a tax on platform’s
revenue
Starting from the FOCs of platform’s revenue:
(1− tr)xpa − ka = 0 (A.1)
(1− tr)xps − ks = 0 (A.2)
We can totally differentiate the above conditions and rewrite them into the matrix
form: (1− tr)xpaa − kaa (1− tr)xpas − kas
(1− tr)xpsa − ksa (1− tr)xpss − kss
da
ds
 =
xpadtr
xpsdtr

By assuming that the Hessian matrix is negative semidefinite. It can be expressed
as: Ωr = [(1− tr)xpaa − kaa] [(1− tr)xpss − kss]− [(1− tr)xpas − kas]2 > 0.
Thus, it is possible to show the effect of this tax on platform’s choices about a and s:
Ωr
da
dtr
= xpa[(1− tr)xpss − kss]− xps[(1− tr)xpas − kas] < 0 (A.3)
Ωr
ds
dtr
= xps[(1− tr)xpaa − kaa]− xpa[(1− tr)xpas − kas] < 0 (A.4)
A.2. Derivation of comparative statics for a VAT on platform’s revenue 99
A.2 Derivation of comparative statics for a VAT on platform’s
revenue
Starting from the FOCs of platform’s revenue:
xpa − ka(1+ τ) = 0 (A.5)
xps − ks(1+ τ) = 0 (A.6)
We can totally differentiate the above conditions and rewrite them into the matrix
form: xpaa − kaa(1+ τ) xpas − kas(1+ τ)
xpsa − ksa(1+ τ) xpss − kss(1+ τ)
da
ds
 =
kadτ
ksdτ

By assuming that the Hessian matrix is negative semidefinite, i.e. Ωτ > 0. Thus, it is
possible to show the effect of this tax on platform’s choices about a and s:
Ωτ
da
dtτ
= ka[xpss − kss(1+ τ)]− ks[xpas − kas(1+ τ)] < 0 (A.7)
Ωτ
ds
dtτ
= ks[xpaa − kaa(1+ τ)]− xpa[xpas − kas(1+ τ)] < 0 (A.8)
A.3 Derivation of comparative statics for a specific tax on ads
Starting from the FOCs of platform’s revenue:
xpa − ka − ta = 0 (A.9)
xps − ks = 0 (A.10)
We can totally differentiate the above conditions and rewrite them into the matrix
form: xpaa − kaa xpas − kas
xpsa − ksa xpss − kss
da
ds
 =
dta
0

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By assuming that the Hessian matrix is negative semidefinite, i.e. Ωta > 0. Thus, it
is possible to show the effect of this tax on platform’s choices about a and s:
Ωta
da
dta
= xpss − kss < 0 (A.11)
Ωta
ds
dta
= −xpas + kas < 0 (A.12)
A.4 Derivation of comparative statics for a specific tax on
data
Starting from the FOCs of platform’s revenue:
xpa − ka = 0 (A.13)
xps − ks − ts = 0 (A.14)
We can totally differentiate the above conditions and rewrite them into the matrix
form: xpaa − kaa xpas − kas
xpsa − ksa xpss − kss
da
ds
 =
 0
dts

By assuming that the Hessian matrix is negative semidefinite, i.e. Ωts > 0. Thus, it
is possible to show the effect of this tax on platform’s choices about a and s:
Ωts
da
dts
= −xpas + kas < 0 (A.15)
Ωts
ds
dts
= xpaa − kaa < 0 (A.16)
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A.5 Derivation of comparative statics for a turnover tax in
open economy
Starting from the FOCs of platform’s revenue:
(1− tr)xh pha − ka
∂a
∂ah
= 0
(1− tr)xh phs − ks
∂s
∂sh
= 0
x f p fa − ka ∂a
∂a f
= 0
x f p fs − ks ∂s
∂a f
= 0
where ∂s
∂si =
∂s
∂si = 1 with i = h, f .
We can totally differentiate the above conditions and rewrite them into the matrix
form:
(1− tr)xh paa − kaa ∂2a
∂ah2
−kaa ∂2a∂ah∂a f (1− tr)xh pas − kas ∂a∂s∂ah∂sh −kas ∂a∂s∂ah∂s f
−kaa ∂2a
∂ah2
x f paa − kaa ∂2a∂ah∂a f −kas ∂a∂s∂a f ∂sh x f pas − kas ∂a∂s∂a f ∂s f
(1− tr)xh pas − kas ∂a∂s∂ah∂sh −kas ∂a∂s∂a f ∂sh (1− tr)xh pss − kss ∂
2s
∂sh2
−kss ∂2s∂sh∂s f
−kas ∂a∂s∂ah∂s f x f pas − kas ∂a∂s∂a f ∂s f −kss ∂
2s
∂sh∂s f x
f pss − kss ∂2s
∂s f 2

∗

dah
da f
dsh
ds f

=

xh phadtr
0
xh phs dtr
0

We assume that the Hessian matrix is negative semidefinite, i.e. Ωopentr > 0 and
thereafter we consider only the case where marginal cost of ads ka is constant and
normalized to zero in order to avoid cumbersome calculations related to a matrix
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4× 4. Thus, it is possible to show the effects of this tax on platform’s choices about
a and s, home and abroad, result from the following:
(1− tr)xh paa 0 (1− tr)xh pas 0
0 x f paa 0 x f pas
(1− tr)xh pas 0 (1− tr)xh pss − kss ∂2s
∂sh2
−kss ∂2s∂sh∂s f
0 x f pas −kss ∂2s∂sh∂s f x f pss − kss ∂
2s
∂s f 2


dah
da f
dsh
ds f

=

xh phadtr
0
xh phs dtr
0

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Hence, one can derive immediately the effects of a tax on revenue on platform’s
choices at home and abroad:
Ωopentr
dah
dtr
= xh pha ∗ det
x
f paa 0 x f pas
0 (1− tr)xh pss − kss ∂2s
∂sh2
−kss ∂2s∂sh∂s f
x f pas −kss ∂2s∂sh∂s f x f pss − kss ∂
2s
∂s f 2

(−)
+ xh phs ∗ det
 0 (1− tr)x
h pas 0
x f paa 0 x f pas
x f pas −kss ∂2s∂sh∂s f x f pss − kss ∂
2s
∂s f 2

(+/−)
≷ 0
Ωopentr
da f
dtr
= −xh pha ∗ det
 0 0 x
f pas
(1− tr)xh pas (1− tr)xh pss − kss ∂2s
∂sh2
−kss ∂2s∂sh∂s f
0 −kss ∂2s∂sh∂s f x f pss − kss ∂
2s
∂s f 2

(+)
− xh phs ∗ det
(1− tr)x
h paa (1− tr)xh pas 0
0 0 x f pas
0 −kss ∂2s∂sh∂s f x f pss − kss ∂
2s
∂s f 2

(+)
< 0
Ωopentr
dsh
dtr
= xh pha ∗ det
 0 x
f paa x f pas
(1− tr)xh pas 0 −kss ∂2s∂sh∂s f
0 x f pas x f pss − kss ∂2s
∂s f 2

(+/−)
+ xh phs ∗ det
(1− tr)x
h paa 0 0
0 x f paa x f pas
0 x f pas x f pss − kss ∂2s
∂s f 2

(−)
≷ 0
Ωopentr
ds f
dtr
= −xh pha ∗ det
 0 x
f paa 0
(1− tr)xh pas 0 (1− tr)xh pss − kss ∂2s
∂sh2
0 x f pas −kss ∂2s∂sh∂s f

(+)
− xh phs ∗ det
(1− tr)xh paa 0 (1− tr)xh pas0 x f paa 0
0 x f pas −kss ∂2s∂sh∂s f

(+)
< 0
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A.6 Derivation of comparative statics for a specific tax on ads
or on data in open economy
By totally differentiating the first order conditions in presence of a tax on ads, ta, and
under the assumption that ka = 0 and that the Hessian matrix is negative semidefi-
nite, i.e. Ωopenta = Ω
open
ts > 0, we can rewrite them into the matrix form:
xh paa 0 xh pas 0
0 x f paa 0 x f pas
xh pas 0 xh pss − kss ∂2s
∂sh2
−kss ∂2s∂sh∂s f
0 x f pas −kss ∂2s∂sh∂s f x f pss − kss ∂
2s
∂s f 2


dah
da f
dsh
ds f

=

dta
0
dts
0

Hence, one can derive immediately the effects of a tax on advertising “intensity" on
platform’s choices at home and abroad:
Ωopenta
dah
dta
= det
x
f paa 0 x f pas
0 xh pss − kss ∂2s
∂sh2
−kss ∂2s∂sh∂s f
x f pas −kss ∂2s∂sh∂s f x f pss − kss ∂
2s
∂s f 2

(−)
< 0
Ωopenta
da f
dta
= −det
 0 0 x
f pas
xh pas xh pss − kss ∂2s
∂sh2
−kss ∂2s∂sh∂s f
0 −kss ∂2s∂sh∂s f x f pss − kss ∂
2s
∂s f 2

(+)
< 0
Ωopenta
dsh
dta
= det
 0 x
f paa x f pas
xh pas 0 −kss ∂2s∂sh∂s f
0 x f pas x f pss − kss ∂2s
∂s f 2

(+/−)
≷ 0
Ωopenta
ds f
dta
= −det
 0 x
f paa 0
xh pas 0 xh pss − kss ∂2s
∂sh2
0 x f pas −kss ∂2s∂sh∂s f

(+)
< 0
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Or, alternatively, one can derive immediately the effects of a tax on data exploitation
on platform’s choices at home and abroad:
Ωopents
dah
dts
= det
 0 x
h pas 0
x f paa 0 x f pas
x f pas −kss ∂2s∂sh∂s f x f pss − kss ∂
2s
∂s f 2

(+/−)
≷ 0
Ωopents
da f
dts
= −det
x
h paa xh pas 0
0 0 x f pas
0 −kss ∂2s∂sh∂s f x f pss − kss ∂
2s
∂s f 2

(+)
< 0
Ωopents
dsh
dts
= det
x
h paa 0 0
0 x f paa x f pas
0 x f pas x f pss − kss ∂2s
∂s f 2

(−)
< 0
Ωopents
ds f
dts
= −det
xh paa 0 xh pas0 x f paa 0
0 x f pas −kss ∂2s∂sh∂s f

(+)
< 0
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Appendix B
Main derivations for Chapter 3
B.1 Comparative statics for a change in expectation about data
exploitation
Totally differentiating the first order conditions of the platform, we get:
vsds− ψse − 2dZ− xpada− xpsds = 0
x(paada + pasds)2n + xpa [vsds− ψse dse + xpada + xpsds]− 2(kaada + kasds) = 0
(vssds + xpasda + xpssds)2n + (vs + xps) [vsds− ψse dse + paxda + xpsds]− 2(kasda + kssds) = 0
In matrix form:
−2 −xpa vs − xps
0 2nxpaa + x2 p2a − 2kaa 2nxpas + xpavs + x2 pa ps − 2kas
0 2nxpas + (vs + xps)xpa − 2kas 2n(vss + xpss) + (vs + xps)2 − 2kss


dZ
da
ds
 =
=

ψse dse
xpaψse dse
(vs + xps)ψse dse

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By assuming that conditions required for the Hessian matrix to be negative semidef-
inite hold, the determinant of the matrix above is defined as follows:
Ω = −2

[
2nxpaa + x2 p2a − 2kaa
] [
2n(vss + xpss) + (vs + xps)2 − 2kss
]
+
− [2nxpas + (vs + xps)xpa − 2kas]2
 < 0
It is possible to show the effect of this change in users’ expectation on platform’s
choices about Z, a and s:
dZ
dse
=

ψse(2nxpaa + x2 p2a − 2kaa)
[
2n(vss + xpss) + (vs + xps)2 − 2kss
]
+
−ψse
[
2nxpas + xpavs + x2 pa ps − 2kas
]2
+
+xpaψse(vs − xps) [2nxpas + (vs + xps)xpa − 2kas] +
+x2 p2aψse
[
2n(vss + xpss) + (vs + xps)2 − 2kss
]
+
−xpa(vs + xps)ψse +
[
2nxpas + xpavs + x2 pa ps − 2kas
]
+
−(v2s − x2 p2s )ψse
[
2nxpaa + x2 p2a − 2kaa
]

Ω
≷ 0
da
dse
=
 −2xpaψse
[
2n(vss + xpss) + (vs + xps)2 − 2kss
]
+
+2(vs + xps)ψse
[
2nxpas + xpavs + x2 pa ps − 2kas
]

Ω
< 0
ds
dse
=
 −2(vs + xps)ψse
[
2nxpaa + x2 p2a − 2kaa
]
+
+2xpaψse
[
2nxpas + xpavs + x2 pa ps − 2kas
]

Ω
< 0
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B.2 Comparative statics after the introduction of a unit tax
either on the access fee or on ads or on data
Totally differentiating the first order conditions of the platform, we get:
vsds− ψse − 2dZ− xpada− xpsds− dtZ = 0
2nx(paada + pasds) + xpa [vsds− ψse dse − dZ]− kaada− kasds− dta = 0
2n(vssds + xpasda + xpssds) + (vs + xps) [vsds− ψse dse − dZ]− kasda− kssds− dts = 0
In matrix form:
−2 −xpa vs − xps
−xpa 2nxpaa − kaa 2nxpas + xpavs − kas
−(vs + xps) 2nxpas − kas 2n(vss + xpss) + vs(vs + xps)− kss


dZ
da
ds
 =
=

ψse dse + dtZ
xpaψse dse + dta
(vs + xps)ψse dse + dts

By assuming that conditions required for the Hessian matrix to be negative semidef-
inite hold, i.e. Ω < 0, it is possible to show the effect following the introduction of a
tax the access fee, tZ, on platform’s choices about Z, a and s:
dZ
dtZ
=
(2nxpaa − kaa) [2n(vss + xpss) + vs(vs + xps)− kss] +−(2nxpas + xpavs − kas)(2nxpas − kas)

Ω
< 0
da
dtZ
=
−(vs + xps)(2nxpas + xpavs − kas) + xpa [2n(vss + xpss) + vs(vs + xps)− kss]
Ω
> 0
ds
dtZ
=
−xpa(2nxpas − kas) + (2nxpaa − kaa)(vs + xps)
Ω
> 0
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or subsequent to a tax on ads, ta:
dZ
dta
=
(vs − xps)(2nxpas − kas) + xpa [2n(vss + xpss) + vs(vs + xps)− kss]
Ω
≷ 0
da
dta
=
−2 [2n(vss + xpss) + vs(vs + xps)− kss] + v2s − x2 p2s
Ω
< 0
ds
dta
=
xpa(vs + xps) + 2(2nxpas − kas)
Ω
< 0
and a tax on data, ts:
dZ
dts
=
−xpa(2nxpas + xpavs − kas)− (vs − xps)(2nxpaa − kaa)
Ω
≷ 0
da
dts
=
−xpa(vs − xps) + 2(2nxpas + xpavs − kas)
Ω
≶ 0
ds
dts
=
−2(2nxpaa − kaa)− x2 p2a
Ω
< 0
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Appendix C
Main derivations for Chapter 4
C.1 Comparative statics for firm
Totally differentiating the set of first order conditions for the firm gives:
pi
∂x`2
∂B`
dB` + pi
∂x`2
∂a
da + pi
∂x`2
∂q
dp + pi
∂x`2
∂q
dt + (1− pi) ∂x
h
2
∂Bh
dBh
+ (1− pi) ∂x
h
2
∂q
(dp + dt) +
[
pi
∂x`2
∂q
+ (1− pi) ∂x
h
2
∂q
]
dp +
+ (p− c)pi ∂
2x`2
∂q∂B`
dB` + (p− c)pi ∂
2x`2
∂q∂a
da + (p− c)pi ∂
2x`2
∂q∂q
(dp + dt)
+ (p− c) (1− pi) ∂
2xh2
∂q∂Bh
dBh + (p− c) (1− pi) ∂
2xh2
∂q∂q
(dp + dt) = 0
pi
∂x`2
∂a
dp+(p− c)pi ∂
2x`2
∂a∂B`
dB`+(p− c)pi ∂
2x`2
∂a∂a
da+(p− c)pi ∂
2x`2
∂a∂q
(dp + dt)− θ′′ (a) da = 0
C.1. Comparative statics for firm 111
In matrix form we have:
2
[
pi
∂x`2
∂q + (1− pi)
∂xh2
∂q
]
+ (p− c)
[
pi
∂2x`2
∂q∂q + (1− pi)
∂2xh2
∂q∂q
]
pi
[
∂x`2
∂a + (p− c)
∂2x`2
∂q∂a
]
pi
[
∂x`2
∂a + (p− c)
∂2x`2
∂a∂q
]
(p− c)pi ∂2x`2∂a∂a − θ′′ (a)

dp
da

=


−pi
[
∂x`2
∂B`
+ (p− c) ∂2x`2
∂q∂B`
]
dB` − (1− pi)
[
∂xh2
∂Bh
+ (p− c) ∂2xh2
∂q∂Bh
]
dBh
−
[(
∂x`2
∂q + (p− c)
∂2x`2
∂q∂q
)
pi +
(
(p− c) ∂2xh2∂q∂q +
∂xh2
∂q
)
(1− pi)
]
dt

− (p− c)pi
[
∂2x`2
∂a∂B`
dB` + ∂
2x`2
∂a∂q dt
]

Define the Hessian matrix Ω as
Ω ≡
{[
pi
∂2x`2
∂q∂q
+ (1− pi) ∂
2xh2
∂q∂q
]
(p− c) +
(
pi
∂x`2
∂q
+ (1− pi) ∂x
h
2
∂q
)
2
}[
pi
∂2x`2
∂a∂a
(p− c)− θ′′ (a)
]
−pi2
[
∂x`2
∂a
+ (p− c) ∂
2x`2
∂q∂a
]2
> 0
We therefore get the following comparative statics results:
Ω
dp
dt
= pi2 (p− c) ∂
2x`2
∂q∂a
[
∂x`2
∂a
+ (p− c) ∂
2x`2
∂q∂a
]
−
[
pi
∂2x`2
∂a∂a
(p− c)− θ′′ (a)
] [
pi
∂x`2
∂q
+ (1− pi) ∂x
h
2
∂q
]
−
[
pi
∂2x`2
∂a∂a
(p− c)− θ′′ (a)
] [
pi
∂2x`2
∂q∂q
+ (1− pi) ∂
2xh2
∂q∂q
]
(p− c)
Ω
da
dt
=
[
pi
∂x`2
∂q
+ (1− pi) ∂x
h
2
∂q
] [
∂x`2
∂a
− (p− c) ∂
2x`2
∂q∂a
]
pi
+ (p− c) ∂x
`
2
∂a
[
pi
∂2x`2
∂q∂q
+ (1− pi) ∂
2xh2
∂q∂q
]
pi < 0
Ω
dp
dBh
= − (1− pi)
[
∂xh2
∂Bh
+ (p− c) ∂
2xh2
∂Bh∂q
] [
pi
∂2x`2
∂a∂a
(p− c)− θ′′ (a)
]
≥ 0
Ω
da
dBh
= pi (1− pi)
[
∂xh2
∂Bh
+ (p− c) ∂
2xh2
∂Bh∂q
] [
∂x`2
∂a
+ (p− c) ∂
2x`2
∂q∂a
]
≥ 0
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Ω
dp
dB`
= pi2 (p− c) ∂
2x`2
∂B`∂a
[
∂x`2
∂a
+ (p− c) ∂
2x`2
∂q∂a
]
−pi
[
∂x`2
∂B`
+ (p− c) ∂
2x`2
∂B`∂q
] [
pi
∂2x`2
∂a∂a
(p− c)− θ′′ (a)
]
≥ 0
Ω
da
dB`
= pi2
[
∂x`2
∂a
+ (p− c) ∂
2x`2
∂q∂a
] [
∂x`2
∂B`
+ (p− c) ∂
2x`2
∂B`∂q
]
−2pi (p− c) ∂
2x`2
∂B`∂a
[
pi
∂x`2
∂q
+ (1− pi) ∂x
h
2
∂q
]
−pi (p− c)2 ∂
2x`2
∂B`∂a
[
pi
∂2x`2
∂q∂q
+ (1− pi) ∂
2xh2
∂q∂q
]
≥ 0
C.2 Derivation of the optimal commodity tax rate
Denote the Lagrange multipliers associated to the three constraints above by, respec-
tively, δ, λ and µ. Denote by a “hat" a variable pertaining to a high-skilled behaving
as a mimicker. Define ∆ as:
∆ ≡ ∂V
`
∂q
− ∂ψ
∂x`2
∂x`2
∂q
+ (δ+ λ)
∂Vh
∂q
− λ∂V̂
∂q
+ µt
[
pi
∂x`2
∂q
+ (1− pi) ∂x
h
2
∂q
]
(C.1)
First order condition with respect to Bh:
(δ+ λ)
∂Vh
∂Bh
+ µ
[
t
∂xh2
∂Bh
− 1
]
(1− pi) +
[
µtpi − ∂ψ
∂x`2
]
∂x`2
∂a
da
dBh
+ ∆
dp
dBh
= 0
First order condition with respect to B`:
∂V`
∂B`
− ∂ψ
∂x`2
∂x`2
∂B`
− λ ∂V̂
∂B`
+ µ
[
t
∂x`2
∂B`
− 1
]
pi +
[
µtpi − ∂ψ
∂x`2
]
∂x`2
∂a
da
dB`
+ ∆
dp
dB`
= 0
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First order condition with respect to t:
∂V`
∂q
− ∂ψ
∂x`2
∂x`2
∂q
+ (δ+ λ)
∂Vh
∂q
− λ∂V̂
∂q
+ µt
[
pi
∂x`2
∂q
+ (1− pi) ∂x
h
2
∂q
]
+µ
[
pix`2 + (1− pi) xh2
]
+
[
µtpi − ∂ψ
∂x`2
]
∂x`2
∂a
da
dt
+ ∆
dp
dt
= 0 (C.2)
Denote Hicksian (compensated) demands by a “tilde" symbol; applying Roy’s iden-
tity1 and Slutsky equation2, we can rewrite (C.2) as:
− ∂ψ
∂x`2
∂x˜`2
∂q
+ λx̂2
∂V̂
∂B`
+ µt
[
pi
∂x˜`2
∂q
+ (1− pi) ∂x˜
h
2
∂q
]
+
[
µtpi − ∂ψ
∂x`2
]
∂x`2
∂a
da
dt
+ ∆
dp
dt
= x`2
∂V`
∂B`
− ∂ψ
∂x`2
∂x`2
∂B`
x`2 + (δ+ λ) x
h
2
∂Vh
∂Bh
+ µt
[
pix`2
∂x`2
∂B`
+ (1− pi) xh2
∂xh2
∂Bh
]
−µ
[
pix`2 + (1− pi) xh2
]
(C.3)
Rewrite the first order conditions with respect to Bh and B` by multiplying for xh2
and x`2 as, respectively:
(δ+ λ)
∂Vh
∂Bh
xh2 + µ
[
txh2
∂xh2
∂Bh
− xh2
]
(1− pi) = −
[
µtpi − ∂ψ
∂x`2
]
∂x`2
∂a
da
dBh
xh2 − ∆
dp
dBh
xh2
(C.4)
∂V`
∂B`
x`2−
∂ψ
∂x`2
∂x`2
∂B`
x`2+µ
[
tx`2
∂x`2
∂B`
− x`2
]
pi = λ
∂V̂
∂B`
x`2−
[
µtpi − ∂ψ
∂x`2
]
∂x`2
∂a
da
dB`
x`2−∆
dp
dB`
x`2
(C.5)
1It is x2(q, B) = − ∂V/∂q∂V/∂B .
2It is ∂x2∂q =
∂x˜2
∂q − x2 ∂x2∂B .
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Then we can use (C.4)-(C.5) to rewrite (C.3) as:
− ∂ψ
∂x`2
∂x˜`2
∂q
+ λx̂2
∂V̂
∂B`
+ µt
[
pi
∂x˜`2
∂q
+ (1− pi) ∂x˜
h
2
∂q
]
+
[
µtpi − ∂ψ
∂x`2
]
∂x`2
∂a
da
dt
+ ∆
dp
dt
= λ
∂V̂
∂B`
x`2 −
[
µtpi − ∂ψ
∂x`2
]
∂x`2
∂a
da
dB`
x`2 − ∆
dp
dB`
x`2 −
[
µtpi − ∂ψ
∂x`2
]
∂x`2
∂a
da
dBh
xh2 − ∆
dp
dBh
xh2 ,
(C.6)
or, equivalently:
∆
[
dp
dt
+
dp
dB`
x`2 +
dp
dBh
xh2
]
=
λ
∂V̂
∂B`
(
x`2 − x̂2
)
+
∂ψ
∂x`2
{
∂x˜`2
∂q
+
[
da
dt
+
da
dB`
x`2 +
da
dBh
xh2
]
∂x`2
∂a
}
(C.7)
−µt
{[
pi
∂x˜`2
∂q
+ (1− pi) ∂x˜
h
2
∂q
]
+ pi
[
da
dt
+
da
dB`
x`2 +
da
dBh
xh2
]
∂x`2
∂a
}
Now rewrite ∆ as defined in (C.1) as:
∆ ≡ −∂V
`
∂B`
x`2 +
∂ψ
∂x`2
∂x`2
∂B`
x`2 − µtpix`2
∂x`2
∂B`
− (δ+ λ) ∂V
h
∂Bh
xh2 − µt (1− pi) xh2
∂xh2
∂Bh
+µt
[
(1− pi) ∂x˜
h
2
∂q
+ pi
∂x˜`2
∂q
]
+ λ
∂V̂
∂B`
x̂2 − ∂ψ
∂x`2
∂x˜`2
∂q
Using (C.4)-(C.5) we can re-express ∆ as:
∆ ≡ −µpix`2 − λ
∂V̂
∂B`
x`2 + ∆
dp
dB`
x`2 +
[
µtpi − ∂ψ
∂x`2
]
∂x`2
∂a
da
dB`
x`2
−µ (1− pi) xh2 + ∆
dp
dBh
xh2 +
[
µtpi − ∂ψ
∂x`2
]
∂x`2
∂a
da
dBh
xh2
+µt
[
(1− pi) ∂x˜
h
2
∂q
+ pi
∂x˜`2
∂q
]
+ λ
∂V̂
∂B`
x̂2 − ∂ψ
∂x`2
∂x˜`2
∂q
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Therefore, we can write:
∆
[
1− dp
dB`
x`2 −
dp
dBh
xh2
]
= µt
[
(1− pi) ∂x˜
h
2
∂q
+ pi
∂x˜`2
∂q
]
+ λ
∂V̂
∂B`
(
x̂2 − x`2
)
− ∂ψ
∂x`2
∂x˜`2
∂q
− µ
[
pix`2 + (1− pi) xh2
]
+
[
µtpi − ∂ψ
∂x`2
] [
da
dB`
x`2 +
da
dBh
xh2
]
∂x`2
∂a
,
or, equivalently:
∆ =
[
1− dp
dB`
x`2 −
dp
dBh
xh2
]−1{
µt
[
(1− pi) ∂x˜
h
2
∂q
+ pi
∂x˜`2
∂q
]
+ λ
∂V̂
∂B`
(
x̂2 − x`2
)
− ∂ψ
∂x`2
∂x˜`2
∂q
}
−
[
1− dp
dB`
x`2 −
dp
dBh
xh2
]−1
µ
[
pix`2 + (1− pi) xh2
]
+
[
1− dp
dB`
x`2 −
dp
dBh
xh2
]−1 [ da
dB`
x`2 +
da
dBh
xh2
] [
µtpi − ∂ψ
∂x`2
]
∂x`2
∂a
Substituting the expression above into (C.7) and collecting terms gives:
−
dp
dt +
dp
dB` x
`
2 +
dp
dBh x
h
2
1− dpdB` x`2 −
dp
dBh x
h
2
µ
[
pix`2 + (1− pi) xh2
]
=
λ ∂V̂
∂B`
(
x`2 − x̂2
) (
1+ dpdt
)
1− dpdB` x`2 −
dp
dBh x
h
2
−
µt
[
pi
∂x˜`2
∂q + (1− pi) ∂x˜
h
2
∂q
] (
1+ dpdt
)
1− dpdB` x`2 −
dp
dBh x
h
2
+
∂ψ
∂x`2
∂x˜`2
∂q
(
1+ dpdt
)
1− dpdB` x`2 −
dp
dBh x
h
2
−
[
µtpi − ∂ψ
∂x`2
] da
dt
+
(
1+ dpdt
)
da
dB` x
`
2
1− dpdB` x`2 −
dp
dBh x
h
2
+
(
1+ dpdt
)
da
dBh x
h
2
1− dpdB` x`2 −
dp
dBh x
h
2
 ∂x`2
∂a
,
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or, equivalently:
µt
[
pi
∂x˜`2
∂q
+ (1− pi) ∂x˜
h
2
∂q
](
1+
dp
dt
)
=
λ
∂V̂
∂B`
(
x`2 − x̂2
)(
1+
dp
dt
)
+
∂ψ
∂x`2
∂x˜`2
∂q
(
1+
dp
dt
)
+ µ
[
pix`2 + (1− pi) xh2
] [dp
dt
+
dp
dB`
x`2 +
dp
dBh
xh2
]
−
[
da
dB`
x`2 +
da
dBh
xh2
] (
1+
dp
dt
)[
µtpi − ∂ψ
∂x`2
]
∂x`2
∂a
−
[
µtpi − ∂ψ
∂x`2
]
∂x`2
∂a
da
dt
[
1− dp
dB`
x`2 −
dp
dBh
xh2
]
. (C.8)
Noticing that from (4.5) we have
pix`2 + (1− pi) xh2 = −
[
pi
∂x`2
∂q
+ (1− pi) ∂x
h
2
∂q
]
(p− c) ,
we can rewrite (C.8) as
µt
[
pi
∂x˜`2
∂q
+ (1− pi) ∂x˜
h
2
∂q
](
1+
dp
dt
)
+µt
[(
da
dB`
x`2 +
da
dBh
xh2
)(
1+
dp
dt
)
+
da
dt
(
1− dp
dB`
x`2 −
dp
dBh
xh2
)]
pi
∂x`2
∂a
=
λ
∂V̂
∂B`
(
x`2 − x̂2
)(
1+
dp
dt
)
+
∂ψ
∂x`2
∂x˜`2
∂q
(
1+
dp
dt
)
− µ (p− c)
[
pi
∂x`2
∂q
+ (1− pi) ∂x
h
2
∂q
] [
dp
dt
+
dp
dB`
x`2 +
dp
dBh
xh2
]
+
{[
da
dB`
x`2 +
da
dBh
xh2
] (
1+
dp
dt
)
+
da
dt
[
1− dp
dB`
x`2 −
dp
dBh
xh2
]}
∂ψ
∂x`2
∂x`2
∂a
.
To simplify the interpretation of the optimality condition that we have derived above,
assume that the agents’ utility function is quasi-linear in x1 so that ∂x
j
2/∂q = ∂x˜
j
2/∂q
for j = `, h and da/dB` = da/dBh = dp/dB` = dp/dBh = 0. Then, the condition
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above simplifies to:
λ
∂V̂
∂B`
(
x̂2 − x`2
)(
1+
dp
dt
)
dt
+
∂ψ
∂x`2
[
∂x`2
∂a
da
dt
+
∂x`2
∂q
(
1+
dp
dt
)]
dt
−µ
[
pi
∂x`2
∂q
+ (1− pi) ∂x
h
2
∂q
]
(p− c) dp
dt
dt
Using the simplified expressions above, we get:
µt
{[
pi
∂x˜`2
∂q
+ (1− pi) ∂x˜
h
2
∂q
](
1+
dp
dt
)
+ pi
∂x`2
∂a
da
dt
}
=
λ
∂V̂
∂B`
(
x`2 − x̂2
)(
1+
dp
dt
)
+
[
∂x`2
∂a
da
dt
+
∂x˜`2
∂q
(
1+
dp
dt
)]
∂ψ
∂x`2
−µ
[
pi
∂x˜`2
∂q
+ (1− pi) ∂x˜
h
2
∂q
]
(p− c) dp
dt
. (C.9)
where
1+
dp
dt
=
(
pi
∂x`2
∂q + (1− pi) ∂x
h
2
∂q
) [
pi
∂2x`2
∂a∂a (p− c)− θ′′ (a)
]
− pi2
[
∂x`2
∂a +
∂2x`2
∂q∂a (p− c)
]
∂x`2
∂a
Ω
.
Finally, defining Υ as
Υ ≡
[
pi
∂x˜`2
∂q
+ (1− pi) ∂x˜
h
2
∂q
](
1+
dp
dt
)
+ pi
∂x`2
∂a
da
dt
,
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we can finally restate (C.9) as
t =
λ
µΥ
∂V̂
∂B`
(
x`2 − x̂2
)(
1+
dp
dt
)
+
1
µΥ
[
∂x`2
∂a
da
dt
+
∂x˜`2
∂q
(
1+
dp
dt
)]
∂ψ
∂x`2
− p− c
Υ
[
pi
∂x˜`2
∂q
+ (1− pi) ∂x˜
h
2
∂q
]
dp
dt
. (C.10)
C.3 Comparative statics for platform and monopolist with a
tax on commodity
Here we show the expression needed to understand the effect of a tax on commodity
through comparative statics. Totally differentiating the set of first order condition of
monopolist gives:
pi
∂x`2
∂B`
dB` + pi
∂x`2
∂a`
da` + pi
∂x`2
∂q
dp + pi
∂x`2
∂q
dt + pi
∂x`2
∂s
ds + (1− pi) ∂x
h
2
∂Bh
dBh
+ (1− pi) ∂x
h
2
∂ah
dah + (1− pi) ∂x
h
2
∂q
(dp + dt) + (1− pi) ∂x
h
2
∂s
ds
+
[
pi
∂x`2
∂q
+ (1− pi) ∂x
h
2
∂q
]
dp + (p− c)pi ∂
2x`2
∂q∂B`
dB`
+ (p− c)pi ∂
2x`2
∂q∂a`
da` + (p− c)pi ∂
2x`2
∂q∂s
ds + (p− c)pi ∂
2x`2
∂q∂q
(dp + dt)
+ (p− c) (1− pi) ∂
2xh2
∂q∂Bh
dBh + (p− c) (1− pi) ∂
2xh2
∂q∂ah
dah + (p− c) (1− pi) ∂
2xh2
∂q∂s
ds
+ (p− c) (1− pi) ∂
2xh2
∂q∂q
(dp + dt) = 0
(1− pi) ∂x
h
2
∂ah
dp + (p− c) (1− pi) ∂
2xh2
∂ah∂Bh
dBh + (p− c) (1− pi) ∂
2xh2
∂ah∂ah
+ (p− c) (1− pi) ∂
2xh2
∂ah∂s
ds + (p− c) (1− pi) ∂
2xh2
∂ah∂q
(dp + dt)− dpa = 0
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pi
∂x`2
∂a`
dp + (p− c)pi ∂
2x`2
∂a`∂B`
dBh + (p− c)pi ∂
2x`2
∂a`∂a`
+ (p− c)pi ∂
2x`2
∂a`∂s
ds + (p− c)pi ∂
2x`2
∂a`∂q
(dp + dt)− dpa = 0
In matrix form we have:
2
[
pi
∂x`2
∂q + (1− pi)
∂xh2
∂q
]
+ (p− c)
[
pi
∂2x`2
∂q∂q + (1− pi)
∂2xh2
∂q∂q
]
(1− pi)
[
∂xh2
∂ah
+ (p− c) ∂2xh2
∂q∂ah
]
pi
[
∂x`2
∂a`
+ (p− c) ∂2x`2
∂q∂a`
]
(1− pi)
[
∂xh2
∂ah
+ (p− c) ∂2xh2
∂ah∂q
]
(p− c) (1− pi) ∂2xh2
∂ah∂ah
0
pi
[
∂x`2
∂a`
+ (p− c) ∂2x`2
∂q∂a`
]
0 (p− c)pi ∂2x`2
∂a`∂a`


dp
dah
da`
 =


−pi
[
∂x`2
∂B`
+ (p− c) ∂2x`2
∂q∂B`
]
dB` − (1− pi)
[
∂xh2
∂Bh
+ (p− c) ∂2xh2
∂q∂Bh
]
dBh
−
[(
∂x`2
∂s + (p− c)
∂2x`2
∂q∂s
)
pi +
(
(p− c) ∂2xh2∂q∂s +
∂xh2
∂s
)
(1− pi)
]
ds
−
[(
∂x`2
∂q + (p− c)
∂2x`2
∂q∂q
)
pi +
(
(p− c) ∂2xh2∂q∂q +
∂xh2
∂q
)
(1− pi)
]
dt

− (p− c) (1− pi)
[
∂2xh2
∂a∂Bh
dBh + ∂
2xh2
∂ah∂q
dt + ∂
2xh2
∂ah∂s
ds
]
+ dpa
− (p− c)pi
[
∂2x`2
∂a∂B`
dB` + ∂
2x`2
∂a`∂q dt +
∂2x`2
∂a`∂s ds
]
+ dpa

Define HM as
HM ≡ Hessian matrix < 0
We therefore get the following comparative statics results:
dp
dt
| ds=0
dpa=0
≶ 0
dah
dt
| ds=0
dpa=0
≶ 0
da`
dt
| ds=0
dpa=0
≶ 0
dp
dpa
< 0 ,
dah
dpa
< 0 ,
da`
dpa
< 0
dp
ds
> 0 ,
dah
ds
> 0 ,
da`
ds
> 0
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It is possible to show that only the impact on variables p, ah and a` holding s and pa
fixed is ambiguous, while all other effects are well-defined.
Then totally differentiating the set of first order condition of platform gives:
2
(
∂ah
∂pa
+
∂a`
∂pa
)
dpa +
(
∂ah
∂s
+
∂a`
∂s
)
ds +
(
dah
dt
| ds=0
dpa=0
+
da`
dt
| ds=0
dpa=0
)
dt +
(
pa − g′′11
) ( ∂2ah
∂pa∂s
+
∂2a`
∂pa∂s
)
ds
+
(
pa − g′′11
) [( ∂2ah
∂pa∂pa
+
∂2a`
∂pa∂pa
)
dpa +
(
∂ah
∂pa
dah
dt
| ds=0
dpa=0
+
∂a`
∂pa
da`
dt
| ds=0
dpa=0
)
dt
]
− g′′12
(
∂ah
∂pa
+
∂a`
∂pa
)
ds = 0
(
pa − g′′11
) ( ∂2ah
∂s∂pa
+
∂2a`
∂s∂pa
)
dpa +
(
pa − g′′12
) ( ∂2ah
∂s∂s
+
∂2a`
∂s∂s
)
ds +
[
∂ah
∂s
+
∂a`
∂s
− g′′12
(
∂ah
∂pa
+
∂a`
∂pa
)]
dpa
+
(
pa − g′′11
) ( ∂ah
∂pa
dah
dt
| ds=0
dpa=0
+
∂a`
∂pa
da`
dt
| ds=0
dpa=0
)
dt− g′′ssds− g′′12
(
dah
dt
| ds=0
dpa=0
+
da`
dt
| ds=0
dpa=0
)
dt = 0
In matrix form we have:
2
(
∂ah
∂pa
+ ∂a
`
∂pa
)
+ (pa − g′′11)
(
∂2ah
∂pa∂pa
+ ∂
2a`
∂pa∂pa
)
(pa − g′′11)
(
∂2ah
∂s∂pa
+ ∂
2a`
∂s∂pa
)
+ ∂a
h
∂s +
∂a`
∂s − g′′12
(
∂ah
∂pa
+ ∂a
`
∂pa
)
(pa − g′′11)
(
∂2ah
∂s∂pa
+ ∂
2a`
∂s∂pa
)
+ ∂a
h
∂s +
∂a`
∂s − g′′12
(
∂ah
∂pa
+ ∂a
`
∂pa
)
(pa − g′′12)
(
∂2ah
∂s∂s +
∂2a`
∂s∂s
)
− g′′ss

dpa
ds
 =

−
[
dah
dt | ds=0
dpa=0
+ da
`
dt | ds=0
dpa=0
+ (pa − g′′11)
(
∂ah
∂pa
dah
dt | ds=0
dpa=0
+ ∂a
`
∂pa
da`
dt | ds=0
dpa=0
)]
dt
−
[
(pa − g′′11)
(
∂ah
∂pa
dah
dt | ds=0
dpa=0
+ ∂a
`
∂pa
da`
dt | ds=0
dpa=0
)
− g′′12
(
dah
dt | ds=0
dpa=0
+ da`dt | ds=0
dpa=0
)]
dt

Define HP as
HP ≡ Hessian matrix > 0
Now define the term which multiplies dt in the first line as β1 and that in the second
line as β2, then we get the following comparative statics results:
HP ∗ dpa
dt
= β1
[(
pa − g′′12
) ( ∂2ah
∂s∂s
+
∂2a`
∂s∂s
)
− g′′ss
]
−β2
[(
pa − g′′11
) ( ∂2ah
∂s∂pa
+
∂2a`
∂s∂pa
)
+
∂ah
∂s
+
∂a`
∂s
− g′′12
(
∂ah
∂pa
+
∂a`
∂pa
)]
HP ∗ ds
dt
= β2
[
2
(
∂ah
∂pa
+
∂a`
∂pa
)
+
(
pa − g′′11
) ( ∂2ah
∂pa∂pa
+
∂2a`
∂pa∂pa
)]
−β1
[(
pa − g′′11
) ( ∂2ah
∂s∂pa
+
∂2a`
∂s∂pa
)
+
∂ah
∂s
+
∂a`
∂s
− g′′12
(
∂ah
∂pa
+
∂a`
∂pa
)]
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We can state that they have the opposite sign when both βs have the same sign, that
is negative for βs positive and positive when they are negative, whereas their sign is
ambiguous if they differ each other.
C.4 Derivation of the optimal commodity tax rate in a model
with data
Start at an optimum where t = 0 and the nonlinear income tax is optimally chosen
(i.e. the two first order conditions above apply). Then consider a tax reform that
marginally increases t while at the same time adjusting B` and Bh by, respectively,
dB` = x`2dt and dB
h = xh2dt. Consider the effects on the Lagrangian of the govern-
ment’s problem. We have:
[
∂V`
∂q
(
1+
dp
dt
)
+
∂V`
∂B`
x`2
]
dt− ρ` ∂ψ
(
x`2, a
`, s
)
∂x`2
[
∂x`2
∂q
(
1+
dp
dt
)
+
∂x`2
∂a`
da`
dt
+
∂x`2
∂s
ds
dt
]
dt
+δ
{[
∂Vh
∂q
(
1+
dp
dt
)
+
∂Vh
∂Bh
xh2
]
dt− ρh ∂ψ
(
xh2 , a
h, s
)
∂xh2
[
∂xh2
∂q
(
1+
dp
dt
)
+
∂xh2
∂ah
dah
dt
+
∂xh2
∂s
ds
dt
]
dt
}
+λ
[
∂Vh
∂q
(
1+
dp
dt
)
+
∂Vh
∂Bh
xh2
]
dt− λρh
[
∂ψ
(
xh2 , a
h, s
)
∂ah
dah
dt
+
∂ψ
(
xh2 , a
h, s
)
∂s
ds
dt
]
dt
−λ
[
∂V̂
∂q
(
1+
dp
dt
)
+
∂V̂
∂B`
x`2
]
dt + λρh
[
∂ψ
(
x̂2, ah, s
)
∂ah
dah
dt
+
∂ψ
(
x̂2, ah, s
)
∂s
ds
dt
]
dt
+µ (p− c)
{
pi
[
∂x`2
∂q
(
1+
dp
dt
)
+
∂x`2
∂a`
da`
dt
+
∂x`2
∂s
ds
dt
]
+ (1− pi)
[
∂xh2
∂q
(
1+
dp
dt
)
+
∂xh2
∂ah
dah
dt
+
∂xh2
∂s
ds
dt
]}
dt
+µ
{[
pix`2
(
B`, p + t, a`, s
)
+ (1− pi) xh2
(
Bh, p + t, ah, s
)] dp
dt
−
[(
ah + a`
) dpa
dt
+ pa
(
dah
dt
+
da`
dt
)]}
dt
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Using Roy’s identity and the first order conditions with respect to Bh and B` the
expression above can be rewritten as:
[
−x`2
∂V`
∂B`
(
1+
dp
dt
)
+
∂V`
∂B`
x`2
]
dt− ρ` ∂ψ
(
x`2, a
`, s
)
∂x`2
[
∂x`2
∂q
(
1+
dp
dt
)
+
∂x`2
∂a`
da`
dt
+
∂x`2
∂s
ds
dt
]
dt
+δ
{[
−xh2
∂Vh
∂Bh
(
1+
dp
dt
)
+
∂Vh
∂Bh
xh2
]
dt− ρh ∂ψ
(
xh2 , a
h, s
)
∂xh2
[
∂xh2
∂q
(
1+
dp
dt
)
+
∂xh2
∂ah
dah
dt
+
∂xh2
∂s
ds
dt
]
dt
}
+λ
[
−xh2
∂Vh
∂Bh
(
1+
dp
dt
)
+
∂Vh
∂Bh
xh2
]
dt− λρh
[
∂ψ
(
xh2 , a
h, s
)
∂ah
dah
dt
+
∂ψ
(
xh2 , a
h, s
)
∂s
ds
dt
]
dt
−λ
[
−x̂2 ∂V̂
∂B`
(
1+
dp
dt
)
+
∂V̂
∂B`
x`2
]
dt + λρh
[
∂ψ
(
x̂2, ah, s
)
∂ah
dah
dt
+
∂ψ
(
x̂2, ah, s
)
∂s
ds
dt
]
dt
+µ (p− c)
{
pi
[
∂x`2
∂q
(
1+
dp
dt
)
+
∂x`2
∂a`
da`
dt
+
∂x`2
∂s
ds
dt
]
+ (1− pi)
[
∂xh2
∂q
(
1+
dp
dt
)
+
∂xh2
∂ah
dah
dt
+
∂xh2
∂s
ds
dt
]}
dt
+µ
{[
pix`2
(
B`, p + t, a`, s
)
+ (1− pi) xh2
(
Bh, p + t, ah, s
)] dp
dt
−
[(
ah + a`
) dpa
dt
+ pa
(
dah
dt
+
da`
dt
)]}
dt
Simplifying terms we get:
−x`2
∂V`
∂B`
dp
dt
dt− (δ+ λ) xh2
∂Vh
∂Bh
dp
dt
dt
−ρ` ∂ψ
(
x`2, a
`, s
)
∂x`2
[
∂x`2
∂q
(
1+
dp
dt
)
+
∂x`2
∂a`
da`
dt
+
∂x`2
∂s
ds
dt
]
dt
−δρh ∂ψ
(
xh2 , a
h, s
)
∂xh2
[
∂xh2
∂q
(
1+
dp
dt
)
+
∂xh2
∂ah
dah
dt
+
∂xh2
∂s
ds
dt
]
dt
−λρh
[
∂ψ
(
xh2 , a
h, s
)
∂ah
dah
dt
+
∂ψ
(
xh2 , a
h, s
)
∂s
ds
dt
]
dt
−λ
[
−x̂2 ∂V̂
∂B`
(
1+
dp
dt
)
+
∂V̂
∂B`
x`2
]
dt + λρh
[
∂ψ
(
x̂2, ah, s
)
∂ah
dah
dt
+
∂ψ
(
x̂2, ah, s
)
∂s
ds
dt
]
dt
+µ (p− c)
{
pi
[
∂x`2
∂q
(
1+
dp
dt
)
+
∂x`2
∂a`
da`
dt
+
∂x`2
∂s
ds
dt
]
+ (1− pi)
[
∂xh2
∂q
(
1+
dp
dt
)
+
∂xh2
∂ah
dah
dt
+
∂xh2
∂s
ds
dt
]}
dt
+µ
{[
pix`2
(
B`, p + t, a`, s
)
+ (1− pi) xh2
(
Bh, p + t, ah, s
)] dp
dt
−
[(
ah + a`
) dpa
dt
+ pa
(
dah
dt
+
da`
dt
)]}
dt
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Using the first order conditions3 with respect to Bh and B` the expression above can
be rewritten as:
λ
∂V̂
∂B`
[
x̂2 − x`2
] (
1+
dp
dt
)
dt− µ
[
pix`2 + (1− pi) xh2
] dp
dt
dt
−ρ` ∂ψ
(
x`2, a
`, s
)
∂x`2
[
∂x`2
∂q
(
1+
dp
dt
)
+
∂x`2
∂a`
da`
dt
+
∂x`2
∂s
ds
dt
]
dt
−δρh ∂ψ
(
xh2 , a
h, s
)
∂xh2
[
∂xh2
∂q
(
1+
dp
dt
)
+
∂xh2
∂ah
dah
dt
+
∂xh2
∂s
ds
dt
]
dt
−λρh
[(
∂ψ
(
xh2 , a
h, s
)
∂ah
− ∂ψ
(
x̂2, ah, s
)
∂ah
)
dah
dt
+
(
∂ψ
(
xh2 , a
h, s
)
∂s
− ∂ψ
(
x̂2, ah, s
)
∂s
)
ds
dt
]
dt
+µ (p− c)
{
pi
[
∂x`2
∂q
(
1+
dp
dt
)
+
∂x`2
∂a`
da`
dt
+
∂x`2
∂s
ds
dt
]
+ (1− pi)
[
∂xh2
∂q
(
1+
dp
dt
)
+
∂xh2
∂ah
dah
dt
+
∂xh2
∂s
ds
dt
]}
dt
+µ
{[
pix`2
(
B`, p + t, a`, s
)
+ (1− pi) xh2
(
Bh, p + t, ah, s
)] dp
dt
−
[(
ah + a`
) dpa
dt
+ pa
(
dah
dt
+
da`
dt
)]}
dt
Using the first order conditions for profit maximization of the monopolist allows us
to rewrite the expression above as
λ
∂V̂
∂B`
[
x̂2 − x`2
] (
1+
dp
dt
)
dt
−ρ` ∂ψ
(
x`2, a
`, s
)
∂x`2
[
∂x`2
∂q
(
1+
dp
dt
)
+
∂x`2
∂a`
da`
dt
+
∂x`2
∂s
ds
dt
]
dt
−δρh ∂ψ
(
xh2 , a
h, s
)
∂xh2
[
∂xh2
∂q
(
1+
dp
dt
)
+
∂xh2
∂ah
dah
dt
+
∂xh2
∂s
ds
dt
]
dt
−λρh
[(
∂ψ
(
xh2 , a
h, s
)
∂ah
− ∂ψ
(
x̂2, ah, s
)
∂ah
)
dah
dt
+
(
∂ψ
(
xh2 , a
h, s
)
∂s
− ∂ψ
(
x̂2, ah, s
)
∂s
)
ds
dt
]
dt
+µ (p− c)
{
pi
[
∂x`2
∂q
(
1+
dp
dt
)
+
∂x`2
∂s
ds
dt
]
+ (1− pi)
[
∂xh2
∂q
(
1+
dp
dt
)
v +
∂xh2
∂s
ds
dt
]}
dt
−µ
(
ah + a`
) dpa
dt
dt
3They are respectively: (δ+ λ) ∂V
h
∂Bh = µ(1− pi) and ∂V
`
∂B` = µpi.
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Using the first order condition of the platform we can rewrite the expression above
as
λ
∂V̂
∂B`
[
x̂2 − x`2
] (
1+
dp
dt
)
dt
−ρ` ∂ψ
(
x`2, a
`, s
)
∂x`2
[
∂x`2
∂q
(
1+
dp
dt
)
+
∂x`2
∂a`
da`
dt
+
∂x`2
∂s
ds
dt
]
dt
−δρh ∂ψ
(
xh2 , a
h, s
)
∂xh2
[
∂xh2
∂q
(
1+
dp
dt
)
+
∂xh2
∂ah
dah
dt
+
∂xh2
∂s
ds
dt
]
dt
−λρh
[(
∂ψ
(
xh2 , a
h, s
)
∂ah
− ∂ψ
(
x̂2, ah, s
)
∂ah
)
dah
dt
+
(
∂ψ
(
xh2 , a
h, s
)
∂s
− ∂ψ
(
x̂2, ah, s
)
∂s
)
ds
dt
]
dt
+µ (p− c)
{
pi
[
∂x`2
∂q
(
1+
dp
dt
)
+
∂x`2
∂s
ds
dt
]
+ (1− pi)
[
∂xh2
∂q
(
1+
dp
dt
)
+
∂xh2
∂s
ds
dt
]}
dt
+µ
(
∂ah
∂pa
+
∂a`
∂pa
) (
pa − g′1
) dpa
dt
dt
Or again
λ
∂V̂
∂B`
[
x̂2 − x`2
] (
1+
dp
dt
)
dt
−ρ` ∂ψ
(
x`2, a
`, s
)
∂x`2
[
∂x`2
∂q
(
1+
dp
dt
)
+
∂x`2
∂a`
da`
dt
+
∂x`2
∂s
ds
dt
]
dt
−δρh ∂ψ
(
xh2 , a
h, s
)
∂xh2
[
∂xh2
∂q
(
1+
dp
dt
)
+
∂xh2
∂ah
dah
dt
+
∂xh2
∂s
ds
dt
]
dt
−λρh
[(
∂ψ
(
xh2 , a
h, s
)
∂ah
− ∂ψ
(
x̂2, ah, s
)
∂ah
)
dah
dt
+
(
∂ψ
(
xh2 , a
h, s
)
∂s
− ∂ψ
(
x̂2, ah, s
)
∂s
)
ds
dt
]
dt
+µ (p− c)
{
pi
[
∂x`2
∂q
(
1+
dp
dt
)
+
∂x`2
∂s
ds
dt
]
+ (1− pi)
[
∂xh2
∂q
(
1+
dp
dt
)
+
∂xh2
∂s
ds
dt
]}
dt
+µg′2
(
∂ah
∂pa +
∂a`
∂pa
)
(
∂ah
∂s +
∂a`
∂s
) dpa
dt
dt
When the reform is performed starting at a value for t which is different from zero,
an additional effect needs to be considered. This effect, which stems from the fact
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that the reform exerts an effect on the commodity tax revenue collected by the gov-
ernment, is given by:
µt
{
pi
[
∂x`2
∂q
(
1+
dp
dt
)
+
∂x`2
∂a`
da`
dt
+
∂x`2
∂s
ds
dt
]
+ (1− pi)
[
∂xh2
∂q
(
1+
dp
dt
)
+
∂xh2
∂ah
dah
dt
+
∂xh2
∂s
ds
dt
]}
Therefore, when t is optimally chosen, the following equation will hold:
µt
{
pi
[
∂x`2
∂q
(
1+
dp
dt
)
+
∂x`2
∂a`
da`
dt
+
∂x`2
∂s
ds
dt
]
+ (1− pi)
[
∂xh2
∂q
(
1+
dp
dt
)
+
∂xh2
∂ah
dah
dt
+
∂xh2
∂s
ds
dt
]}
=
λ
∂V̂
∂B`
(
x`2 − x̂2
)(
1+
dp
dt
)
+ρ`
∂ψ
(
x`2, a
`, s
)
∂x`2
[
∂x`2
∂q
(
1+
dp
dt
)
+
∂x`2
∂a`
da`
dt
+
∂x`2
∂s
ds
dt
]
+δρh
∂ψ
(
xh2 , a
h, s
)
∂xh2
[
∂xh2
∂q
(
1+
dp
dt
)
+
∂xh2
∂ah
dah
dt
+
∂xh2
∂s
ds
dt
]
+λρh
[(
∂ψ
(
xh2 , a
h, s
)
∂ah
− ∂ψ
(
x̂2, ah, s
)
∂ah
)
dah
dt
+
(
∂ψ
(
xh2 , a
h, s
)
∂s
− ∂ψ
(
x̂2, ah, s
)
∂s
)
ds
dt
]
−µ (p− c)
{
pi
[
∂x`2
∂q
(
1+
dp
dt
)
+
∂x`2
∂s
ds
dt
]
+ (1− pi)
[
∂xh2
∂q
(
1+
dp
dt
)
+
∂xh2
∂s
ds
dt
]}
−µ
(
∂ah
∂pa
+
∂a`
∂pa
) (
pa − g′1
) dpa
dt
Defining Ξ as
Ξ ≡ pi
[
∂x`2
∂q
(
1+
dp
dt
)
+
∂x`2
∂a`
da`
dt
+
∂x`2
∂s
ds
dt
]
+ (1− pi)
[
∂xh2
∂q
(
1+
dp
dt
)
+
∂xh2
∂ah
dah
dt
+
∂xh2
∂s
ds
dt
]
=
[
pi
∂x`2
∂q
+ (1− pi) ∂x
h
2
∂q
](
1+
dp
dt
)
+
[
pi
∂x`2
∂s
+ (1− pi) ∂x
h
2
∂s
]
ds
dt
+ pi
∂x`2
∂a`
da`
dt
+ (1− pi) ∂x
h
2
∂ah
dah
dt
,
we have (taking into account that, due to the assumed quasi-linear specification
of individual preferences, ∂V̂/∂B` = 1,
∂ψ(xh2 ,ah,s)
∂ah =
∂ψ(x̂2,ah,s)
∂ah and
∂ψ(xh2 ,ah,s)
∂s =
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∂ψ(x̂2,ah,s)
∂s , since the amount of consumed commodity is the same):
t =
λ
µΞ
(
x`2 − x̂2
)(
1+
dp
dt
)
+
ρ`
µΞ
∂ψ
(
x`2, a
`, s
)
∂x`2
[
∂x`2
∂q
(
1+
dp
dt
)
+
∂x`2
∂a`
da`
dt
+
∂x`2
∂s
ds
dt
]
+
δρh
µΞ
∂ψ
(
xh2 , a
h, s
)
∂xh2
[
∂xh2
∂q
(
1+
dp
dt
)
+
∂xh2
∂ah
dah
dt
+
∂xh2
∂s
ds
dt
]
− p− c
Ξ
{[
pi
∂x`2
∂q
+ (1− pi) ∂x
h
2
∂q
](
1+
dp
dt
)
+
[
pi
∂x`2
∂s
+ (1− pi) ∂x
h
2
∂s
]
ds
dt
}
− pa − g
′
1
Ξ
(
∂ah
∂pa
+
∂a`
∂pa
)
dpa
dt
.
C.5 Derivation of the optimal advertising tax rate in a model
with data exploitation
Start at an optimum where ta = 0 and the nonlinear income tax is optimally chosen
(i.e. the two first order conditions above apply). Then consider a tax reform that
marginally increases ta. Now we do not need to adjust B` and Bh. Then, consider
the effects on the Lagrangian of the government’s problem. We have:
∂V`
∂p
dp
dta
dta − ρ` ∂ψ
(
x`2, a
`, s
)
∂x`2
[
∂x`2
∂p
dp
dta
+
∂x`2
∂a`
da`
dta
+
∂x`2
∂s
ds
dta
]
dta
+δ
{
∂Vh
∂p
dp
dta
dta − ρh ∂ψ
(
xh2 , a
h, s
)
∂xh2
[
∂xh2
∂p
dp
dta
+
∂xh2
∂ah
dah
dta
+
∂xh2
∂s
ds
dta
]
dta
}
+λ
∂Vh
∂p
dp
dta
dta − λρh
[
∂ψ
(
xh2 , a
h, s
)
∂ah
dah
dta
+
∂ψ
(
xh2 , a
h, s
)
∂s
ds
dta
]
dta
−λ ∂V̂
∂p
dp
dta
dta + λρh
[
∂ψ
(
x̂2, ah, s
)
∂ah
dah
dta
+
∂ψ
(
x̂2, ah, s
)
∂s
ds
dta
]
dta
+µ (p− c)
{
pi
[
∂x`2
∂p
dp
dta
+
∂x`2
∂a`
da`
dta
+
∂x`2
∂s
ds
dta
]
+ (1− pi)
[
∂xh2
∂p
dp
dta
+
∂xh2
∂ah
dah
dta
+
∂xh2
∂s
ds
dta
]}
dta
+µ
{[
pix`2 + (1− pi) xh2
] dp
dta
−
[(
ah + a`
) dpa
dta
+ pa
(
dah
dta
+
da`
dta
)]}
dta
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Using Roy’s identity and the first order conditions with respect to Bh and B` the
expression above can be rewritten as:
−x`2
∂V`
∂B`
dp
dta
dta − ρ` ∂ψ
(
x`2, a
`, s
)
∂x`2
[
∂x`2
∂p
dp
dta
+
∂x`2
∂a`
da`
dta
+
∂x`2
∂s
ds
dta
]
dta
+δ
{
−xh2
∂Vh
∂Bh
dp
dta
dta − ρh ∂ψ
(
xh2 , a
h, s
)
∂xh2
[
∂xh2
∂p
dp
dta
+
∂xh2
∂ah
dah
dta
+
∂xh2
∂s
ds
dta
]
dta
}
−λxh2
∂Vh
∂Bh
dp
dta
dta − λρh
[
∂ψ
(
xh2 , a
h, s
)
∂ah
dah
dta
+
∂ψ
(
xh2 , a
h, s
)
∂s
ds
dta
]
dta
+λx̂2
∂V̂
∂B`
dp
dta
dta + λρh
[
∂ψ
(
x̂2, ah, s
)
∂ah
dah
dta
+
∂ψ
(
x̂2, ah, s
)
∂s
ds
dta
]
dta
+µ (p− c)
{
pi
[
∂x`2
∂p
dp
dta
+
∂x`2
∂a`
da`
dta
+
∂x`2
∂s
ds
dta
]
+ (1− pi)
[
∂xh2
∂p
dp
dta
+
∂xh2
∂ah
dah
dta
+
∂xh2
∂s
ds
dta
]}
dta
+µ
{[
pix`2 + (1− pi) xh2
] dp
dta
−
[(
ah + a`
) dpa
dta
+ pa
(
dah
dta
+
da`
dta
)]}
dta
Using the first order conditions for monopolist, the expression above can be rewrit-
ten as:
λ
∂V̂
∂B`
[
x̂2 − x`2
] dp
dta
dta − ρ` ∂ψ
(
x`2, a
`, s
)
∂x`2
[
∂x`2
∂p
dp
dta
+
∂x`2
∂a`
da`
dta
+
∂x`2
∂s
ds
dta
]
dta
−δρh ∂ψ
(
xh2 , a
h, s
)
∂xh2
[
∂xh2
∂p
dp
dta
+
∂xh2
∂ah
dah
dta
+
∂xh2
∂s
ds
dta
]
dta
−λρh
[(
∂ψ
(
xh2 , a
h, s
)
∂ah
− ∂ψ
(
x̂2, ah, s
)
∂ah
)
dah
dta
+
(
∂ψ
(
xh2 , a
h, s
)
∂s
− ∂ψ
(
x̂2, ah, s
)
∂s
)
ds
dta
]
dta
+µ (p− c)
{
pi
[
∂x`2
∂p
dp
dta
+
∂x`2
∂s
ds
dta
]
+ (1− pi)
[
∂xh2
∂p
dp
dta
+
∂xh2
∂s
ds
dta
]}
dta
−µ
(
ah + a`
) dpa
dta
dta + µta
(
∂ah
∂ta
+
∂a`
∂ta
)
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Using the first order condition of the platform we can rewrite the expression above
as
λ
∂V̂
∂B`
[
x̂2 − x`2
] dp
dta
dta − ρ` ∂ψ
(
x`2, a
`, s
)
∂x`2
[
∂x`2
∂p
dp
dta
+
∂x`2
∂a`
da`
dta
+
∂x`2
∂s
ds
dta
]
dta
−δρh ∂ψ
(
xh2 , a
h, s
)
∂xh2
[
∂xh2
∂p
dp
dta
+
∂xh2
∂ah
dah
dta
+
∂xh2
∂s
ds
dta
]
dta
−λρh
[(
∂ψ
(
xh2 , a
h, s
)
∂ah
− ∂ψ
(
x̂2, ah, s
)
∂ah
)
dah
dta
+
(
∂ψ
(
xh2 , a
h, s
)
∂s
− ∂ψ
(
x̂2, ah, s
)
∂s
)
ds
dta
]
dta
+µ (p− c)
{
pi
[
∂x`2
∂p
dp
dta
+
∂x`2
∂s
ds
dta
]
+ (1− pi)
[
∂xh2
∂p
dp
dta
+
∂xh2
∂s
ds
dta
]}
dta
+µ
(
∂ah
∂pa
+
∂a`
∂pa
) (
pa − g′1
) dpa
dta
dta + µta
(
∂ah
∂ta
+
∂a`
∂ta
)
Or again
λ
∂V̂
∂B`
[
x̂2 − x`2
] dp
dta
dta − ρ` ∂ψ
(
x`2, a
`, s
)
∂x`2
[
∂x`2
∂p
dp
dta
+
∂x`2
∂a`
da`
dta
+
∂x`2
∂s
ds
dta
]
dta
−δρh ∂ψ
(
xh2 , a
h, s
)
∂xh2
[
∂xh2
∂p
dp
dta
+
∂xh2
∂ah
dah
dta
+
∂xh2
∂s
ds
dta
]
dta
−λρh
[(
∂ψ
(
xh2 , a
h, s
)
∂ah
− ∂ψ
(
x̂2, ah, s
)
∂ah
)
dah
dta
+
(
∂ψ
(
xh2 , a
h, s
)
∂s
− ∂ψ
(
x̂2, ah, s
)
∂s
)
ds
dta
]
dta
+µ (p− c)
{
pi
[
∂x`2
∂p
dp
dta
+
∂x`2
∂s
ds
dta
]
+ (1− pi)
[
∂xh2
∂p
dp
dta
+
∂xh2
∂s
ds
dta
]}
dta
+µg′2
(
∂ah
∂pa +
∂a`
∂pa
)
(
∂ah
∂s +
∂a`
∂s
) dpa
dta
dta + µta
(
∂ah
∂ta
+
∂a`
∂ta
)
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Therefore, when ta is optimally chosen, the following equation will hold:
µta
(
∂ah
∂ta
+
∂a`
∂ta
)
= λ
∂V̂
∂B`
[
x`2 − x̂2
] dp
dta
+ ρ`
∂ψ
(
x`2, a
`, s
)
∂x`2
[
∂x`2
∂p
dp
dta
+
∂x`2
∂a`
da`
dta
+
∂x`2
∂s
ds
dta
]
+δρh
∂ψ
(
xh2 , a
h, s
)
∂xh2
[
∂xh2
∂p
dp
dta
+
∂xh2
∂ah
dah
dta
+
∂xh2
∂s
ds
dta
]
+λρh
[(
∂ψ
(
xh2 , a
h, s
)
∂ah
− ∂ψ
(
x̂2, ah, s
)
∂ah
)
dah
dta
+
(
∂ψ
(
xh2 , a
h, s
)
∂s
− ∂ψ
(
x̂2, ah, s
)
∂s
)
ds
dta
]
−µ (p− c)
{
pi
[
∂x`2
∂p
dp
dta
+
∂x`2
∂s
ds
dta
]
+ (1− pi)
[
∂xh2
∂p
dp
dta
+
∂xh2
∂s
ds
dta
]}
−µ
(
∂ah
∂pa
+
∂a`
∂pa
) (
pa − g′1
) dpa
dta
Defining Ψ as
Ψ ≡
(
∂ah
∂ta
+
∂a`
∂ta
)
,
we have (taking into account that, due to the assumed quasi-linear specification
of individual preferences, ∂V̂/∂B` = 1,
∂ψ(xh2 ,ah,s)
∂ah =
∂ψ(x̂2,ah,s)
∂ah and
∂ψ(xh2 ,ah,s)
∂s =
∂ψ(x̂2,ah,s)
∂s , since the amount of consumed commodity is the same):
ta =
λ
µΨ
(
x`2 − x̂2
) dp
dta
+
ρ`
µΨ
∂ψ
(
x`2, a
`, s
)
∂x`2
[
∂x`2
∂p
dp
dta
+
∂x`2
∂a`
da`
dt
+
∂x`2
∂s
ds
dt
]
+
δρh
µΨ
∂ψ
(
xh2 , a
h, s
)
∂xh2
[
∂xh2
∂p
dp
dta
+
∂xh2
∂ah
dah
dt
+
∂xh2
∂s
ds
dt
]
− p− c
Ψ
[
pi
(
∂x`2
∂p
dp
dta
+
∂x`2
∂s
ds
dta
)
+ (1− pi)
(
∂xh2
∂p
dp
dta
+
∂xh2
∂s
ds
dta
)]
− pa − g
′
1
Ψ
(
∂ah
∂pa
+
∂a`
∂pa
)
dpa
dta
.
C.6 Comparative statics for platform and monopolist with a
tax on ads
Here we show the expression needed to understand the effect of a tax on commodity
through comparative statics. Totally differentiating the set of first order condition of
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monopolist gives:
pi
(
∂x`2
∂B`
dB` +
∂x`2
∂p
dp +
∂x`2
∂a`
da` +
∂x`2
∂s
ds
)
+ (1− pi)
(
∂xh2
∂Bh
dBh +
∂xh2
∂p
dp +
∂xh2
∂ah
dah +
∂xh2
∂s
ds
)
+
[
pi
∂x`2
∂p
+ (1− pi) ∂x
h
2
∂p
]
dp + (p− c)pi
(
∂2x`2
∂p∂B`
dB` +
∂2x`2
∂p∂p
dp +
∂2x`2
∂p∂a`
da` +
∂2x`2
∂p∂s
ds
)
+ (p− c) (1− pi)
[
∂2xh2
∂p∂Bh
dBh +
∂2xh2
∂p∂p
dp +
∂2xh2
∂p∂ah
dah +
∂2xh2
∂p∂s
ds
]
= 0
(1− pi)
[
∂xh2
∂ah
dp + (p− c)
(
∂2xh2
∂ah∂Bh
dBh +
∂2xh2
∂ah∂p
dp +
∂2xh2
∂ah∂ah
dah +
∂2xh2
∂ah∂s
ds
)]
− dpa − dta = 0
pi
[
∂x`2
∂a`
dp + (p− c)
(
∂2x`2
∂a`∂B`
dBh +
∂2x`2
∂a`∂p
dp +
∂2x`2
∂a`∂a`
+
∂2x`2
∂a`∂s
ds
)]
− dpa − dta = 0
In matrix form we have:
2
[
pi
∂x`2
∂p + (1− pi)
∂xh2
∂p
]
+ (p− c)
[
pi
∂2x`2
∂p∂p + (1− pi)
∂2xh2
∂p∂p
]
(1− pi)
[
∂xh2
∂ah
+ (p− c) ∂2xh2
∂p∂ah
]
pi
[
∂x`2
∂a`
+ (p− c) ∂2x`2
∂p∂a`
]
(1− pi)
[
∂xh2
∂ah
+ (p− c) ∂2xh2
∂ah∂p
]
(p− c) (1− pi) ∂2xh2
∂ah∂ah
0
pi
[
∂x`2
∂a`
+ (p− c) ∂2x`2
∂p∂a`
]
0 (p− c)pi ∂2x`2
∂a`∂a`


dp
dah
da`
 =

−
[(
∂x`2
∂s + (p− c)
∂2x`2
∂p∂s
)
pi +
(
(p− c) ∂2xh2∂q∂s +
∂xh2
∂s
)
(1− pi)
]
ds
− (p− c) (1− pi) ∂2xh2
∂ah∂s
ds + dpa + dta
− (p− c)pi ∂2x`2∂a`∂s ds + dpa + dta

Define HM as
HM ≡ Hessian matrix < 0
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We therefore get the following comparative statics results:
dp
dta
| ds=0
dpa=0
< 0
dah
dta
| ds=0
dpa=0
< 0
da`
dta
| ds=0
dpa=0
< 0
dp
dpa
< 0 ,
dah
dpa
< 0 ,
da`
dpa
< 0
dp
ds
> 0 ,
dah
ds
> 0 ,
da`
ds
> 0
Then totally differentiating the set of first order condition of platform (it is equal to
the previous case) gives:
2
(
∂ah
∂pa
+
∂a`
∂pa
)
dpa +
(
∂ah
∂s
+
∂a`
∂s
)
ds +
(
dah
dt
| ds=0
dpa=0
+
da`
dt
| ds=0
dpa=0
)
dta +
(
pa − g′′11
) ( ∂2ah
∂pa∂s
+
∂2a`
∂pa∂s
)
ds
+
(
pa − g′′11
) [( ∂2ah
∂pa∂pa
+
∂2a`
∂pa∂pa
)
dpa +
(
∂ah
∂pa
dah
dt
| ds=0
dpa=0
+
∂a`
∂pa
da`
dta
| ds=0
dpa=0
)
dt
]
− g′′12
(
∂ah
∂pa
+
∂a`
∂pa
)
ds = 0
(
pa − g′′11
) ( ∂2ah
∂s∂pa
+
∂2a`
∂s∂pa
)
dpa +
(
pa − g′′12
) ( ∂2ah
∂s∂s
+
∂2a`
∂s∂s
)
ds +
[
∂ah
∂s
+
∂a`
∂s
− g′′12
(
∂ah
∂pa
+
∂a`
∂pa
)]
dpa
+
(
pa − g′′11
) ( ∂ah
∂pa
dah
dta
| ds=0
dpa=0
+
∂a`
∂pa
da`
dta
| ds=0
dpa=0
)
dta − g′′ssds− g′′12
(
dah
dta
| ds=0
dpa=0
+
da`
dta
| ds=0
dpa=0
)
dta = 0
In matrix form we have:
2
(
∂ah
∂pa
+ ∂a
`
∂pa
)
+ (pa − g′′11)
(
∂2ah
∂pa∂pa
+ ∂
2a`
∂pa∂pa
)
(pa − g′′11)
(
∂2ah
∂s∂pa
+ ∂
2a`
∂s∂pa
)
+ ∂a
h
∂s +
∂a`
∂s − g′′12
(
∂ah
∂pa
+ ∂a
`
∂pa
)
(pa − g′′11)
(
∂2ah
∂s∂pa
+ ∂
2a`
∂s∂pa
)
+ ∂a
h
∂s +
∂a`
∂s − g′′12
(
∂ah
∂pa
+ ∂a
`
∂pa
)
(pa − g′′12)
(
∂2ah
∂s∂s +
∂2a`
∂s∂s
)
− g′′ss

dpa
ds
 =

−
[
dah
dta
| ds=0
dpa=0
+ da
`
dta
| ds=0
dpa=0
+ (pa − g′′11)
(
∂ah
∂pa
dah
dta
| ds=0
dpa=0
+ ∂a
`
∂pa
da`
dta
| ds=0
dpa=0
)]
dta
−
[
(pa − g′′11)
(
∂ah
∂pa
dah
dta
| ds=0
dpa=0
+ ∂a
`
∂pa
da`
dta
| ds=0
dpa=0
)
− g′′12
(
dah
dta
| ds=0
dpa=0
+ da`dta | ds=0dpa=0
)]
dta

Define HP as
HP ≡ Hessian matrix > 0
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Now define the term which multiplies dta in the first line as β1 and that in the second
line as β2, then we get the following comparative statics results:
HP ∗ dpa
dt
= β1
[(
pa − g′′12
) ( ∂2ah
∂s∂s
+
∂2a`
∂s∂s
)
− g′′ss
]
−β2
[(
pa − g′′11
) ( ∂2ah
∂s∂pa
+
∂2a`
∂s∂pa
)
+
∂ah
∂s
+
∂a`
∂s
− g′′12
(
∂ah
∂pa
+
∂a`
∂pa
)]
HP ∗ ds
dt
= β2
[
2
(
∂ah
∂pa
+
∂a`
∂pa
)
+
(
pa − g′′11
) ( ∂2ah
∂pa∂pa
+
∂2a`
∂pa∂pa
)]
−β1
[(
pa − g′′11
) ( ∂2ah
∂s∂pa
+
∂2a`
∂s∂pa
)
+
∂ah
∂s
+
∂a`
∂s
− g′′12
(
∂ah
∂pa
+
∂a`
∂pa
)]
Differently from the previous case, here the sign of β2 is negative, while the sign of
β1 is not well-defined. Therefore, we can state that when β1 is negative too, both
price for ads and data exploitation moves positively, whereas their sign remains
ambiguous if β1 is negative and moreover they can move opposite each other.
C.7 Derivation of effects on welfare subsequent the intro-
duction of ta when t is optimal
Defining Γj as:
Γj ≡ −ρj
∂ψ
(
xj2, a
j, s
)
∂xj2
[
∂xj2
∂aj
(
∂aj
∂ta
− ∂a
j
∂t
dp
dta
1+ dpdt
)
+
∂xj2
∂s
(
∂s
∂ta
− ∂s
∂t
dp
dta
1+ dpdt
)]
,
C.7. Derivation of effects on welfare subsequent the introduction of ta when t is
optimal
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we have that the total effect of the reform on the Lagrangian will be given by:(
δΓh + Γ`
)
/µ
+tpi
[
∂x`2
∂a`
(
da`
dta
− da
`
dt
dp
dta
1+ dpdt
)
+
∂x`2
∂s
(
ds
dta
− ds
dt
dp
dta
1+ dpdt
)]
+t (1− pi)
[
∂xh2
∂ah
(
dah
dta
− da
h
dt
dp
dta
1+ dpdt
)
+
∂xh2
∂s
(
ds
dta
− ds
dt
dp
dta
1+ dpdt
)]
−
[
pix`2 + (1− pi) xh2
] dp
dta
1+ dpdt
+
(
ah + a`
)
+ (p− c)pi
[
∂x`2
∂a`
(
da`
dta
− da
`
dt
dp
dta
1+ dpdt
)
+
∂x`2
∂s
(
ds
dta
− ds
dt
dp
dta
1+ dpdt
)]
+ (p− c) (1− pi)
[
∂xh2
∂ah
(
dah
dta
− da
h
dt
dp
dta
1+ dpdt
)
+
∂xh2
∂s
(
ds
dta
− ds
dt
dp
dta
1+ dpdt
)]
+
[
pix`2 + (1− pi) xh2
] ( dp
dta
−
dp
dta
1+ dpdt
dp
dt
)
−
(
ah + a`
)(
1+
dpa
dta
−
dp
dta
1+ dpdt
dpa
dt
)
− pa
[
da`
dta
− da
`
dt
dp
dta
1+ dpdt
+
dah
dta
− da
h
dt
dp
dta
1+ dpdt
]
.
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Simplifying terms we can rewrite the above expression as:(
δΓh + Γ`
)
/µ
+tpi
[
∂x`2
∂a`
(
da`
dta
− da
`
dt
dp
dta
1+ dpdt
)
+
∂x`2
∂s
(
ds
dta
− ds
dt
dp
dta
1+ dpdt
)]
+t (1− pi)
[
∂xh2
∂ah
(
dah
dta
− da
h
dt
dp
dta
1+ dpdt
)
+
∂xh2
∂s
(
ds
dta
− ds
dt
dp
dta
1+ dpdt
)]
+ (p− c)pi
[
∂x`2
∂a`
(
da`
dta
− da
`
dt
dp
dta
1+ dpdt
)
+
∂x`2
∂s
(
ds
dta
− ds
dt
dp
dta
1+ dpdt
)]
+ (p− c) (1− pi)
[
∂xh2
∂ah
(
dah
dta
− da
h
dt
dp
dta
1+ dpdt
)
+
∂xh2
∂s
(
ds
dta
− ds
dt
dp
dta
1+ dpdt
)]
−
(
ah + a`
)(dpa
dta
−
dp
dta
1+ dpdt
dpa
dt
)
− pa
[
da`
dta
− da
`
dt
dp
dta
1+ dpdt
+
dah
dta
− da
h
dt
dp
dta
1+ dpdt
]
.
Now define
A` ≡ pi
[
∂x`2
∂a`
(
da`
dta
− da
`
dt
dp
dta
1+ dpdt
)
+
∂x`2
∂s
(
ds
dta
− ds
dt
dp
dta
1+ dpdt
)]
= − piΓ
`
ρ`
∂ψ(x`2,a`,s)
∂x`2
,
(C.11)
Ah ≡ (1− pi)
[
∂xh2
∂ah
(
dah
dta
− da
h
dt
dp
dta
1+ dpdt
)
+
∂xh2
∂s
(
ds
dta
− ds
dt
dp
dta
1+ dpdt
)]
= − (1− pi) Γ
h
ρh
∂ψ(xh2 ,ah,s)
∂xh2
.
(C.12)
We can then rewrite our expression for the total effect of the reform on the La-
grangian of the government’s problem as follows:(
q− c− ρ
`
µpi
∂ψ
(
x`2, a
`, s
)
∂x`2
)
A` +
(
q− c− δρ
h
µ (1− pi)
∂ψ
(
xh2 , a
h, s
)
∂xh2
)
Ah
− ∑
j=`,h
aj
(
dpa
dta −
dp
dta
1+ dpdt
dpa
dt
)
− pa ∑
j=`,h
(
daj
dta − da
j
dt
dp
dta
1+ dpdt
)
. (C.13)
C.7. Derivation of effects on welfare subsequent the introduction of ta when t is
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If (C.13) is positive, then the introduction of a tax on advertising proves to be welfare-
enhancing. If it is negative, it is instead a small subsidy on advertising which is
welfare-enhancing. Notice also that, when ta = 0, the optimal value for t is implic-
itly characterized by the following condition:(
q− c− ρ
`
µpi
∂ψ
(
x`2, a
`, s
)
∂x`2
)[
∂x`2
∂q
(
1+
dp
dt
)
+
∂x`2
∂a`
da`
dt
+
∂x`2
∂s
ds
dt
]
pi +
+
(
q− c− δρ
h
(1− pi) µ
∂ψ
(
xh2 , a
h, s
)
∂xh2
)[
∂xh2
∂q
(
1+
dp
dt
)
+
∂xh2
∂ah
dah
dt
+
∂xh2
∂s
ds
dt
]
(1− pi)
+
λ
µ
(
x̂2 − x`2
)(
1+
dp
dt
)
= ∑
j=`,h
(
aj dpadt +
daj
dt pa
)
. (C.14)
Now rewrite (C.13) as follows:(
q− c− ρ
`
µpi
∂ψ
(
x`2, a
`, s
)
∂x`2
)
A` +
(
q− c− δρ
h
µ (1− pi)
∂ψ
(
xh2 , a
h, s
)
∂xh2
)
Ah
− ∑
j=`,h
(
aj dpadta +
daj
dta pa
)
+ ∑
j=`,h
(
aj dpadt +
daj
dt pa
) dp
dta
1+ dpdt
. (C.15)
Plugging into (C.15) the value for ∑
j=`,h
(
aj dpadt +
daj
dt pa
)
provided by (C.14), one can
rewrite (C.15) as follows:(
q− c− ρ
`
µpi
∂ψ
(
x`2, a
`, s
)
∂x`2
)
A` +
(
q− c− δρ
h
µ (1− pi)
∂ψ
(
xh2 , a
h, s
)
∂xh2
)
Ah
− ∑
j=`,h
(
aj dpadta +
daj
dta pa
)
+
(
q− c− ρ
`
µpi
∂ψ
(
x`2, a
`, s
)
∂x`2
)[
∂x`2
∂q
(
1+
dp
dt
)
+
∂x`2
∂a`
da`
dt
+
∂x`2
∂s
ds
dt
]
pi
dp
dta
1+ dpdt
+
(
q− c− δρ
h
(1− pi) µ
∂ψ
(
xh2 , a
h, s
)
∂xh2
)[
∂xh2
∂q
(
1+
dp
dt
)
+
∂xh2
∂ah
dah
dt
+
∂xh2
∂s
ds
dt
]
(1− pi)
dp
dta
1+ dpdt
+
λ
µ
(
x̂2 − x`2
)(
1+
dp
dt
) dp
dta
1+ dpdt
.
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Using the definition of A` and Ah provided by (C.11) and (C.12), and simplifying
and collecting terms, the expression above boils down to:(
q− c− ρ
`
µpi
∂ψ
(
x`2, a
`, s
)
∂x`2
)(
∂x`2
∂a`
da`
dta
+
∂x`2
∂s
ds
dta
+
∂x`2
∂q
dp
dta
)
pi
+
(
q− c− δρ
h
µ (1− pi)
∂ψ
(
xh2 , a
h, s
)
∂xh2
)(
∂xh2
∂ah
dah
dta
+
∂xh2
∂s
ds
dta
+
∂xh2
∂q
dp
dta
)
(1− pi)
− ∑
j=`,h
(
aj dpadta +
daj
dta pa
)
+ λµ
(
x̂2 − x`2
) dp
dta .
Finally, defining dx
j
2
dta as
dxj2
dta ≡
∂xj2
∂aj
daj
dta +
∂xj2
∂s
ds
dta +
∂xj2
∂q
dp
dta and the elasticity eaj,pa as eaj,pa ≡
daj
dpa
pa
aj , we can rewrite the expression above as:(
q− c− ρ
`
µpi
∂ψ
(
x`2, a
`, s
)
∂x`2
)
pi
dx`2
dta
+
(
q− c− δρ
h
µ (1− pi)
∂ψ
(
xh2 , a
h, s
)
∂xh2
)
(1− pi) dx
h
2
dta
− ∑
j=`,h
(
1+ eaj,pa
)
aj dpadta +
λ
µ
(
x̂2 − x`2
) dp
dta .
